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Preface
Agency theory recommends ﬁrms to ﬁlter out systematic risks in evaluating
the performance of the agents. This practice permits ﬁrms to reduce the
compensation risk that arises from the volatility of systematic risk factors and
makes the agents' contract more eﬃcient. Firms are however exposed to a
variety of diﬀerent exogenous risks, such as commodity prices, exchange rates
or macroeconomic factors, and it is not evident to ﬁlter out these elements
from an executive's compensation. In fact, the numerous empirical studies
in this branch of the literature have so far found no clear evidence that ﬁrms
actually ﬁlter out systematic risks as recommended by agency theory.
The ﬁrst part of this thesis is dedicated to this discrepancy between theory
and practice and provides a literature review of empirical studies on rela-
tive performance evaluation (RPE). The focus of the survey is to describe
the most prominent explanations for the RPE puzzle, i.e. I investigate how
researchers explain the missing evidence in favor of RPE despite its theo-
retical advantages. More precisely, I summarize the existing empirical re-
search to describe how the optimality of implementing RPE can depend on
many aspects, such as strategic considerations, CEO-speciﬁc characteristics
or managerial power.
The main part of the thesis then investigates a particular diﬃculty that arises
if a ﬁrm tries to ﬁlter out systematic risks and what this implicates in terms of
eﬃcient contracting. Namely, I study how the ﬁrms' exposure to systematic
risks varies over time and how this prevents eﬃcient ﬁltering. To do so, I
investigate two relevant forms of common risk ﬁltering, RPE and the removal
of foreign exchange rate movements from ﬁrm performance.
Relative performance evaluation (RPE) aims to ﬁlter out the systematic risks
by evaluating the agent's performance relative to the performance of a peer
group. The reasoning behind this approach is that ﬁrms are exposed to
common risks and observing the performance of the peer group provides
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information on the extent of the exogenous shock. This allows ﬁrms to ﬁlter
the common risks from their own performance, even if the common risk
factors are not directly measurable (Holmström, 1982). However, a time-
varying exposure to systematic risks could preclude the complete ﬁltering in
a RPE setting. I address this concern in the second paper of this thesis.
To do so, I estimate in a ﬁrst step the exposure of a ﬁrm's performance to the
performance of potential peer ﬁrms in order to construct a ﬁrm-speciﬁc peer
group. Second, I investigate how the volatility in the exposure can aﬀect the
composition and aggregation of a peer group over time. Finally, I show how
these movements in the peer group composition and aggregation can reduce
the eﬀectiveness of the ﬁltering purpose in RPE settings.
If common risk factors are perfectly measurable, such as commodity prices
or foreign exchange rates, the systematic risk can theoretically be perfectly
eliminated from measures of ﬁrms performance. The executive's performance
should then be evaluated net of the inﬂuence of common risk to avoid reward
for (observable) luck (Bertrand and Mullainathan, 2001). In the last part of
the thesis, I address this topic and investigate the foreign exchange rate ex-
posures of Swiss ﬁrms. As a small and export-oriented country, the currency
exchange rates are particularly important for Switzerland and therefore rep-
resent a relevant common risk factor for Swiss ﬁrms.
More precisely, the third study measures the exchange rate exposure of Swiss
ﬁrms to its most relevant export and import currencies and assesses its vari-
ation over time. I ﬁnd that the ﬁrm-level exposure varies considerably over
time and that the volatility in the exposure limits the ability to ﬁlter out
currency risks. This can lead to wrong decisions with regard to risk ﬁltering
and hedging activities, respectively.
Overall, the ﬁndings in this thesis show that a time-varying exposure to
systematic risks precludes perfect ﬁltering. In the worst case, trying to ﬁlter
out common risk factors from a ﬁrm performance to reduce its variance can
even be counterproductive due to the time-variation of the risk exposure, i.e.
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ﬁltering can even increase the variance of the ﬁrm performance instead of
reducing it.
This has important implications for the use of RPE. A ﬁrm not only needs
to know how it is exposed to systematic risks, but as well how their exposure
varies over time. Ignoring this aspect might lead to wrong decision making.
And even if ﬁrms are aware of the exposure volatility, they need to evaluate
whether it is still optimal for them to ﬁlter out systematic risks or not.
3
Survey on empirical RPE tests
Abstract
This paper provides a literature review of empirical studies on relative per-
formance evaluation (RPE). The focus of this survey is to describe the most
prominent explanations for the RPE puzzle, i.e. I investigate how researchers
explain the missing evidence in favor of RPE despite its theoretical ad-
vantages. Namely, I summarize the existing empirical research to describe
how the optimality of implementing RPE depends on many aspects, such as
strategic considerations, CEO-speciﬁc characteristics or managerial power.
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1 Introduction
According to agency theory, the use of relative performance evaluation pro-
vides clear beneﬁts. Many ﬁrms reward their executives for absolute ﬁrm
performance to align the interests of the shareholder with those of the exec-
utives. The absolute ﬁrm performance is however noisy, since it is aﬀected
by external factors beyond the manager's control. In a RPE setting, the
principal rewards the agent not only based on the ﬁrm's own performance,
but also on the performance of a peer group. This combined performance
measure removes the common risks without reducing the agent's incentives,
which increases the overall eﬃciency of the contract (Holmström, 1982).
Empirical researchers have consequently investigated whether ﬁrms actually
use RPE as predicted by theory. The numerous attempts to detect RPE
have however largely been unsuccessful. This lack of evidence in favor of
RPE stands in contrast to its theoretical predication and has become know
as the RPE puzzle (see e.g. Gibbons and Murphy (1990) or Rajgopal et al.
(2006)). Numerous researchers have attempted to resolve this puzzle by
investigating possible explanations for the absence of RPE.
In the present survey, I provide an overview of the existing empirical RPE
studies and how they explain the RPE puzzle. In a ﬁrst step, I review the
empirical methodology of the prevailing RPE tests by describing two typical
examples of such studies. This allows to assess the question how the studies
diﬀer from each other in terms of methodology and builds a foundation for
the analysis of the RPE puzzle. Second, I describe possible explanations
for the RPE puzzle that have been empirically investigated in the academic
literature.
The empirical literature on RPE has been rapidly growing during the last
two decades and a single survey cannot cover each and every of these studies.
Thus, I need to make some restrictions in the scope of this paper. I collect
the most prevailing explanations for the RPE puzzle and classify them into
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three diﬀerent categories. This categorization is of course just one possible
approach out of many, but it can help the reader to get an overview of the
topic. For each category I pick some representative studies and present the
researchers' main hypotheses, their regression model, the test they use and
their main ﬁndings.
One of the most prevalent hypothesis to explain the lack of RPE as failures
in corporate governance, as e.g. in Bebchuk et al. (2002) or Bertrand and
Mullainathan (2001). In this view, the ﬁltering of external risks is optimal,
but agents with some power over the pay-setting process prevent the imple-
mentation of RPE in their contract. A second widely spread explanation
for the RPE puzzle is that RPE creates incentives for manipulation. For
example, Aggarwal and Samwick (1999a) describe a setting where the prin-
cipal adjusts the agent's exposure to the peer group performance to account
for its competitive position in the product market. Another example is the
setting in Gopalan et al. (2010), where the agents can take actions to aﬀect
the ﬁrm's exposure to the peer group performance. I use the term strategic
considerations to refer to all kind of such manipulations. One diﬀerence to
the corporate governance explanation is that, due to strategic considerations,
it might be optimal for a ﬁrm not to do RPE.
Third, some authors argue that the use of RPE depends on the CEO hedg-
ing possibilities or CEO outside options, e.g. Garvey and Milbourn (2003) or
Oyer (2004). The beneﬁts of RPE are generally acknowledged in those pa-
pers, but the extent to which it is optimal for a ﬁrm to provide such a contract
to the executive, depends on their individual characteristics or actions.
The objective of the present survey is to provide a useful overview of the
existing literature on empirical RPE tests and their explanation for the RPE
puzzle. The survey looks at the RPE puzzle from diﬀerent points of view,
which is in my opinion important to better understand a problem and to
be able to deal with the proposed solutions in a critical and diﬀerentiated
way. It can thus serve as starting point for interested readers and researchers
and might as well give new ideas for further research. The reminder of
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the paper is organized as follows. The next section brieﬂy describes the
theoretical framework for RPE. Section 3 reviews the empirical approach of
typical RPE tests. Section 4 presents some relevant studies in detail. Section
5 summarizes and concludes the survey.
2 Theoretical foundations of RPE
2.1 The performance-based contract
Agency theory builds the framework for the investigation of executive com-
pensation contracts, which includes RPE contracts. The starting point is a
principal, who hires an agent to run a ﬁrm. This ﬁrm belongs to the principal,
who is typically represented by the shareholders or the board of directors.
The principal is interested in maximizing the ﬁrm performance x, which is
composed of the following three terms (as e.g. in Dikolli et al. (2013)):
x = ax + cx · η + x (1)
The agent can positively aﬀect the expected ﬁrm performance E(x) by exert-
ing a personal eﬀort ax. However, providing an eﬀort ax is personally costly
to the agent. The personal costs are measured by the function C(ax), which
is strictly convex in ax. Additionally, x depends on a systematic risk com-
ponent η. This can be viewed as a market-wide risk factor, such as foreign
exchange rates, commodity prices or other macroeconomic conditions. cx is
the ﬁrm's exposure to this systematic risk, i.e. the degree to which the ﬁrm's
performance reacts to external shocks. It is assumed that the agent cannot
control cx · η. Finally, the term x reﬂects uncontrollable ﬁrm-speciﬁc risks.
It is in the best interest of the shareholders to motivate the agent to provide
some eﬀort. Because the eﬀort is not directly observable, the principal can-
not write a contract based on ax to obtain the desired level of the agent's
eﬀort. Instead, the principal oﬀers her a performance-based compensation
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s(x) which is linearly increasing in x.
s(x) = w + vx · x (2)
w is a ﬁxed wage and vx is the agent's share of the ﬁrm performance x. The
contract of the form s(x) has the following consequences. On the one hand it
becomes costly for the principal to provide incentives for the agent to exert
eﬀort. An increase of x has to be shared with the agent as her compensation
is increasing in x. On the other hand, awarding the manager for the ﬁrm
performance makes the contract risky, because the compensation does not
only depend on her eﬀort, but also on η and x, both of which are not under
the control of the manager.
In the linear agency model (Holmström and Milgrom, 1987), all noise terms
are normally distributed, the agent's utility function is negative exponen-
tial, and the contract takes the form in (2). Under these conditions, the
certainty equivalent of the agent can be described as follows (r being the
agent's coeﬃcient of absolute risk aversion):
CEA = E(s(x))− C(a)− r
2
· V ar(s(x)) (3)
The risk-neutral principal will maximize own utility UP = E(x) − E(s(x))
subject to the following constraints:
a ∈ arg max
a
CEA (4)
and
CEA ≥ U (5)
The incentive constraint (4) indicates that the agent will chose her level of
eﬀort in order to maximize her utility and the participation constraint (5)
ensures that the agent can attain at least her reservation utility U from the
contract. Normalizing U to zero, the substitution of both constraints into
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the principal's utility function yields
UP = E(x)− C(a)− r
2
· V ar(s(x)). (6)
The equation (6) shows that a lower compensation variance increases the
principal's utility and it is thus in his best interest to minimize it. Fur-
thermore, the expected proﬁt E(x) can only be positive if vx > 0, because
otherwise the agent would not provide any eﬀort and E(x) would be zero,
which cannot be in the interest of the principal.
The agent's compensation risk can be measured by the variance of the agent's
pay, so that:
V ar(s(x)) = v2x · V ar(x) (7)
It follows that increasing the agent's incentive rate vx not only raises the
agent's level of eﬀort and expected compensation, but also the risk premium
that the principal must bear in order to motivate the agent. An optimal
performance-based contract aims thus to solve the trade-oﬀ between the in-
centive eﬀect and the risk sharing. The next subsection shows how a RPE
contract improves the simple performance-based compensation in equation
(2).
2.2 The RPE contract
In a RPE contract, the agent's compensation is not only based on the own
ﬁrm performance, but also on the performance of a peer group. For simplicity,
I use only a single peer ﬁrm instead of an entire group to explain the RPE
contract. The peer ﬁrm's performance y is observable and takes following
form:
y = ay + cy · η + y (8)
This is essentially the same as in equation (1). The peer ﬁrm is exposed to
the same systematic risk η as the focal ﬁrm. However, the exposure cy is not
necessarily identical to cx. The contribution of the peer ﬁrm's manager and
9
the idiosyncratic risk y are ﬁrm-speciﬁc as well. The two ﬁrm performances
are related via the common risk η, i.e. Cov(x, y) 6= 0. The peer performance
y is included in the RPE contract, which now takes the following form:
s(x, y) = w + vx · x+ vy · y (9)
Following the same argument as in section 2.1, the variance of manager's
compensation is accordingly:
V ar(s(x, y)) = v2x · V ar(x) + v2y · V ar(y) + 2 · vx · vy · Cov(x, y) (10)
The principal will choose the parameters vx and vy in a way to minimize the
variance of the compensation for risk-averse agent. Minimizing equation (10)
with respect to vy yields
v∗y = −vx ·
Cov(x, y)
V ar(y)
(11)
Equivalent to (11), the optimal ratio of the the parameters vx and vy is
v∗y
vx
= −Cov(x, y)
V ar(y)
(12)
In the next step I substitute v∗y from equation (11) into the equation (10) to
obtain the variance of the agent's compensation:
V ar(s(x, y)) = v2x · (V ar(x)−
Cov(x, y)2
V ar(y)
) (13)
The comparison between the variances of the simple performance-based con-
tract and the RPE contract shows that V ar(s(x, y)) < V ar(s(x)). Using
relative performance evaluation reduces the overall variance of the agent's
compensation for any vx 6= 0 and is thus always more eﬃcient.
The empirical approach to test for the presence of RPE in executive com-
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pensation contracts uses equation (9) as regression model:
zi,t = β0 + β1 · xi,t + β2 · yi,t + εi,t (14)
zi,t is the executive's compensation of ﬁrm i in period t. xi,t is the focal ﬁrm
performance and yi,t is the peer ﬁrm performance. One can see from equation
(12) that the theoretical prediction to be tested is
β2
β1
= −Cov(x, y)
V ar(y)
. (15)
Rejecting this hypothesis means that the focal ﬁrms does not completely ﬁlter
out the systematic risk from the executive's compensation. This test form
is a called a strong-form test in the RPE literature (see e.g. Janakiraman
et al. (1992) or Albuquerque (2009)). An alternative possibility is to conduct
a weak-form test, which can provide evidence that the common risk factors
are at least partly ﬁltered out from the agent's compensation (Janakiraman
et al., 1992). I next describe both tests in more detail, each with the help of
an example.
3 Empirical RPE tests
3.1 The strong-form test
Antle and Smith (1986) were among the ﬁrst authors to conduct an empirical
RPE test. In this section, I present their methodology for a strong-form test,
which many subsequent studies have adopted. Their approach can thus still
be considered as commonly accepted and up to date, even if the study has
already been published three decades ago.
Antle and Smith (1986) use a two-step approach to test whether the system-
atic risk component is completely ﬁltered out from the executive's compensa-
tion. The ﬁrst step serves to separate the ﬁrm's systematic and unsystematic
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risk. Since those two components cannot be observed directly, they must be
estimated by decomposing the total ﬁrm performance x. The authors obtain
this decomposition by regressing the ﬁrm performance on the peer perfor-
mance:
xi,t = γ0 + γ1 · yi,t + ui,t (16)
Antle and Smith (1986) use two performance measures, namely equity re-
turns (RET) and the return on assets (ROA).1 2 The independent variable
y measures the peer performance. In most implicit RPE tests, it takes the
form of the S&P500 index, an industry, or an industry-size peer group. For
example, Antle and Smith (1986) use an industry index based on the two-
digit SIC code. The performances of those ﬁrms is then aggregated to an
index by using a correlation-based aggregation rule.
On the basis of the results from the regression in (16), one can compute the
systematic and the unsystematic risk component as xs and xu, respectively:
xsi,t = γˆ1 · yi,t (17)
and
xui,t = x− γˆ1 · yi,t = γˆ0 + uˆi,t (18)
xs takes the value of the estimated regression coeﬃcient γˆ1 multiplied by
the peer performance. xu is accordingly deﬁned as the remaining part of
the regression, where γˆ0 is the estimated regression constant and uˆi,t is the
residual.
The second step measures whether the peer performance y has been ﬁltered
out from the executive's compensation. To do so, the researcher needs the
corresponding compensation data. Regarding the availability of the data,
1Later on, RET has become the established performance measure for RPE tests, since
nowadays nearly all researchers use the equity returns to conduct their RPE tests.
2Albuquerque (2009) and Dikolli et al. (2013) provide a useful overview of empirical
RPE tests. They describe some details on the empirical approach and the main ﬁndings
for a large number of RPE studies. Appendix A and B of the present survey enlarge their
overview by giving further details on the econometric speciﬁcations.
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there has been a strong trend towards an increased disclosure in this ﬁeld
over the last two decades. RPE studies from the 1980s use hand-collected
data from the annual proxy statements (e.g. Antle and Smith (1986)) or
rely on survey data (e.g. Gibbons and Murphy (1990) use compensation
surveys). Increased disclosure rules and the emergence of databases such as
ExecuComp doubtlessly enlarged the amount of compensation data available
and improved its measurement accuracy.
The dependent variable for the second regression is the executive's compensa-
tion zi,t. Antle and Smith (1986) deﬁne z as the level of compensation, while
most other studies use the diﬀerence in the remuneration from one year to
another. The independent variables are the systematic and unsystematic risk
components which have been estimated in the ﬁrst step.
zi,t = β0 + β1 · xui,t + β2 · xsi,t + εi,t (19)
If the entire systematic risk is ﬁltered out of the executive's compensation, the
regression coeﬃcient β2 cannot be distinguished from zero, i.e. one tests the
hypothesis β2 = 0. To illustrate the link between the theoretical part in the
previous section and the regression above, I use again the RPE contract from
regression model (14) and substitute the results from the ﬁrst-step regression
(16) into (14). This leads to
zi,t = β0 + β1 · (γˆ0 + γˆ1 · yi,t + uˆi,t) + β2 · yi,t + εi,t
= β0 + β1 · (γˆ0 + uˆi,t) + β1 · γˆ1 · yi,t + β2 · yi,t + εi,t (20)
Next, I substitute the optimal β2 from equation (15) into (20). I additionally
use the estimated coeﬃcient γˆ1 from the regression (16), which can be written
as
γˆ1 =
Cov(x, y)
V ar(y)
. (21)
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Thus I have
zi,t = β0 + β1 · (γˆ0 + uˆi,t) + β1 · γˆ1 · yi,t + (−β1 · Cov(x, y)
V ar(y)
) · yi,t + εi,t
= β0 + β1 · (γˆ0 + uˆi,t) + (β1 − β1) · γˆ1 · yi,t + εi,t
= β0 + β1 · xui,t + (β1 − β1) · xsi,t + εi,t (22)
One can see that the optimal contract does not reward the agent for the
systematic risk, since its weight is given by (β1−β1) = 0. This transformation
helps to see how the implementation of the optimal contract is empirically
investigated by running the regression model (19) and testing the hypothesis
β2 = 0.
3.2 The weak-form test
As I described in the introduction, there exist many possible explanations
why ﬁrms might not completely ﬁlter out the systematic risks out of a com-
pensation contract. A common approach in the RPE literature is thus to
test whether the systematic risks are at least partially ﬁltered out. I ﬁrst
show how the two-step procedure explained above can be used to perform a
weak-form test. Second, I describe an alternative one-step approach for this
test.
The regression model (19) can also be used for the weak-form test. The
only diﬀerence is that one does not test whether β2 = 0, but rather the
hypothesis β2 < β1. Finding support for the weak-form RPE suggests that
the executives are paid diﬀerently for an increase in the unsystematic and
systematic risk. For example, Antle and Smith (1986) ﬁnd that the average
pay level of CEOs is higher for a given increase in xui,t than for the same
increase in xsi,t.
The study from Gibbons and Murphy (1990) uses a widespread alternative
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regression model to test the weak-form RPE:
zi,t = α0 + α1 · xi,t + α2 · yi,t + εi,t (23)
The main diﬀerence to the setting above is that simply one regression is
needed, i.e. it is a one-step approach instead of the two-step model before.
The hypothesis is that the peer performance y is negatively related to the
manager's remuneration.3 A regression coeﬃcient α1 > 0 means that the
executive compensation is increasing in x (which includes the systematic
risk component), and a regression coeﬃcient α2 signiﬁcantly lower than zero
means that the ﬁrm at least partly ﬁlters out the systematic risk component.
3.3 Explicit RPE tests
A general diﬃculty in empirical RPE tests is that the researcher cannot
observe how the board of directors computes the peer group performance.
The researcher thus needs to make assumptions on this matter and can only
implicitly test for RPE. This creates possible summarization errors which
can lead to wrong inferences (Dikolli et al., 2013).
Beside the numerous studies which investigate possible reasons for the lack
of RPE, some authors argue that ﬁrms might actually use RPE, but that it is
simply not detected by the researchers because they make wrong assumptions
on the peer group composition. Gong et al. (2011) take advantage of the
SEC's 2006 disclosure rule on executive compensation, which requires ﬁrms
to report details on the peer group they use for compensation benchmarking
or RPE. This disclosure rule enables the authors to know the peer group
composition of the ﬁrms and to perform an explicit RPE test.
The problem of the unobservable peer group performance has however not
fully been resolved by the introduction of the 2006 SEC disclosure rule. While
3This assumes that the ﬁrm performances x and y are positively correlated. In case of
a negative correlation, one would test whether α2 is positive.
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the composition of a peer group can now be observed, it remains unclear
which weight a ﬁrm assigns to each of its peers, as already pointed out by
Dikolli et al. (2013). Summarization errors are thus still possible, even if the
researcher exactly knows which ﬁrms use RPE and how their peer group is
selected.
The regression model itself is not diﬀerent for explicit and implicit RPE
tests. For example, Gong et al. (2011) follow a typical weak-form test, i.e.
the authors estimate
zi,t = α0 + α1 · xi,t + α2 · yi,t + αc · Ci,t + εi,t. (24)
Diﬀerent from most other studies, Gong et al. (2011) do not aggregate the
peer ﬁrms' performances to an index according to a speciﬁc aggregation rule,
but rather use the median stock return of the disclosed peer group as peer
performance yi,t. Ci,t are the control variables (which are, amongst others,
ﬁrm size, growth options and CEO tenure). In order to show how the ex-
plicit approach can outperform the implicit RPE test, the authors estimate
regression (24) by using two diﬀerent speciﬁcations.
First, they reperform existing RPE tests and compute yi,t as an industry-size
index (as in Albuquerque (2009)). Second, they compute yi,t as the median
return of the explicitly disclosed peer ﬁrms as described above. The results
provide no evidence in favor of RPE when the industry-size index is used
(α2 cannot be distinguished form zero). In contrast, the coeﬃcient α2 is
signiﬁcantly negative if the disclosed peer group is used. This shows how the
results in a RPE test are sensitive to the researcher's choice of a peer group
composition.
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4 Empirical studies on the RPE puzzle
4.1 Strategic considerations
A reason which has often served as an argument for not using RPE is the
possibility that RPE creates incentives for the CEO to take decisions that
aﬀect the outcome of the peer group or the extent to which the ﬁrm is ex-
posed to the peer group. Gibbons and Murphy (1990) describe some possible
limitations of RPE in a setting, where the agent can aﬀect the peer outcome
and thus limit the usefulness of RPE.
For example, if the decision of a manager has a positive eﬀect on the perfor-
mance of the industry, RPE can reduce the incentive to take such a decision.
Imagine a CEO who can invest in lobbying in order to obtain a better regu-
latory framework for the industry. RPE would reduce the incentive to invest,
because other ﬁrms in the industry would beneﬁt as well from her eﬀort and
the CEO cannot create an advantage for her ﬁrm relative to its competi-
tors. Even though in absolute terms the investment might be proﬁtable, the
manager has no incentive to realize it.
Another example is that a RPE contract might incentivize agents to collude
and supply less eﬀort than would be supplied in absence of the collusion.
Establishing a cartel and creating high barriers for new competitors to en-
ter the market are examples for such a collusion. Aggarwal and Samwick
(1999b) analyze such a setting in more detail to show the eﬀect of strategic
considerations in RPE settings. I next provide an overview of their study.
Aggarwal and Samwick (1999b) present an inherent conﬂict between strategic
competition and the principal-agent problem. The authors analyze two dif-
ferent oligopolistic market structures (Bertrand and Cournot competition).
The main question of the study is whether a ﬁrm i can raise their proﬁts by
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oﬀering their manager a RPE contract, written as
zi = wi + αi · xi + βi · yi (25)
where wi,j is the ﬁxed salary and xi is the proﬁt of the own ﬁrm i and yi the
one of the rival ﬁrm.4 This is a standard setting for the weak-form RPE test
for which the basic hypothesis is βi < 0.
The Bertrand competition describes a market where ﬁrms compete in prices
and the ﬁrm's choices are strategic complements. Aggarwal and Samwick
(1999b) show that the equilibrium where outputs are strategic complements
and price competition is prevailing in a duopoly with contracts as in (25)
result in higher proﬁts for both ﬁrms than with contracts based on the own
ﬁrm's proﬁts only. However, contrary to the basic RPE setting, the optimal
weight β on the rival ﬁrm's proﬁt is now positive. The intuition behind this
solution is that the positive weight on β softens the price competition. To
put it another way, a negative weight in RPE contracts, with the goal of
ﬁltering out common shocks, induces managers to act more aggressively in
the product market, which hurts ﬁrm proﬁtability.
In a Cournot competition, where the ﬁrms compete in quantities and their
choices are strategic substitutes, the optimal contract looks diﬀerent. Namely,
the weight β on the rival ﬁrm's proﬁt is now negative, as it is in a basic RPE
contract described in section 2.2. However, the result is not driven by a
principal-agent problem (to ﬁlter out systematic risks), but by the nature of
the strategic interaction, i.e. it is a strategic choice rather than a response
to moral hazard. The principal wants to toughen the competition in order
become a quantity leader. The RPE contract creates the usual prisoner's
dilemma among Cournot competitors. If ﬁrms would agree not to use RPE,
proﬁts would be higher for both ﬁrms. But as soon as one ﬁrm moves to an
RPE contract, it is optimal for the rival ﬁrm to do RPE as well.
4Aggarwal and Samwick (1999b) use all ﬁrms in the same 4-digit SIC code as rival
ﬁrms and compute yi as a value-weighted return.
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The intensity of RPE depends on the degree of competition in both settings.
In the Bertrand model, a high degree of competition in the industry leads to
a lower weight of α relative to β. In Cournot settings, a more competitive
industry puts as well more weight on the rival ﬁrm, but with a negative sign.
The two diﬀerent results make an empirical test for RPE diﬃcult, since there
is no clear direction for the RPE weight β. The authors use their result that
an increased product substitutability, which also means a higher competition
in the market, is associated with a lower ratio α/β in absolute terms in
both settings the Bertrand and the Cournot competition, respectively. The
regression model to test this hypothesis takes the following form:
zi,j,t = β0 + β1 · xj,t + β2 · yj,t + β3 · F (Hj) · xj,t + β4 · F (Hj) · yj,t
+β5 · F (Hj) + β6 · CEOi,t + SICj + Yt + εi,j,t (26)
zi,j,t is the total compensation of the executive i, who works for the ﬁrm j in
year t. F (Hj) is the cumulative distribution function of the Herﬁndahl index.
This index measures the intensity of the market competition, which Aggarwal
and Samwick (1999b) use as proxy for product substitutability. The value
zero is assigned to the least concentrated industry and the most concentrated
(i.e. least competitive) market takes the value of one.5 The variable CEOi,t is
one if the executive is the CEO of the ﬁrm and zero for non-CEO executives.
The authors also include industry and year ﬁxed eﬀects.
Aggarwal and Samwick (1999b) ﬁrst evaluate whether the weak-form RPE
holds by testing the hypothesis β2 +β4 ·F (Hj) < 0. The estimate β2 alone is
positively associated with executive pay, which is against the RPE prediction,
but instead supports the Bertrand model.6 Together, the estimates β2 + β4 ·
5The construction of the cumulative distribution function (cdf) is a popular approach in
order to obtain conveniently interpretable regression coeﬃcients. Aggarwal and Samwick
(1999a) have ﬁrst used the cdf in a RPE test and many subsequent RPE studies have
followed this approach.
6However, in a speciﬁcation where only the short term compensation is used as de-
pendent variable, the authors ﬁnd β2 < 0, which supports the presence of weak-form
RPE.
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F (Hj) are also positive for all degrees of competition.
To test whether the extent of RPE diﬀers with the competition in a market,
the authors investigate the hypothesis β4 < 0. This estimate is signiﬁcantly
negative for all speciﬁcations, which further supports the Bertrand model of
the authors. The interpretation of Aggarwal and Samwick (1999b) for this
result is that RPE is limited by strategic interaction. Namely, an intense
competition (and thus a low F (Hj)) makes RPE less useful for the ﬁrm ac-
cording to the Bertrand model, because RPE would create incentives for the
executives to behave more aggressively on the product market. A negative
β4 suggests that those ﬁrms use less RPE, while in industries with less in-
tense competition (and thus a high F (Hj)) ﬁrms more often ﬁlter out the
systematic risks.
The theoretical prediction developed by Aggarwal and Samwick (1999b),
claims that the ratio α/β from equation (25) is a decreasing function of the
degree of competition. This test is deﬁned as follows:
R(β) ≡ ∂(
α
β
)
∂F (H)
=
β2 · β3 − β1 · β4
(β2 + β4 · F (H))2 (27)
In presence of a Bertrand competition, the authors expect R(β) > 0 and in
presence of a Cournot competition R(β) < 0. The compensation ratio test
R(β) = 0 is rejected for all diﬀerent speciﬁcations. More precisely, the results
show a positive R(β) and thus further support the Bertrand competition
model.7
7The tests are performed at the median industry concentration, i.e. F (H) = 0.5.
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4.2 CEO-speciﬁc characteristics and CEO actions
4.2.1 Personal hedging
Some researchers argue that RPE contracts are not necessary because the
executives can personally hedge against systematic risks. The reasoning be-
hind this argument is that the risk exposure and incentives of the executives
do not only stem from their compensation contract, but from the overall
portfolio they hold, i.e. including privately held assets.
Core et al. (2003) state how a lack of explicit RPE in a compensation scheme
does not necessarily imply a lack of implicit RPE in the agent's overall port-
folio. They provide a descriptive example by taking the view of a rational,
risk-averse CEO, who holds, consistent with the portfolio theory, a well-
diversiﬁed portfolio with the expected market return RM . She enters into a
new ﬁrm, which requires her to hold a certain amount of equity, and sells
some of her market portfolio to buy shares of her company. She is now still
exposed to the market risk (depending on the beta of the ﬁrm, she would
have to increase or decrease her holdings in the market portfolio to attain at
the same level as before), but additionally also to the idiosyncratic risk of the
ﬁrm. Core et al. (2003) argue that most incentives for executives come from
their equity holdings and not from the annual ﬂow compensation. Thus, this
implicit RPE can generate the proper incentives even if there is no explicit
RPE in the contract.
One drawback for the empiricists as well as for the board of directors, who
designs the compensation package, is that the CEO wealth generally cannot
be measured precisely. The principal does therefore not know what the nec-
essary amount of equity holdings is to induce the optimal incentives. If the
principal requires too much equity holdings, then the CEO is exposed to a
high degree of idiosyncratic risk, which in turn would require a higher risk
premium to be paid. In contrast, if the required equity holdings are too low,
only weak incentives are provided to the CEO.
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On the other hand, if the CEO has outside wealth that she can invest in
assets, she might choose a portfolio, where her overall exposure represents
again the market portfolio. This can e.g. be done by giving a higher weight
to assets with a low correlation to the own ﬁrm in order to compensate for
the large amount of the ﬁrm's own shares that she is forced to hold. As long
as it is costless for the CEO to adjust her personal exposure, a RPE contract
provides thus no beneﬁts, since any given RPE element in the contract will
be oﬀset by personal portfolio adjustments (Maug, 2000).
Garvey and Milbourn (2003) analyze a setting, where executives can hedge
the market and where adjusting the manager's exposure to the market risk is
costly for both the manager and the ﬁrm. The optimal level or RPE depends
then on the relative costs of the two players. For example, if the cost to
the ﬁrm increases relative to the one of the manager, the ﬁrm gives a lower
RPE-weight and the manager will hedge more privately.
Garvey and Milbourn (2003) empirically test their hypothesis of whether the
level of RPE diﬀers with the executive's possibilities to hedge personally and
the ﬁrm's cost to provide RPE. Since the cost for RPE and private hedging
cannot be observed, the following proxies are used. The ﬁrst proxy for the
manger's cost to hedge market risk is her age. An older manager is supposed
to have more accumulated ﬁnancial wealth than a younger and can thus more
freely allocate her assets. The authors also estimate individual executive's
wealth for a subsample in order to obtain a second, more direct proxy of
their wealth.
To capture the costs to the ﬁrm in providing RPE, the absolute number of
executives leaving their ﬁrm within an industry is identiﬁed. In industries
where CEO turnover is high, the ﬁrm is assumed to face higher costs of
providing RPE. This is consistent with the literature, such as in Oyer (2004),
where the CEO's outside wealth varies with the industry return. In those
cases it can be optimal to provide some pay for systematic risk, because
otherwise the CEO might leave the ﬁrm, which implicates turnover costs.8
8The eﬀect of CEOs outside options on RPE are further discussed in the next subsec-
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Garvey and Milbourn (2003) use a one-step model, where the regression
equation takes the following form:
zi,t = β0 + β1 · xi,t + β2 · (xi,t × age) + β3 · (xi,t ×mobility)
+β4 · yi,t + β5 · (yi,t × age) + β6 · (yi,t ×mobility)
+β7 · Ci,t + εi,t (28)
The authors measure peer performance yi,t by a ﬁrm-speciﬁc CAPM-based
benchmark and, in an alternative speciﬁcation, by the S&P500 index. The
variables age and mobility are computed by the value of the respective cu-
mulative distribution function (cdf).9
In a ﬁrst step, the authors do not include the variables age and mobility and
only use xi,t, yi,t and the control variables. They perform a typical weak-form
RPE test by looking whether the coeﬃcient on yi,t is negative. This estimate
is however not signiﬁcant and thus conﬁrms the lack of RPE.
Next, Garvey and Milbourn (2003) test the main hypothesis of their study,
namely whether β5 > 0 and β6 > 0. Using the S&P500 as peer index,
the authors obtain the following results. The coeﬃcient β4 is signiﬁcantly
negative and β5 is signiﬁcantly positive. This provides evidence that RPE is
more present for young CEOs than for older ones. For example, the variable
age takes the value zero for the youngest CEO and thus β5 · age = 0. Since
β4 is negative, ﬁrms ﬁlter out market risks at least partially for young CEOs.
In contrast, for the oldest CEO the variable age takes the value one and thus
β5 · age > 0. This neutralizes the negative coeﬃcient β4 and therefore, no
evidence of RPE is found for the oldest CEO. The results persists for the
second proxy, a direct estimate of wealth for a subsample of CEOs.
tion.
9Garvey and Milbourn (2003) also include variables for the systematic and idiosyncratic
variance of the ﬁrm and interact them with xi,t, xi,t × age and xi,t × mobility (I do not
include them in the equation above for reasons of readability and because I do not interpret
these coeﬃcients).
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In terms of the CEO mobility, Garvey and Milbourn (2003) ﬁnd no support
for their hypothesis that a high CEO mobility is associated with a lower
degree of RPE. The estimate β6 is close to zero and not signiﬁcantly positive,
which the authors expect to ﬁnd if the costs for providing RPE would be high
in industries with more CEO turnovers.
4.2.2 CEO outside options
Oyer (2004) views bonus schemes, such as stock option plans, not only as
instrument to incentivize the executives, but also to index wages to the cur-
rent market situation. The basic assumption behind this reasoning is that
the executive's outside options vary with the market conditions. This is a
deviation from the standard principal-agent setting, where the reservation
utility is exogenously given. A certain pay for market risks is optimal if
the executive's outside options depend on the market conditions, because
in good times, the outside options increase and the contract has to be ad-
justed in order to retain the manager. Tying the pay to the market situation
automatically makes this adjustment.
The principal might instead also write a new contract in every period in
which he considers the changes in the market situation. However, Oyer
(2004) introduces a second important assumption in his model, which is that
turnover and adjustments in the contract parameters are costly, which in
turn makes replacing the manager or continuous recontracting less attractive
to the principal.
Rajgopal et al. (2006) empirically test whether CEOs with better outside
opportunities are compensated for market risk. Since CEOs' outside options
are not observable, the authors hypothesize that CEO talent does as well
reﬂect her outside opportunities and that in economic booms there is a higher
demand for talented CEOs. While it seems obvious that more qualiﬁed CEOs
have better outside options, the assumption that their demand is higher in
prosperous economic times can certainly be questioned. The reasoning of the
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authors, which follows Oyer (2004), is that e.g. a booming industry attracts
possible new competitors or rival ﬁrms start new projects, and managerial
talent is thus needed to cope with this situation.
However, one might as well think that especially in diﬃcult times a highly
skilled CEO is necessary to lead the ﬁrm. The authors acknowledge this view
and test also for asymmetries in RPE, i.e. whether the talented CEOs are
protected from economic downturns.
A second diﬃculty in implementing this empirical test is to ﬁnd a valid proxy
for CEO talent. Rajgopal et al. (2006) do this by counting the positive press
articles on CEOs and by computing industry-adjusted average ROA. A high
number of positive press citations and outperforming the industry ROA are
taken as signs for superior CEO talent. The results do not diﬀer much what-
ever proxy is used. This gives some support for the proxies, but of course,
the inherent diﬃculty to measure a CEO's talent cannot be overridden. The
main regression takes then the following form:
zi,t = β0 + β1 · xi,t + β2 · yi,t + β3 · (yi,t × talenti,t)
+β4 · (xi,t × Ci,t) + SICi + Yt + i,t (29)
The peer performance yi,t takes the form of an industry and a market index,
respectively. The variable talenti,t is computed as the value of the empirical
cumulative distribution function (cdf) of the CEO talent proxies described
above. The authors add control variables to the regression (ﬁrm size, CEO
tenure, CEO age and the ﬁrm's equity return variance), as well as industry
and year ﬁxed eﬀects.
The structure of the regression model is very similar to the other approaches
described so far. It takes basically the form of a weak-form RPE test, but
additionally includes an interaction of yi,t and another variable to investigate
whether this other variable aﬀects the extent of RPE.
Rajgopal et al. (2006) thus ﬁrst test for the presence of weak-form RPE by
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the hypothesis β2 < 0 and then investigate their main hypothesis β3 > 0.
The estimate β2 is negative and signiﬁcant, which supports the presence of
weak-form RPE. The next test then clariﬁes whether this results holds for
all CEOs or whether it diﬀers with the CEO's talent. The regression results
present some evidence that the level of RPE is indeed lower for talented
CEOs. The coeﬃcient β3 is positive and signiﬁcant, which means that the
industry or market risk is ﬁltered out for least talented CEOs, but not for
the most talented ones.
The main results are however only statistically signiﬁcant at the 10%-level
using a one-tailed test. Additionally, the magnitude of the coeﬃcients β2 and
β3 are very low compared to β1.
10 For example, the coeﬃcients of a median
regression using the model (29) are β1 = 15.82, β2 = −2.36, β3 = 0.77 if
the authors use the number of press articles as proxy for CEO talent and
β3 = 0.55 if they use the industry-adjusted ROA.
4.3 RPE and the managerial power approach
The managerial power approach has received considerable attention in the ex-
ecutive compensation literature and has been discussed under several terms,
e.g. skimming (Bertrand and Mullainathan, 2001), rent seeking/extraction
(Bebchuk et al., 2002) or simply named as excessive pay (Bebchuk and Fried,
2003). The managerial power approach assumes that the agent has some
power over the pay-setting process, which she uses to extract a rent at the
expense of the shareholders. Some possible arguments for this assumption
are that the manager has inﬂuence over the appointment of the directors,
the manager can hire compensation consultants to justify her salary or other
eﬀects, which are generally the outcome of deﬁciencies in the ﬁrm's corporate
governance (Bebchuk et al., 2002).
As in the sections before, the advantages of RPE are generally acknowledged
10Rajgopal et al. (2006) accordingly clearly reject the strong-form test β1 + β2 = 0 in
their study.
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in those papers, but now the shortcomings arise from the agent's power
over the pay-setting process and not from the CEO's hedging possibilities or
outside options. Correctly implemented, RPE would provide a good tool to
increase the eﬃciency of compensation contracts and taking measures like
improving a ﬁrm's corporate governance can lead to lower managerial power
and increased use of RPE (Bebchuk et al., 2002).
One might wonder why a risk-averse CEO, who has power over the pay-
setting process, would chose to increase her risky variable compensation
instead of the predetermined, ﬁxed salary. There exists a well-established
reason for this behavior. The ability of a CEO to increase her pay level is
limited, even for very powerful CEOs. At a certain level, the board of di-
rectors, the shareholders and the general public would notice and suppress
the rent seeking behavior. With this limitation in mind, a CEO seeks to
camouﬂage the high pay level (see e.g. Bertrand and Mullainathan (2001)
or Bebchuk et al. (2002)). The absence of RPE, respectively the presence of
pay for luck, is a possibility to hide the rent extraction.
4.3.1 Failures in corporate governance
Bertrand and Mullainathan (2001) investigate how weaknesses in corporate
governance aﬀect the presence of reward for luck.11 Their RFL test is more
general than a typical RPE test. It investigates for diﬀerent (observable)
luck factors, whether they are ﬁltered out from the CEO's compensation,
whereas the typical RPE test uses an index or a peer group performance to
investigate whether the ﬁrms ﬁlters out (unobservable) common shocks from
the manager's remuneration.
More precisely, the study from Bertrand and Mullainathan (2001) uses three
diﬀerent measures for luck, namely oil prices, exchange rates and industry
11The authors use the term reward for luck (RFL) rather than RPE. However, both
terms basically describe the same concept, where the presence of reward for luck can be
described as absence of RPE. The empirical approach is the same in both cases and thus,
I discuss the RFL test in this survey in the same way as any RPE test.
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performance. The latter corresponds to a typical RPE test and shows that the
notions of RPE and RFL are not clearly delimited in the literature. Bertrand
and Mullainathan (2001) use the industry performance as luck measure to
present their main results.
The authors use a typical strong-form test in their study. In a ﬁrst step,
the performance measure xi,t, measured as logarithmic shareholder returns,
is regressed on the luck variable:
xi,t = γ0 + γ1 · yi,t + γ2 · Ci,t + Fi + Yt + εi,t (30)
yi,t is the observable luck variable (oil price, exchange rate index, or industry
performance), Ci,t are the control variables (CEO tenure, CEO age), Fi and
Yt are ﬁrm and year ﬁxed eﬀects, respectively. Using the results of this
equation, the authors predict the part of the ﬁrm performance which is due
to luck, and deﬁne this systematic risk component as xsi,t = γˆ1 · yi,t. The
RFL-test then takes the form
zi,t = β0 + β1 · xsi,t + β2 · Ci,t + Fi + Yt + εi,t (31)
and tests the hypothesis β1 = 0, which is what one would expect if observable
luck is completely ﬁltered out. The diﬀerence between the strong-form test
described in section 3.1 is that the ﬁrm performance itself is not included in
the regression. This does however not aﬀect the expectation for β1 in any
way.
The strong-form RPE hypothesis is rejected for all three kind of luck vari-
ables at the 5%-level. Bertrand and Mullainathan (2001) also compute the
regression (31) with xi,t as independent variable (instead of x
s
i,t) to show
that there is a positive pay-performance sensitivity for xi,t in general, and
to compare it to the pay-for-luck sensitivity. The regression coeﬃcient for
the general pay-performance sensitivity is named βGeneral and the one for the
pay-for-luck sensitivity βLuck . The diﬀerences between these two estimates is
not signiﬁcant, meaning that CEO pay responds as much to a 'lucky' dollar
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as to a 'general' dollar (Bertrand and Mullainathan, 2001).
The main hypothesis is then investigated in a next step. In order to test
whether the CEO has captured the pay-setting process, the Bertrand and
Mullainathan (2001) include a measure for corporate governance in the re-
gression. Since in poorly governed ﬁrms it is easier for CEOs to gain control
on the pay-setting process, the authors expect more pay for luck in those
ﬁrms compared to the ones with a good corporate governance.
Bertrand and Mullainathan (2001) use the presence of a large shareholder
(holding at least 5% of the ﬁrm's common shares) as proxy for governance,
assuming that such an investor has greater incentives to watch over the ﬁrm
than a group of dispersed shareholders. The corresponding variable Gov
is thus binary and takes the value one if the ﬁrm has a large shareholder.
Alternatively, the authors use board size (where a small board is assumed to
be more eﬀective) and the fraction of insiders on the board (many insiders are
assumed to weaken the governance) to proxy for governance. The regression
model takes the following form:
zi,t = β0 +β
Luck
1 ·xsi,t+βLuck2 ·(Gov i,t×xsi,t)+β3 ·Ci,t+β4 ·Gov i,t+Fi+Yt+εi,t
(32)
The estimated coeﬃcient βˆLuck2 measures the eﬀect of governance on pay
for luck, i.e. a positive (negative) coeﬃcient means that ﬁrms with a good
corporate governance are more (less) sensitive to pay for luck. As before,
the same regression is also run with xi,t as independent variable (instead of
xsi,t) and the estimated eﬀect of governance on the general pay sensitivity is
βˆGeneral2 (instead of βˆ
Luck
2 ). The test then consists of comparing βˆ
General
2 and
βˆLuck2 .
The results show again that there is a signiﬁcant sensitivity to a general dollar
as well as to a lucky dollar (βGeneral1 and β
Luck
1 are both signiﬁcantly posi-
tive). However, adding a large shareholder does not signiﬁcantly reduce the
sensitivity to a general dollar (βGeneral2 cannot be distinguished from zero),
whereas the decrease in the sensitivity to a lucky dollar (βLuck2 < 0) is signif-
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icant. The eﬀect is the strongest when the presence of a large shareholder is
used as proxy for good governance. This supports the hypothesis that there
is less RFL in ﬁrms with good corporate governance.
4.3.2 Asymmetric RPE
A point, which Bertrand and Mullainathan (2001) only marginally address, is
a potential asymmetry in RPE.12 If a CEO really can inﬂuence her pay level,
she would only want a RPE based compensation if it is in her interest, i.e. if
the peer performance was bad. Garvey and Milbourn (2006) investigate this
possible asymmetry in RPE. They assume that a compensation package is
not completely determined ex ante, but that the board of directors decides
on some parts of variable pay at the end of a period. At this point it is known
whether the ﬁrm has outperformed the industry or not, and the manager uses
her inﬂuence over the board to implement RPE (if the industry performance
was bad) or not (if the industry performance was good).
The authors use a two-step approach similar to Bertrand and Mullainathan
(2001) in order to separate the 'luck' component in a ﬁrm's performance
from the 'skill' component. The ﬁrst step consists of regressing the ﬁrm
performance on an equal-weighted industry index (yewi,t ) and a value-weighted
industry index (yvwi,t ):
xi,t = γ0 + γ1 · yewi,t + γ2 · yvwi,t + Yt + ui,t (33)
The approach to include two benchmarks instead of just one is diﬀerent from
most other RPE studies. Furthermore, the two chosen benchmarks are very
similar. In both cases, the 2-digit SIC code is used to create the industry
index and the only diﬀerence is the aggregation rule. The exact beneﬁts of
using both indices instead of just one remain unclear. However, Garvey and
Milbourn (2006) also use other peer and luck measures and ﬁnd that their
12Some anecdotal evidence for asymmetric pay for luck is provided on the oil industry
by showing a graphical analysis (ﬁgure 3 in their paper).
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main results are robust to those diﬀerent speciﬁcations.
The luck variable for the second step regression is deﬁned as xsi,t = γˆ0 + γˆ1 ·
yewi,t + γˆ2 · yvwi,t + Yˆt and the skill variable is accordingly xui,t = uˆi,t, i.e. the
idiosyncratic performance shock represents skill. The second step regression
is thus estimated by the following model:13
zi,t = β0 + β1 · xui,t + β2 · xsi,t + β5 · Ci,t + Fi + Yt + εi,t (34)
Both coeﬃcients β1 and β2 are signiﬁcantly positive, the latter conﬁrming the
presence of reward for luck and the absence of RPE, respectively. The RPE
test β2 = 0 is thus rejected and Garvey and Milbourn (2006) can address their
main research question, i.e. whether the pay for luck is more pronounced if
luck is positive compared to when it is negative. The authors add dummy
variables to the regression model (34), where the dummy equals one if luck
(skill) is negative and zero otherwise. The dummy is then interacted with
the luck (skill) variable, which gives the following regression model:
zi,t = β0 + β1 · xui,t + β2 · (xui,t ×Du) + β3 · xsi,t + β4 · (xsi,t ×Ds)
+β7 · Ci,t + Fi + Yt + εi,t (35)
The skimming hypothesis tests whether β4 < 0 and β2 = β4. A negative β4
suggests that the industry performance is ﬁltered out if it is negative. It is
however possible in an optimal contract to obtain the result β4 < 0 if at the
same time one observes β2 = β4. In this case, the 'punishment' for bad luck
is equal to the one for bad skill, which is not what one would observe if the
executive has captured the pay process.
The estimate for β4 < 0 is negative and signiﬁcant. This result provides
evidence for the asymmetry in RPE, because there appears to be no ﬁltering
if the industry return is positive (β3 is still positive and signiﬁcant), but at
13The authors also include the cdf of the variances of xsi,t and x
u
i,t in their strong-form
test. I do not show them in the equation (34) for reasons of readability and because I do
not interpret these coeﬃcients.
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least some ﬁltering if the industry return is negative.14 Second, Garvey and
Milbourn (2006) reject β2 − β4 = 0, which further supports the skimming
hypothesis.
5 Conclusion
This study provides a summary on the methodology of empirical RPE tests
and their explanations of the RPE puzzle. In a ﬁrst step, I explained how
researchers generally conduct strong-form and weak-form tests. Because the
numerous RPE tests so far have not found clear evidence in favor of RPE, the
researchers have been looking for diﬀerent explanations why RPE might be
harmful for some ﬁrms or why it might be optimal, but rarely implemented.
In a second step, I thus described the prevalent explanations for the RPE
puzzle in terms of their methodology and results.
I classiﬁed the selected studies for this survey in the categories strategic con-
siderations, CEO characteristics and the managerial power approach. This
approach is of course only one of many possibilities to give a clear view
on the academic RPE literature, but in my view these are categories which
have been investigated profoundly and which are able to capture the most
prevailing pros and cons of RPE. The categorization also helps to explain
the diﬀerences in the empirical methodologies and to compare the diﬀerent
studies with each other.
The empirical approach of most studies to explain the lack of RPE is very
similar. The researchers conﬁrm in a ﬁrst step the absence of RPE in order to
establish a basis for their further analysis. In a second step, the researchers
investigate their explanation for the absence of RPE by introducing their vari-
able of interest in the regression. They test whether the extent of RPE varies
with respect to changes in the variable of interest. For example, Bertrand
14The magnitude of the estimate β4 is low compared to β3. Taken together, the executive
pay is still sensitive to industry returns, even if they are negative. The executives are thus
not completely shielded from bad luck.
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and Mullainathan (2001) test whether the extent of RPE is diﬀerent for ﬁrms
with weak or strong corporate governance.
The majority of the studies summarized in this paper ﬁnd empirical support
for their explanation of the RPE puzzle (see Appendix A for an overview of
the empirical approach and the main ﬁndings for each RPE study discussed
in this survey). However, there seems to be no explanation which consis-
tently provides stronger evidence than the others. Thus, there are multiple
explanations why a limited use of RPE can be optimal for executives and
shareholders. For a researcher it is important to know about these diﬀerent
aspects in order to better understand the use of RPE in the context of exec-
utive compensation. This survey can help to take a look at the RPE puzzle
from diﬀerent points of view and to deal with the proposed solutions in a
critical and diﬀerentiated way.
There is evidence suggesting that the number of ﬁrms using RPE has in-
creased during the last years, which shows that the topic is still relevant
these days (Bettis et al., 2014).15 The reason for this increase remains how-
ever unclear. Do ﬁrms only learn now about the beneﬁts of RPE? Have
improvements in corporate governance led to a wider dispersal of RPE? Are
the ﬁrms under pressure (e.g. from shareholder activists, proxy advisors,
media or political forces) to use RPE even though they think it would not
be useful for their ﬁrm? Further research might use the information of a
ﬁrm's decision to implement or discontinue RPE contracts in order to ﬁnd
support for or against the existing explanations or even provide completely
new insights on the RPE puzzle.
15Bettis et al. (2014) report data on RPE usage from 1998 to 2012, with 386 ﬁrms out
of 1149 using RPE in 2014 (33.6%), compared to 16.8% in 2006 and 5.5% in 1998.
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Appendix B: Overview on the empirical approach
of the RPE studies
Aggarwal and Samwick (1999b)
alternative hypothesis (HA) strategic considerations
regression model zi,j,t = β0 + β1 · xj,t + β2 · yj,t
+β3 · F (Hj)× xj,t + β4 · F (Hj)× yj,t
+β5 · F (Hj) + β6 · CEOi,t + SICj + Yt + εi,j,t
ﬁrm performance x shareholder return
peer group industry (SIC3 and SIC4)
aggregation rule value-weighted
control variables CEO, industry + year FE
RPE test β2 + β4 · F (Hj) < 0 (weak-form)
result N
test for HA R(β) =
β2 · β3 − β1 · β4
(β2 + β4 · F (H))2 = 0
result Y for Bertrand model, N for Cournot model
N = hypothesis rejected.
Y = hypothesis is not rejected, data supports the presence of RPE or the alternative explanation,
respectively.
35
Antle and Smith (1986)
alternative hypothesis (HA) -
regression model1 zi,t = β0 + β1 · xui,t + β2 · xsi,t + εi,t
ﬁrm performance x RET, ROA
peer group industry (SIC2)
aggregation rule correlation-weighted
control variables -
RPE test β1 6= β2 (weak-form)
β2 = 0 and β1 > β2 (strong-form)
result N2 (weak-form)
N3 (strong-form)
test for HA -
result -
N = hypothesis rejected.
Y = hypothesis is not rejected, data supports the presence of RPE or the alternative explanation,
respectively.
1 Two-step approach applied. The table shows the second step regression only.
2 Y only for 7(6) out of 39 ﬁrms in RET(ROA) (5%-level).
3 Y only for 2(6) out of 39 ﬁrms in RET(ROA) (5%-level).
Bertrand and Mullainathan (2001)
alternative hypothesis (HA) weak corporate governance
regression model1,2 zi,t = β0 + β
Luck
1 · xsi,t + βLuck2 · (Gov i,t × xsi,t)
+β3 · Ci,t + β4 ·Gov i,t + Fi + Yt + εi,t
ﬁrm performance x shareholder return,
accounting return (income/assets)
peer group oil price, FX exchange rates, industry (SIC2)
aggregation rule value-weighted (for industry peer group)
control variables CEO age, CEO tenure, ﬁrm + year FE
RPE test3 βLuck1 = 0
result N (for oil prices, FX rates, industry return)
test for HA β
Luck
2 6= βGeneral2
result Y (βLuck2 < β
General
2 )
N = hypothesis rejected.
Y = hypothesis is not rejected, data supports the presence of RPE or the alternative explanation,
respectively.
1 Two-step approach applied. The table shows the second step regression only.
2 The compensation zi,t is also regressed on the overall performance xi,t, i.e. zi,t = β0 + β
General
1 ·
xi,t + β
General
2 · (Gov i,t × xi,t) + β3 · Ci,t + β4 ·Gov i,t + Fi + Yt + εi,t
3 For this test, the variable Gov i,t is not yet included in the regression.
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Garvey and Milbourn (2003)
alternative hypothesis (HA) personal hedging
regression model zi,t = β0 + β1 · xi,t + β2 · (xi,t × age)
+β3 · (xi,t ×mobility) + β4 · yi,t
+β5 · (yi,t × age) + β6 · (yi,t ×mobility)
+β7 · Ci,t + SICi + Yt + εi,t
ﬁrm performance x shareholder return
peer group CAPM benchmark1, S&P500
aggregation rule -
control variables ﬁrm-speciﬁc and systematic variance,
Tobin's q, industry + year FE
RPE test β4 < 0 (weak-form)
results Y1
test for HA β5 > 0, β6 > 0
results Y for age (β5), N for mobility (β6)
N = hypothesis rejected.
Y = hypothesis is not rejected, data supports the presence of RPE or the alternative explanation,
respectively.
1 The CAPM benchmark is a ﬁrm-speciﬁc return consisting of the risk-free return and an estimated
beta times the realized premium of the S&P500 return over the risk-free rate.
1 N if the variables (yi,t × age) and (yi,t ×mobility) are excluded from the regression.
Garvey and Milbourn (2006)
alternative hypothesis (HA) asymmetric RPE
regression model1
zi,t = β0 + β1 · xui,t + β2 · (xui,t ×Du) + β3 · xsi,t
+β4 · (xsi,t ×Ds) + β7 · Ci,t + Fi + Yt + εi,t
ﬁrm performance x stock returns
peer group industry (SIC2)
aggregation rule equal- and value-weighted
(both included in the ﬁrst step regression)
control variables CEO tenure, Var(xsi,t), Var(x
u
i,t), ﬁrm + year FE
RPE test2 β3 = 0 (strong-form)
result N
test for HA β4 < 0 and β2 = β4 (weak form)
result Y
N = hypothesis rejected.
Y = hypothesis is not rejected, data supports the presence of RPE or the alternative explanation,
respectively.
1 Two-step approach applied. The table shows the second step regression only.
2 For this test, the variables (xui,t ×Du) and (xsi,t ×Ds) are excluded from the regression.
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Gibbons and Murphy (1990)
alternative hypothesis (HA) -
regression model zi,t = α0 + α1 · xi,t + α2 · yi,t + εi,t
ﬁrm performance x stock return
peer group industry (SIC2), market
aggregation rule value-weighted
control variables -
RPE test α2 < 0 (weak-form)
result Y (for both industry and market benchmark)
test for HA -
result -
N = hypothesis rejected.
Y = hypothesis is not rejected, data supports the presence of RPE or the alternative explanation,
respectively.
Gong et al. (2011)
alternative hypothesis (HA) -
regression model zi,t = α0 + α1 · xi,t + α2 · yi,t + αc · Ci,t + εi,t
ﬁrm performance x stock return
peer group industry-size, disclosed peer group
aggregation rule median stock return
control variables ﬁrm size, growth options, CEO tenure,
idiosyncratic variance, CEO is board chair,
CEO stock ownership, industry FE
RPE test α2 < 0 (weak-form)
result N for industry-size, Y for disclosed peer group
test for HA -
result -
N = hypothesis rejected.
Y = hypothesis is not rejected, data supports the presence of RPE or the alternative explanation,
respectively.
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Rajgopal et al. (2006)
alternative hypothesis (HA) CEO outside options
regression model zi,t = β0 + β1 · xi,t + β2 · yi,t
+β3 · (yi,t × talenti,t) + β4 · (xi,t × Ci,t)
+SICi + Yt + i,t
ﬁrm performance x shareholder return
peer group industry (SIC2)
aggregation rule value-weighted
control variables CEO tenure, CEO age, ﬁrm size
Var(x), industry + year FE
RPE test β2 < 0 (weak-form)
β1 + β2 = 0 (strong-form)
result Y for weak-form RPE, N for strong-form RPE
test for HA β3 > 0
result Y1
N = hypothesis rejected.
Y = hypothesis is not rejected, data supports the presence of RPE or the alternative explanation,
respectively.
1 for both talent proxies (number of positive press articles on the CEO and outperforming the
industry-adjusted ROA).
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Peer group composition and
aggregation for RPE purposes in
presence of exposure risk
Abstract
Agency theory suggests the use relative performance evaluation (RPE) to
ﬁlter out systematic risks from a noisy performance measure. The presence
of exposure risk, i.e. if the exposure to the systematic risks moves over time,
however precludes complete ﬁltering. In the present study I ﬁrst estimate
the exposure of a ﬁrm's performance to the performance of potential peer
ﬁrms in order to construct a ﬁrm-speciﬁc peer group. Second, I investigate
how the presence of exposure risk can aﬀect the composition and aggregation
of a peer group over time. Third, I show how these movements in the peer
group composition and aggregation can reduce the eﬀectiveness of the ﬁlter-
ing purpose in RPE settings. I ﬁnd that the ﬁrm-speciﬁc peer groups provide
good ﬁltering abilities ex post, but that simple indices, such as industry peer
groups, are more stable and thus perform better out-of-sample.
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1 Introduction
According to the agency theory, relative performance evaluation (RPE) is a
useful way to make an agent's compensation more eﬃcient. While rewarding
the agent for absolute ﬁrm performance aligns her personal goals with those
of the shareholders and thus creates incentives to act in the interest of the
shareholders, the purpose of RPE is to ﬁlter out systematic risks from a noisy
ﬁrm performance. This permits a variance reduction in the compensation of
the risk-averse agent without reducing her incentives, which increases the
overall eﬃciency of the contract.
Empirical research on RPE has mostly focused on investigating whether or
not ﬁrms actually use RPE as predicted by the agency theory, but the results
so far are mixed. The missing empirical evidence in support of RPE has led
to the situation known as the RPE puzzle. There have been many attempts
to resolve this puzzle. For example Bebchuk et al. (2002) or Bertrand and
Mullainathan (2001) explain the lack of RPE as failure in corporate gover-
nance. Other authors argue that it can be optimal not to do RPE due to
strategic considerations (e.g. Aggarwal and Samwick (1999a) and Gopalan
et al. (2010)), CEO hedging possibilities (Garvey and Milbourn, 2003) or
CEO outside options (Rajgopal et al., 2006). Some researchers also argue
that ﬁrms might use RPE, but that the existing empirical approaches have
so far been unable to detect it (see e.g. Albuquerque (2009), Gong et al.
(2011) or Dikolli et al. (2013)).
One possible explanation for the RPE puzzle is the presence of exposure risk
as modeled in Göx (2016). In this view, the exposure to common risks, which
are supposed to be ﬁltered out by RPE, is assumed to be a random factor
rather than a known constant. The uncertainty about the exposure prevents
a perfect ﬁltering of the systematic risks and thus makes RPE less useful. In
the present study, I focus on this aspect and investigate how the presence of
exposure risk can aﬀect the composition and weighting of a peer group. This
investigation is interesting and important for several reasons.
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First, the notion of exposure risk in the context of RPE has emerged only
recently and, to my knowledge, so far never been empirically investigated.
Nevertheless, there is much evidence that the exposure to systematic risks
varies over time. For example, Ang and Chen (2007) or Lewellen and Nagel
(2006) observe moving beta factors in asset pricing models. Other examples
are Bodnar and Wong (2003) or Parsley and Popper (2006), who observe
time-varying exchange rate exposures. It is thus important to understand
the temporal aspect of those risks and how it aﬀects the ﬁltering purpose of
RPE. Second, ﬁnding evidence that exposure risk mitigates the usefulness of
RPE can provide an additional explanation for the RPE puzzle and support
the point of view that such contracts might not necessarily be optimal in any
case.
I will take the view of a ﬁrm trying to implement an eﬃcient contract and
derive my research questions from this point. The ﬁrst question to address
is how a ﬁrm can estimate the exposure of its own performance to the one
of a set of possible peer ﬁrms and use this information to construct a peer
index as a performance measure. This index contains a certain number of
peer ﬁrms and gives each ﬁrm a weight, such that the overall variance of the
performance measure is minimized. The second question addressed in this
study, is how the composition and aggregation of the peer group varies over
time. Third, I use the information from the second step to evaluate how well
external risks can actually be ﬁltered out by using historical data.
For the ﬁrst question I rely on existing theoretical models to measure a ﬁrm's
exposure to its peer ﬁrms by OLS regressions. On the basis of these results,
I construct a ﬁrm-speciﬁc peer group. Second, I measure the time-variation
in the exposure by means of a rolling regression to determine the exposure
risk. Third, I assess how the time-variation aﬀects the composition of the
peer group and the ﬁltering purpose of RPE. To do so, I measure by how
much the variance can be reduced if the ﬁltering process is applied. I also
investigate whether the eﬀectiveness of ﬁltering can be explained by certain
characteristics, such as the peer group size or the share of peer ﬁrms which
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belong to the same industry as the focal ﬁrm.
My main ﬁndings are that the ﬁrm-speciﬁc peer groups provide good ﬁltering
results ex post, but perform much worse out-of-sample. In contrast, simple
indices, such as industry peer groups or the S&P500, exhibit a lower ﬁltering
eﬀectiveness ex post (compared to the ﬁrm-speciﬁc peer groups), but a higher
one on an out-of-sample basis. Among the self-selected peer groups, a high
exposure risk is related to a lower ﬁltering eﬀectiveness.
The study contributes to the literature by providing empirical evidence on
the time-varying nature of peer group composition and aggregation and how
this aﬀects the usefulness of RPE in terms of risk ﬁltering.
The reminder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section provides
a brief literature overview of RPE and time-varying risk exposures, section
3 explains the empirical methodology and section 4 describes the data used
for this study. I present the main results in section 5 and robustness checks
in section 6. Section 7 summarizes and concludes the study.
2 Related literature
2.1 Relative performance evaluation
RPE is a branch of the academic literature on executive compensation that
has intensely been investigated. The theoretical foundation goes back to
Holmström (1979), who established the use of informative signals for eﬃcient
contracting in a principal agent setting. In a later work, Holmström (1982)
describes how diﬀerent agents, which all belong to a team and are exposed
to a common risk, should be rewarded based on the performance relative to
the other agents in the team.
Those papers have given rise to a large number of empirical studies on RPE.
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Early studies in this ﬁeld are e.g. Antle and Smith (1986), Gibbons and
Murphy (1990), Janakiraman et al. (1992), Aggarwal and Samwick (1999a)
or Aggarwal and Samwick (1999b). Despite the clear theoretical prediction,
empirical research has only found limited support for the use of RPE in the
data. This apparent contradiction between theory and practices has become
known as the RPE puzzle.16
Among the most prevalent explanations for the observed lack of RPE is the
managerial power approach. In this view, managers have power over the
pay-setting process and thus prevent the implementation of RPE or allow
only asymmetric RPE (see e.g. Bertrand and Mullainathan (2001), Bebchuk
et al. (2002), Garvey and Milbourn (2006) or Jiménez-Angueira and Stuart
(2015)). The managerial power approach acknowledges the beneﬁts of RPE
and argues that it is mainly due to failures in the ﬁrm's corporate governance
that RPE contracts are not set in place.
Other approaches suggest that it can be optimal not to do RPE, for exam-
ple because the manager can aﬀect the peer outcome (as in Gibbons and
Murphy (1990) or Gopalan et al. (2010)) or because it creates incentives for
harmful strategic considerations (as e.g. in Aggarwal and Samwick (1999b)).
A further explanation is that the optimal extend to which RPE is provided
to an agent depends on her characteristics or actions, such as the ability to
hedge the market (see e.g. Maug (2000) or Garvey and Milbourn (2003)) or
the agent's outside options (as e.g. in Oyer (2004), Rajgopal et al. (2006) or
Jenter and Kanaan (2015)).
A diﬀerent approach for explaining the RPE puzzle is provided amongst
others by Albuquerque (2009), Gong et al. (2011) or Dikolli et al. (2013).
In those cases, the authors claim that RPE might be done by the ﬁrms
but simply not detected by researchers. Dikolli et al. (2013) analytically
investigate the summarization errors which occur because the empiricists
16Summaries on the empirical ﬁndings of RPE tests can be found in Albuquerque (2009)
and Dikolli et al. (2013), where an overview of the test form (weak-, or strong-form test),
the used peer group and the results is provided.
46
cannot observe the composition and the aggregation rule of the peer group,
i.e. the weight assigned to the single peers within the group. Those errors can
lead to wrong inferences in RPE tests and show how sensitive these results
are to changes in the peer group identiﬁcation or aggregation.
While most RPE tests use an industry or market index as peer group, Albu-
querque (2009) matches the peer ﬁrms not only on industry, but as well on
size. Those industry-size peer groups are then shown to ﬁnd more consistent
evidence for the presence RPE compared to the industry only peer group.
Gong et al. (2011) use the information from SEC disclosure rules which came
into force in 2006 and required the ﬁrms to disclose the peers used for com-
pensation benchmarking or RPE. The authors were thus able to ﬁrst conduct
an explicit RPE test and empirically show how the traditional implicit ap-
proach has led to possibly wrong inferences. More precisely, Gong et al.
(2011) incorporate the disclosed peer group composition in their test and
ﬁnd strong support for RPE.17
Furthermore, Gong et al. (2011) conduct a RPE test by using a sample of
ﬁrms, which all explicitly disclose their use of RPE. But instead of regress-
ing the focal ﬁrm's performance on the disclosed, self-selected peer group,
the authors take a simpliﬁed peer group composition, such as industry or
industry-size peers. In this case, no signiﬁcant results can be found in favor
of RPE. This shows the limitations of the implicit RPE tests and emphasize
the importance of the composition of the peer group in such tests.
2.2 Exposure risk in RPE
The eﬀect of random exposures to common risks has been largely ignored so
far in the academic literature on RPE. The prevailing assumption is that all
17However, there is still some uncertainty left to the empiricists, since the weighting of
the single peer ﬁrms within the group is not disclosed, as already pointed out by Dikolli
et al. (2013).
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ﬁrms exactly know how their performance reacts to external shocks, i.e. what
their exposure is, and thus are able to completely ﬁlter out those shocks. One
can however easily imagine why this may not be the case. For example, one
can think of a ﬁrm which is exposed to foreign exchange rate ﬂuctuations and
wants to ﬁlter out this risk. The degree to which its cash ﬂows are exposed to
currency movements depends not only on ﬁrm-speciﬁc characteristics, such
as the proportion of foreign sales or purchasing costs, but as well on factors
beyond the ﬁrm's control, namely the behavior of its competitors and the
competitiveness in the market (Bodnar and Wong, 2003). The exposure to
external risks can thus often be seen as risky itself and the term exposure
risk refers to this concept.
Göx (2016) provides a ﬁrst analytical foundation what the presence of ex-
posure risk in a RPE setting implies in terms of peer group choice and the
possibility to ﬁlter out common noise. The author takes amongst others the
example of a focal ﬁrm, which compensates its manager based on the own
ﬁrm performance and the one of a peer index. This peer index contains a
set of peer ﬁrms, which all share a common risk with the focal ﬁrm. Both
the focal and all peer ﬁrms are assumed to have a random exposure to the
common risk. Göx (2016) shows then that the random exposure precludes
perfect ﬁltering. The higher the exposure risk is, the less useful becomes the
RPE contract.
2.3 Time-varying risk exposures
The intuition of a random or time-varying exposure is very recent in the RPE
literature and thus only few address this concern. I enlarge my literature
overview with some investigations of other time-varying exposures. This
allows me to describe the methods which can be applied in order to estimate
the exposure risk.
In the CAPM literature, there are numerous empirical studies on time-
varying market betas. Those papers provide amongst others a wide set of
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methodological approaches to address the problem of exposure risk. Gener-
ally spoken, the market betas are estimated at diﬀerent points in time and
if the they show a high ﬂuctuation over time, i.e. a large variance, this is
considered to reﬂect a high exposure risk. The use of rolling regressions is
probably the most common approach to estimate time-varying market betas.
A second popular method is to model the betas as a (mostly linear) func-
tion of observed macroeconomic variables. But there exist numerous other
approaches which have been used in the asset pricing literature.
For example, an alternative possibility to model time-varying betas is to
use ARCH-class processes, as e.g. Bollerslev et al. (1988). In this case, a
conditional covariance matrix is estimated and the elements of that matrix
are then used to compute the betas as the ratio of covariance to variance.
Especially GARCH-class models and their extensions, such as multivariate
GARCH models, are widely used to forecast volatility in CAPM settings.
However, the variations in the betas are entirely driven by past innovations
and thus do not have an independent random component (Ang and Chen,
2007), which is not what I seek for in this study.
A further approach, which allows stochastic volatility, is to study the dynam-
ics of betas by Kalman ﬁltering, e.g. by using a state space model. One of
the main drawbacks in this case is the need to specify the stochastic process
of the beta, which in many cases is diﬃcult to motivate (Engle, 2015).
Overall, the CAPM-literature provides large evidence in support of time-
varying betas, but in terms of methodology, there has been no consensus
established so far. Thus, there still exist many diﬀerent approaches and the
choice of methodology depends on the speciﬁc setting of each study.
Another branch in the literature, where time-varying exposures come into
play, is the ﬁeld of exchange rate exposures. However, the method to evaluate
the temporal aspect of the currency exposure is usually less sophisticated
than in the CAPM-literature. Studies from Jorion (1990), Brunner et al.
(2000) or Parsley and Popper (2006) all simply split the available time series
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of data into diﬀerent subperiods and investigate whether or not the exposure
is the same in all subperiods.
When it comes to currency hedging, there exist analyses which show how
exposure risk can limit the ability to ﬁlter out the underlying risks. For
example, Aabo (2015) describes a setting, where not only the currency rate
is uncertain, but as well the quantity which needs to be hedged. In this
case, trying to hedge the entire exposure can even be counterproductive, i.e.
lead to lower-tail outcomes which are worse than outcomes that involve no
hedging at all.
3 Methodology and empirical approach
3.1 The RPE contract
I brieﬂy review a basic RPE contract in an agency setting, where I consider
a ﬁrm (denoted as the focal ﬁrm), which is run by a risk averse agent on the
behalf of one or more principals.18 The agent's payout s is assumed to take
the following linear form, as e.g. in Holmström and Milgrom (1987):
si = wi + vi · zi (36)
w is a ﬁxed wage and vi is the agent's share of the performance measure zi. zi
on its part contains the own ﬁrm performance xi as well as the performances
of its peer ﬁrms xj. βi,j is the weight that the focal ﬁrm i puts on the peer
ﬁrm j.
zi(xi, xi,j) = xi −
n∑
j=1,j 6=i
βi,j · xi,j (37)
18Typically, the agent is represented as the manager of the ﬁrm. Thus, I will use the
terms agent, manager, CEO or executives interchangeably. Similarly, the principal is
typically illustrated by the shareholders or the board of directors of the ﬁrms, and all
three terms are used interchangeably.
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When constructing such a performance measure, there are three elements
that need to be decided by the principal writing the contract. The ﬁrst one
is how to measure ﬁrm performance. I follow previous literature and use eq-
uity returns as measure for ﬁrm performance. This reﬂects the predominant
evidence that stock return is the most inﬂuential factor when it comes to the
components of executives' incentive schemes (Core et al., 2003). Consistent
with that observation, most empirical RPE studies use equity returns as per-
formance measure, see e.g. Antle and Smith (1986), Albuquerque (2009) or
Gong et al. (2011).
The second aspect is the number of peer ﬁrms used in the peer group. Every
ﬁrm that shares some common risks with the focal ﬁrm, will have a non-
zero correlation with the focal ﬁrm's performance. Thus, each of those ﬁrms'
performances is an informative signal for the focal ﬁrm's performance in the
sense of Holmström (1979) and should be used as peer. However, it is typi-
cally not feasible in practice to consider all ﬁrms with a non-zero correlation
in the peer group and the number of peer ﬁrms needs to be restricted. For
example, Gong et al. (2011) investigate disclosed self-selected peer groups of
ﬁrms and ﬁnd that the average peer group consists of around 15 peer ﬁrms,
the 25th and 75th percentile being at 9 and 18 peers, respectively.
In the present study I select peer ﬁrms based on their correlation with the
focal ﬁrm's performance, the details will be provided in section 3.2.1. This
is consistent with the informativeness criterion in Holmström (1979) and re-
ﬂects the traditional theory of stock return comovement. In this view, the
correlation between two ﬁrm performances reﬂects comovement in funda-
mental values, i.e. external shocks aﬀect the expected cash ﬂows of a certain
class of ﬁrms and their returns will show some correlation.19 This assumes
eﬃcient markets, where stock prices instantly react to such shocks.
A popular approach in selecting a peer group, other than self-select the peers,
19There exist other theories which try to explain stock comovement by other factors than
fundamentals, e.g. in Barberis et al. (2003) and Barberis et al. (2005). However, those
models add possible explanations without neglecting the importance of the fundamentals
in stock return comovement.
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is to use a given index, e.g. the S&P500. In this case, the number of peers
can be very large, but the downside is that the composition and aggregation
rule is given and might not be adapted to the speciﬁc circumstances of the
focal ﬁrm.
This leads me to the last aspect, the assignment of the weights βi,j to the
single peers. In this paper, I refer to the solution in Göx (2016), where
the optimal, i.e. variance-minimizing aggregation rule, is derived from a
statistical point of view and can be found by a linear regression of the focal
ﬁrm's performance xi on the peer ﬁrms performances xi,j.
20 This regression
takes the following form:
xi = βi + βi,j
n∑
j=1,j 6=i
xi,j + i (38)
Conducting an OLS regression, one can use the resulting coeﬃcients βˆi,j to
construct the variance-minimizing performance measure zi, where the regres-
sion coeﬃcients represent the optimal weights of the peer ﬁrms within the
peer group:21
zi(xi, xi,j) = xi − βˆi,j
n∑
j=1,j 6=i
xi,j (39)
The presence of exposure risk leads now to the following diﬃculty. The
exposure to systematic risks can only be estimated by using historical data
and thus reﬂects the past exposure. However, in practice ﬁrms typically
choose their peer group ex ante so that the future exposure is relevant for the
ﬁltering (Gong et al., 2011). If the exposure varies over time, the estimated
coeﬃcient βˆi,j might therefore diﬀer from the relevant, future exposure, which
essentially prevents perfect ﬁltering. In the worst case, using the wrong betas
can even be counterproductive and lead to a variance of zi which is higher
20In cases where the peer group takes the form of a given index, such as the S&P500,
the solution can be obtained similarly by regressing the ﬁrm's performance on the index
performance, i.e. xi = β0 + βi · xindex + i.
21Again, in case of a given index, the performance measure can be computed similarly
and the index performance itself will be weighted by the estimated regression coeﬃcient,
i.e. zi(xi, xindex) = xi − βˆi · xindex.
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than it would be without ﬁltering.
3.2 Econometric approach
In this section I take the view of a ﬁrm aiming to design an eﬃcient RPE
contract for its manager. To do so, the ﬁrm evaluates the manager's perfor-
mance on the basis of an aggregate measure of its own performance and the
performance of a peer group so that the overall variance of the performance
measure is minimized. After the peer group has been established, I investi-
gate how this peer group evolves over time and how well the variance of the
performance measure can be reduced compared to a non-RPE contract.
3.2.1 Peer group composition
In a ﬁrst step, I identify the potential peer ﬁrms. While the theoretical
prediction is to include all ﬁrms which are aﬀected by the same external
shocks as the focal ﬁrm in the peer group, a focal ﬁrm will limit its number
of peers for simplicity, as discussed in the previous section.
A common method to create a peer group is to generate an index which
contains ﬁrms in the same industry as the focal ﬁrm. Those industry peer
groups have widely been used in RPE studies (e.g. in Antle and Smith (1986),
Aggarwal and Samwick (1999a), Janakiraman et al. (1992) or Garvey and
Milbourn (2006)). Albuquerque (2009) uses industry-size peer groups, i.e.
the peer group not only contains ﬁrms within the same industry, but as well
ﬁrms with similar market capitalization. The authors show that those peer
groups provide more evidence in favor of RPE when conducting empirical
tests.
However, when it comes to the purpose of ﬁltering out common shocks, ﬁrms
within the same industry are not necessarily those which best explain stock
returns. Hoberg and Phillips (2016) for example, select potential peers on
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a text-based computational analysis, and ﬁnd that those can signiﬁcantly
better explain stock return comovements than traditional industry peers. I
use the explanatory power of the peer ﬁrm as criteria to select the peer group,
regardless of any industry classiﬁcation or other matching criteria. Out of
the entire sample, I make a ﬁrst selection of possible peer ﬁrms by regressing
the performance of the focal ﬁrm i on the performance of each potential peer
ﬁrm j 6= i individually, i.e. each ﬁrm in the entire sample except the focal
ﬁrm itself.
xi = βi + βi,j · xj + i (40)
I keep the ﬁrms that meet a certain threshold for the further selection process.
More precisely, all ﬁrms with a signiﬁcant regression coeﬃcient at the 5%-
level and a R2 larger than 0.30 will remain in the pool of potential peer
ﬁrms.22 However, this approach ignores possible interdependencies between
the peer ﬁrms. In order to address this issue, I run a stepwise regression
with the focal ﬁrm as dependent variable and all remaining ﬁrms from the
regressions in (40) as independent variables.
A stepwise regression permits to choose the most relevant variables among
a large amount of independent variables. More precisely, using a backward
selection approach, I start by estimating the full model, i.e. including all
remaining potential peers that fulﬁll the criteria described above.
xi = βi +
n∑
j=1
βi,j · xj + i (41)
After the ﬁrst iteration, the least signiﬁcant regressor is removed and the
model is re-estimated. This procedure continues until all remaining indepen-
dent variables are signiﬁcant, the signiﬁcance level being set at p < 0.1. In
the end, the ﬁnal self-selected peer group of ﬁrm i consists of all ﬁrms that
22The threshold of 0.30 is arbitrarily chosen and is a result of a compromise between
setting a higher hurdle in order to get only the most relevant peer ﬁrms and a lower hurdle,
which would allow to keep more ﬁrms in the potential peer group, but with the downside
that the group becomes unrealistically large.
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remain in the model estimated by the stepwise regression in (41). The esti-
mated coeﬃcient βˆi,j will be higher if a peer ﬁrm shares the same common
risks and reacts to them in a very similar way as the focal ﬁrm, compared to
other peers with less common risks and which react diﬀerently to them.
A popular alternative approach for ﬁrms is to rely on a given ﬁrm index
instead of self-selecting the peers. In empirical implicit RPE test, the most
widely used peer indices are the S&P500, industry peer groups or industry-
size peer groups (Albuquerque, 2009). In this study, I use those indices
for comparison with the self-selected peer group. The industry peer group
contains all ﬁrms with the same 3-digit SIC level and the industry-size peer
group is based on ﬁrms with the same 2-digit SIC level and the same size
quartile.23 The focal ﬁrm itself is always excluded from the peer group.
Within the indices, I assign an equal weight to all ﬁrms, i.e. the performances
of the peer indices take the form
xSIC3 =
1
n
n∑
j=1
xSIC3j (42)
and
xSIC2SIZE =
1
n
n∑
j=1
xSIC2SIZEj (43)
respectively. The rule of thumb to equal-weight all peers is widely spread
in practice according to anecdotal evidence from ﬁrms and compensation
consultants. It also has been used as aggregation rule for the peer index
in some RPE tests, such as Garvey and Milbourn (2006) or Albuquerque
(2009).
23Matching the ﬁrms on the SIC3-industry and size quartiles would lead to very low
peer group sizes. Thus I prefer to use a larger set of ﬁrms based on the SIC2-code for the
industry-size groups.
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3.2.2 Peer group aggregation
After composing the self-selected peer group, I aggregate the peer ﬁrms into
a peer index by assigning the weight βi,j to each peer ﬁrm. As described in
equation (39), the weight of each peer ﬁrm's performance is the regression
coeﬃcient obtained by estimating the regression in (41). The performance
measure thus becomes
zi(xi, xi,j) = xi − βˆi,j
n∑
j=1
xpi,j, (44)
where xp is the set of peer ﬁrms that has been chosen by the stepwise re-
gression described in the previous section. This is essentially the same as
in equation (37), except that xp is now a subset of all potential peer ﬁrms.
The aggregation rule takes into account the individual exposure of the focal
ﬁrm's performance xi against each peer ﬁrm's performance xj.
To compare the results to the procedures used in previous literature, I addi-
tionally construct an equal-weighted peer index zewi as follows: I again take
the peer ﬁrms estimated by the regression in (41), but instead of using the
regression based weighting scheme, I simply assign equal weights to each peer
ﬁrm. This peer group helps to understand the importance of the aggregation
rule in terms of risk ﬁltering. It takes the form
zewi (xi, xi,j) = xi −
1
n
n∑
j=1
xpi,j. (45)
For all exogenously given indices, such as the S&P500, the industry and
industry-size peer group, I also estimate the individual exposures of the focal
ﬁrm against the index by an OLS regression and compute the performance
measure as follows:
zi(xi, xindex) = xi − βˆi,j · xindex (46)
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3.2.3 Intertemporal peer group composition and aggregation
To measure the stability of the peer group composition and aggregation over
time, I divide the sample period T in several subperiods t and conduct the
procedure described in section 3.2.1 and 3.2.2 for each subperiod separately.
More precisely, I use a rolling regression approach over a window of ﬁve
years, where the interval is shifted by 12 months after each regression. This
procedure generates a time series of estimates which can then be analyzed
further.
A key prerequisite for the use of the rolling regressions approach is the as-
sumption that the focal ﬁrm's exposure to each peer ﬁrm is constant within
each subperiod. If this condition is met, the simple OLS regression produces
unbiased estimates. The advantage of this non-parametric approach is that
it requires no assumptions about the functional form of the exposure or its
determinants (Lewellen and Nagel, 2006).
On the one hand, this approach allows to estimate the exposure risk. Using
the time series of estimated exposures from regression (40), I calculate the
variance of the focal ﬁrm's exposure to each of its peer ﬁrms as:
Ri,j = Var(βˆi,j,t) (47)
A high variance reﬂects a high exposure risk Ri,j. I will include this term
as an explanatory variable in the subsequent analyses to investigate how the
exposure risk is associated with variations in the peer group composition and
how it aﬀects the ﬁltering eﬀectiveness.24
On the other hand, the rolling regression approach permits to reassess the
optimal peer group composition and aggregation every year. For a single
ﬁrm, there are up to 22 peer group compositions possible, the ﬁrst peer
24Because I use the entire time series of the estimated coeﬃcients βˆi,j,t, the exposure
risk remains constant for the entire period. The variable Ri,j is therefore diﬀerent for each
pair of focal and peer ﬁrm, but does not vary with time.
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group stems from the regression period 1990-1994, the last one from 2011-
2015. However, in most cases there are less than 22 observations per ﬁrm
due to several reasons.
First, data are not available from 1990 on for several ﬁrms. Second, when
regressing the performance of the focal ﬁrm on the performance of all other
ﬁrms individually, as in (40), I require a minimum of three potential peer
ﬁrms to meet the threshold criteria of R2 = 0.3 and p < 0.1 as well as a
minimum of three ﬁrms to be in the ﬁnal peer group. This reﬂects the idea
that a ﬁrm with very low comovement with other stocks and low explanatory
power shares only few common risks, so that no reliable peer group can be
constructed.
I investigate how the peer group composition varies over time by looking at
the proportion of peer ﬁrms that remain in the group from one period to
the next. If the exposure to common risks remains constant over time, the
comovement between the stock returns will be rather stable and the selected
peer group will not experience much change over time. Else, because of the
variations in the correlations between ﬁrms over time, i.e. the exposure risk,
the peer group might diﬀer from one period to another.
The method of rolling regression does not only result in a possibly diﬀerent
peer group composition every year, but of course, the regression coeﬃcients
and thus the peer group aggregation does as well change after each iteration.
Even if the ﬁrm is maintained in a peer group for several years, its weighting
within the group will typically change in each period. This fact potentially
aﬀects the ﬁltering eﬀectiveness, which I describe in section 3.3.
When using a given stock or industry index as a peer group, I also perform
a rolling regression over a measurement period of ﬁve years and with an
interval of one year to estimate the exposure of the focal ﬁrm to the peer
index at diﬀerent points in time:
xi,t = β0,i,t + βi,t · xindex,t + εi,t (48)
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The estimated index exposure βˆi,t allows afterwards to compute the perfor-
mance measure as in (46).
3.2.4 Determinants of the peer group composition
To further analyze the changes in the composition of the peer group over
time, I investigate the factors determining whether a peer ﬁrm remains in
the peer group one year after its selection. To do so, I use the following
logistic regression:
Prob(KEEP1yri,j,t = 1) = Φ(α0 + α1 · SIC2 i,j + α2 · SIC3 i,j + α3 · SIZE i,j,t
+α4 · SIC2 i,j × SIZE i,j,t + α5 · SIC3 i,j × SIZE i,j,t
+α6 · Ri,j + εi,j,t (49)
I include all ﬁrms that have been selected as peer ﬁrms as the basic population
(46'027) and assign the value one to each ﬁrm that remains in the peer group
one year later (13'682), and zero if it drops out (32'345).25 To examine the
robustness of the peer group composition over longer time horizons, I also
construct samples, where the dependent variable takes the value one if the
ﬁrm remains in the peer group two and three years after their selection. This
is indicated by the superscript KEEP2yrs and KEEP3yrs, respectively.
The independent variables take the value of one if the peer ﬁrm is in the
same industry (SIC2 or SIC3 ) or in the same size quartile (SIZE ) as the
focal ﬁrm or both (interaction terms of the industry variables and the size
variable), zero otherwise. The exposure risk Ri,j is deﬁned as variance of the
estimated peer ﬁrm exposures, as described in equation (47).
The proportion of peers that are maintained versus the peers that are dropped
25There are 51'693 peer ﬁrms available. However, 5'666 out of them have been estimated
over the period 2011-2015 and it cannot be evaluated whether they remain in the peer
group or not one year later, since the sample data ends in 2015. The sample size for the
regression (49) is thus 46'027.
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is around 30% for the variable KEEP1yr, but much lower for the second and
third year. A balanced sample is important to obtain unbiased and eﬃcient
estimates from a logistic regression (Gong et al., 2011). Thus I use the
undersampling method to create balanced samples as e.g. in Gong et al.
(2011). For example, amongst the 32'345 peer ﬁrms which drop out one year
after their selection, I randomly select 13'682 for the regression analysis. The
random selection and the regression are repeated several times to ensure the
robustness of the results.
3.3 Evaluating the ﬁltering eﬀectiveness
The objective of the performance measure zi(xi, xi,j) is to reduce the variance
compared to a simple compensation scheme based on the focal ﬁrm's raw
performance xi only. The variance of xi and, using the peer group selection
and aggregation procedure explained above, the variance of zi(xi, xi,j) can be
computed and compared to each other to verify if
V ar(z(xi, x
p
i,j)) < V ar(xi). (50)
I consider the ﬁltering as eﬀective whenever the condition in (50) is met.
Moreover, I assess the degree of the ﬁltering eﬀectiveness E by the proportion
of the variance ﬁltered out from the focal ﬁrm's performance, i.e.:
Ei =
V ar(xi)− V ar(z(xi, xpi,j))
V ar(xi)
(51)
I evaluate the ﬁltering eﬀectiveness on an ex post as well as on an out-of-
sample basis. To do so, I deﬁne a measurement period, during which I run the
regressions for the peer group composition and aggregation, and a ﬁltering
period, for which I compute the variance of the performance measure.
For example, if the ﬁltering is done ex post, the measurement period lasts
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from 2010 to 2014 and z is computed for the last year within this period, i.e.
for the year 2014 in this example. Since the ﬁltering period is a subset of the
measurement period, this scenario converges to a perfect ﬁltering, where the
measurement and the ﬁltering periods are identical.
However, in practice ﬁrms typically choose peer groups ex ante or agree upon
the RPE-based performance targets at the beginning of an incentive program,
so that the future performance of the focal ﬁrm and its peer group determines
the eﬀectiveness of the ﬁltering (Gong et al., 2011). The measurement period
thus generally precedes the ﬁltering period.
For example, if a ﬁrms selects and aggregates its peer group based on the
historical information from 2010 to 2014, it applies the ﬁltering to the year
2015. In this case, the peer group estimated during the measurement period
is an imperfect forecast of the relevant peer group in the ﬁltering period
and therefore precludes perfect ﬁltering. In cases where the lag between the
measurement and ﬁltering period is one year, I refer to this practice as a one
year out-of-sample ﬁltering. Likewise, I compute the two and three years
out-of-sample ﬁltering.
3.3.1 Determinants of the ﬁltering eﬀectiveness
I obtain the ﬁltering eﬀectiveness of each ﬁrm and year, where a self-selected
peer group is available. This results in a new panel data set which I fur-
ther analyze. It is interesting to investigate whether certain ﬁrm or peer
group characteristics can explain the variation in the ﬁltering eﬀectiveness.
The results can provide an insight about the determinants of the ﬁltering
eﬀectiveness. I thus investigate the ﬁltering eﬀectiveness by conducting the
following pooled regression:
Ei,t = γ0 + γ1 · PEERS i,t + γ2 · Ri + γ3 · SIC2 i,t + γ4 · SIC3 i,t
+γ5 · SIZE i,t + γ6 · SIC2SIZE i,t + γ7 · SIC3SIZE i,t + εi,t (52)
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Ei is the ﬁltering eﬀectiveness as computed in equation (51). I use Ei ex post
as well as out-of-sample as dependent variable for the regression analysis. If
the dependent variable Ei is evaluated one, two or three years out-of-sample,
the independent variables are lagged by one, two and three years, respectively.
I include the exposure risk as a possible determinant for the ﬁltering eﬀective-
ness. Since Ri,j is measure for each peer ﬁrm j separately, an aggregation is
necessary to obtain a single exposure risk measure for the entire peer group.
As for the aggregation of peer ﬁrms into peer groups, I use the estimated
coeﬃcients from the stepwise regression (41), βˆswi,j , to compute Ri:
Ri =
n∑
j=1
βˆswi,j ·Ri,j (53)
It is one of the main purposes of this study to investigate how exposure
risk aﬀects the ﬁltering eﬀectiveness. The theoretical prediction is that a
high exposure risk precludes perfect ﬁltering (Göx, 2016). The higher the
exposure risk, the lower is the usefulness of RPE and therefore the ﬁltering
eﬀectiveness. Thus, I expect a negative coeﬃcient for the variable Ri.
The other independent variables are the number of peers in the peer group
(PEERS ), the share of ﬁrms within the peer group belonging to the same
industry as the focal ﬁrm (SIC2 and SIC3 ), the share of ﬁrms in the same
size quartile as the focal ﬁrm (SIZE) and the share of ﬁrms within the same
industry and same size quartile (SIC2SIZE and SIC3SIZE).
I expect the number of peers to be positively correlated with E, since each
additional peer that exhibits a non-zero correlation with the performance
of the focal ﬁrm, contributes to explaining the variance of the focal ﬁrm's
performance. I also expect a positive regression coeﬃcient for the industry
and size variables, since peer groups with a high share of ﬁrms within the
same industry or size quartile as the focal ﬁrm are supposed to share more
common risks with the focal ﬁrm (Albuquerque, 2009).
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4 Data
The sample consists of all S&P500 ﬁrms. I include both ﬁnancial as well as
non-ﬁnancial ﬁrms, because I expect no diﬀerences between those ﬁrms in
terms of RPE usage or the ability to use RPE for ﬁltering purposes. I use 26
years of data (1990-2015) and collect monthly stock returns, which allows me
to obtain a time series of exposures long enough to assess its time-variation.
I exclude ﬁrms with less than ﬁve years of consecutive data and winsorize
the stock return and market value variables at the top and bottom 1%-level
to mitigate the eﬀect of outliers. If diﬀerent classes of shares from the same
company are listed, I exclude all except of one class. The performance is
measured by equity returns (computed as total shareholder return). Panel A
of table 1 presents the summary statistics of the data. The sample contains
472 ﬁrms with a total of 127'224 stock return observations and a monthly
mean return of around 1.02%. The market value of equity is used to compute
size quartiles at the beginning of each year.
[please insert table 1 about here]
Panel B shows the summary statistics of the industry and industry-size peer
groups. The industry peer group consists on average of around 10 ﬁrms,
the largest industry contains 23 ﬁrms. The average number of ﬁrms in the
industry-size peer group is 9 and the largest group contains 20 ﬁrms. In
both cases, the minimum size required for the analysis is ﬁxed at three ﬁrms.
The focal ﬁrm is always excluded from the peer group, i.e. the peer group
is slightly diﬀerent for every focal ﬁrm. This is also the reason for the high
number of returns observations (94'183 and 107'078 respectively). I com-
pute the returns as an equal-weighted index of all ﬁrms within the industry
or industry-size peer group as shown in the equations (42) and (43). The
average return of those groups is .010, which is roughly the same as for the
individual stock returns. The S&P500 index contains 311 observations, which
corresponds to 26 years of monthly returns.
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Panel C presents the descriptive statistics for the self-selected peer groups
estimated with the procedure described in 3.2.1. These summary statistics
are also valid for the equal-weighted self-selected peer groups as described in
equation (45), since the composition is the same in both cases.
The average peer group contains about 7.5 ﬁrms, which is less than the
industry peer group or the industry-size group. The largest peer group com-
prises 45 ﬁrms. However, this is an exception, since the majority of the peer
groups contain between three and twenty ﬁrms (the 95th percentile being at
20). Overall, I can ﬁnd 6920 self-selected peer groups accommodating a total
number of 51'693 ﬁrms. Around 16.4% of those peers are in the same SIC3
industry as the focal ﬁrm (8'490 out of 51'693) and around 7.8% of the self-
selected peers also appear in the industry-size peer group of the focal ﬁrm
(4'022 out of 51'693).
5 Main results
5.1 Peer group composition over time
In this section I analyze on a ﬁrm-level basis how the peer group composition
varies over time. For this part of the analysis, I ignore the weighting of the
peers within the group and address it only in the next section. Table 2
presents the results and can be interpreted as follows. Given a peer group
at time t, only 29.7% of the ﬁrms remain in the peer group at t + 1, i.e.
in the next year. Three years later, the original peer group in t has largely
been replaced, the proportion of ﬁrms that are selected in t+3 represent just
16.6% of the original group. In absolute numbers, if I take the average peer
group size of 7.47 peer ﬁrms, only 2.22 of these ﬁrms are the same peers as in
the previous year, whereas the remaining part (5.25) of the peer group has
been newly added to the peer group.
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[please insert table 2 about here]
As shown in table 1, only 16.4% of the peer ﬁrms have the same SIC3-digit
code as the focal ﬁrm (8'490 out of 51'693). In an average peer group there
are thus only 1.23 peer ﬁrms from the same industry. However, the industry
peers seem to be slightly more stable. After one year, 48.1% of these peers
remain in the peer group and even after three years, 36.1% are kept as peer
ﬁrms. Similarly, the peer ﬁrms within the same industry (SIC2) and size
quartile as the focal ﬁrm are also less likely to be replaced. 47.5% of the
selected peer ﬁrms remain in the peer group of that focal ﬁrm after one year,
which is a slightly lower percentage than for the industry-only peers, but
higher than for the general peer ﬁrms.
5.1.1 Determinants of the peer group composition
The next step of the analysis considers all ﬁrms that have been chosen as
peer ﬁrms at any point of time. Within this new sample, I evaluate for each
peer ﬁrm whether it remains in the peer group one, two or three years later.
I run the logistic regression model (49) and obtain the results presented in
table 3. First, the pseudo R2 of just 4.57% to 9.37% indicates a low model
ﬁt. This suggests that there might be other peer group or ﬁrm characteristics
which better determine the peer group stability. Nevertheless, there are some
interesting ﬁndings regarding the peer group composition.
Overall, the results conﬁrm the ﬁndings from the previous section and assure
their statistical signiﬁcance. Furthermore, the results are very similar in all
columns. No matter if one looks at the composition one, two or three year
ahead, the signiﬁcant determinants are almost always the same.
[please insert table 3 about here]
Peer ﬁrms which belong to the same industry are more likely to remain in
the peer group in the following years. This holds for both industry levels
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SIC2 and SIC3, respectively. Similarly, the probability to remain in the peer
group is signiﬁcantly higher for peers with the same size quartile as the focal
ﬁrm.
If a peer ﬁrm belongs to the same industry and to the same size quartile
as the focal ﬁrm, the coeﬃcients add up, meaning that the probability to
remain in the peer group is even higher than for peers matching on industry
or size only. However, the estimate of the interaction variables SIC2 ×SIZE
and SIC3 ×SIZE are not signiﬁcant. The combination per se of being a peer
ﬁrm in the same industry and of the same size as the focal ﬁrm does therefore
not additionally increase the probability to remain in the peer group.
The coeﬃcient Ri,j is signiﬁcant at the 1%-level in the column '3 years'.
This means, that a stable exposure against the focal ﬁrm is associated with
a higher probability of being chosen as peer three years later. However, the
result is ambiguous, because the coeﬃcients for the columns '1 year' and '2
years' are not signiﬁcant.
5.2 Peer group aggregation and ﬁltering
I next consider the aggregation of the peer group in addition to its com-
position. To do so, I compute the performance measure z and analyze the
ﬁltering eﬀectiveness E. First, I present the results where I use the S&P500
index, the industry- and the industry-size peer group to ﬁlter out the system-
atic risks (Table 4, Panel A-C). The four columns show the time diﬀerences
between the estimation periods and the ﬁltering period. t = 0 is the ex post
view and t = 1, 2, 3 are the out-of sample views. For example, in t = 3 I
take the peer group estimated using the data from 1990-1994 to ﬁlter out
common risks in 1997.
The ﬁrst row of each panel shows the number of estimated variances. The
variances are calculated for each ﬁrm and year separately and one ﬁrm-year
variance counts as one observation. However, I count the observation V ar(xi)
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only if V ar(zi) exists as well for the same ﬁrm and year. This is the reason
why the number of observations decreases from t = 0 to t = 3. In Panel
B for example, the ﬁrst column contains 7'064 ﬁrm-year variances, because
data from 1994 until 2015 can be taken into account. For the column t = 3,
the ﬁrst available observation for V ar(zi) occurs in the year 1997 (taking
the ﬁrst estimation period from 1990 to 1994 and adding three years) and
therefore, only 5'962 ﬁrm-year variances can be computed.
The second row presents the mean of all ﬁrm-year variances of the focal
ﬁrm's monthly stock returns xi. It can be seen that V ar(xi) is roughly the
same between and also within all panels. This is not surprising, since the
underlying data is basically the same, the only diﬀerence being that not
always all observations are used. The third row does the same calculation
except that I now compute the variance of the aggregate performance measure
z, i.e. the ﬁltered stock returns. One can see that the ﬁltering is on average
eﬀective in all cases since V ar(zi) is strictly smaller than V ar(xi). In Panel
B, for example, the average yearly variance is .00936 for the unﬁltered returns
and .00613 for the ﬁltered returns. The absolute reduction achieved by RPE
is thus .00323, as shown in the fourth row. The ﬁltering eﬀectiveness, i.e.
the relative reduction in variance, is 34.52% as shown in the last row.
[please insert table 4 about here]
A view at the diﬀerences between and within the panels provides some inter-
esting insights. For example, the ﬁrst column (ex post ﬁltering) shows that
using the S&P500 index to ﬁlter out the systematic risks leads to the low-
est ﬁltering eﬀectiveness. The average variance V ar(xi) can be reduced by
25.93% compared to 32.24% for the industry-size peer group and 34.52% for
the industry peer group. This ﬁnding suggests that industry and industry-
size peer groups can better explain the variance of the focal ﬁrm than the
S&P500 index. However, between the industry and the industry-size peer
group there seems to be no major diﬀerence. The industry-only index, con-
taining all ﬁrms with the same SIC3-digit code as the focal ﬁrm, even per-
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forms slightly better the industry-size index, containing ﬁrms with the same
SIC2-digit code and the same size quartile as the focal ﬁrm. Ex post, the
highest ﬁltering eﬀectiveness is achieved by the beta-weighted self-selected
peer group (72.21%).
Within each panel, one can observe that the ﬁltering eﬀectiveness weakens as
the time diﬀerence between the estimation and the ﬁltering period increases.
The biggest decline occurs between the ex post view t = 0 and the one year
out-of-sample view t = 1. For example, in the equal-weighted self-selected
peer group the eﬃciency decreases from 45.91% to 22.89%. From t = 1
to t = 3 the variance reduction is surprisingly constant and decreases only
slowly. In panel C the eﬀectiveness remains virtually the same and even
slightly increases to 29.91% in t = 3.
The strongest decrease in the eﬀectiveness appears in the self-selected peer
groups, especially when the aggregation rule for the performance measure z is
based on the estimated betas as described in equation (46). Panel E presents
the results. Both self-selected peer groups only outperform the other indices
ex post, otherwise they perform worse. For example, the decrease from t = 0
to t = 1 is by far the largest for the beta-weighted self-selected peer group
as the eﬀectiveness decreases from 72.21% to 8.75%.
The comparison between panel D and E is particularly interesting, because
the only diﬀerence between the two peer groups is the aggregation rule, while
the composition is exactly the same in both cases. Every diﬀerence in the
results is therefore due to the aggregation rule. It shows how the exposure
risk leads to less eﬃcient ﬁltering. Due to the time-variation in the exposure,
the out-of-sample ﬁltering is worse for the beta-weighted peer group than for
the equal-weighted one. For example, the ﬁltering period t = 3 shows a value
of 1.43% in panel E. This means that the variance of the ﬁltered returns is
barely lower than with raw returns. In such a case, using RPE to ﬁlter out
systematic risks is essentially useless.
Overall, it seems that the self-selected peer groups provide good results ex
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post, but are much less constant than the given indices. For example, the
industry peer group exhibits the largest ﬁltering eﬀectiveness in the out-of-
sample speciﬁcations. A ﬁrm might thus prefer to rely on exogenously given
indices to ﬁlter out systematic risks rather than constructing a ﬁrm-speciﬁc
peer group.
5.2.1 Determinants of the ﬁltering eﬀectiveness
So far, the results indicate that the self-selected peer groups perform poorly
in ﬁltering common risks in out-of-sample periods. This observation is par-
ticularly pronounced for the beta-weighted aggregation rule. However, these
results are based on sample averages, whereas the ﬁltering eﬀectiveness varies
considerably among individual ﬁrms. It is thus interesting to examine whether
certain ﬁrm or peer group characteristics can explain the variation of the ﬁl-
tering eﬀectiveness.
Table 5 shows the result of this analysis. The ﬁrst column presents the ex post
view, i.e. when the ex post ﬁltering eﬀectiveness is taken as the dependent
variable. The positive and signiﬁcant estimate for the variable PEERS shows
that an increase in the peer group size is associated with a higher ﬁltering
eﬀectiveness. Similarly, the higher the fraction of ﬁrms belonging to the same
SIC-3 industry, the higher is E. The variables SIZE , SIC2SIZE , SIC3SIZE
and the exposure risk R are not signiﬁcantly related to the ex post ﬁltering
eﬀectiveness.
[please insert table 5 about here]
The results change considerably for the out-of-sample estimates in columns
2-4. For example, the second column reports the estimates if the ﬁltering ef-
fectiveness is computed one year out-of-sample. An interesting ﬁnding is that
the peer group size is now negatively associated to E, whereas the coeﬃcient
is positive for the within sample estimate. An increase in the peer group size
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is therefore related with a lower out-of-sample ﬁltering eﬀectiveness. This
ﬁnding questions the view that a larger peer group is more eﬃcient in ﬁlter-
ing common risk from the focal ﬁrm's performance. A possible interpretation
for this result is that each additional peer ﬁrms also potentially adds expo-
sure risk. However, since I also include the exposure risk in the regression,
this eﬀect should be captured by the variable R.
The variable SIC3 is signiﬁcant for all speciﬁcations. Peer groups with a
higher proportion of ﬁrms belonging to the same SIC3-industry as the focal
ﬁrm, exhibit on average a higher ﬁltering eﬀectiveness. This supports the fact
that ﬁrms tend to choose peers within their industry (see e.g. Albuquerque
(2013) or Gong et al. (2011)). On the other hand, I do not ﬁnd that choosing
peers in the same SIC-2 industry or peers with a similar market capitalization
helps to reduce the variance of the focal ﬁrm's stock return. Only in the last
column, the estimate for the variable SIZE is positive and signiﬁcant.
The variable R is signiﬁcantly negative for all out-of-sample speciﬁcations.
This ﬁnding of great interest in this study, because it supports the theoretical
prediction that a high exposure risk can negatively aﬀect the usefulness of
RPE. Peer groups with a high exposure risk, i.e. where the peer ﬁrms'
exposure to the focal ﬁrm varies over time, have a lower ﬁltering eﬀectiveness.
Vice versa, a more stable peer group is associated with a higher ﬁltering
eﬀectiveness out of sample.
The comparison of the estimates for the diﬀerent time horizons can provide
some additional information. The exposure risk coeﬃcients are increasing
with the forecasting horizon. For example, their value is -13.7 for the one
year horizon and -20.6 for the three year horizon. Thus, the longer a ﬁrm
sticks to the same peer group composition and aggregation, the more harmful
is the exposure risk for the ﬁltering purpose of RPE.
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6 Robustness checks
6.1 Peer group composition
In the main part of the study I already presented the results for diﬀerent peer
group compositions. Namely, I compared the self-selected peer group with
commonly used indices, such as an equal-weighted industry index (based on
the SIC2- and SIC3-codes) and the S&P500. There are of course numerous
ways to establish a self-selected peer group. In any case, the focal ﬁrm's per-
formance will potentially show a time-varying correlation to the performance
of the selected peer ﬁrm, because the underlying exposure to the common
risk varies over time. Thus, I do not expect that the main ﬁndings regarding
the ﬁltering eﬀectiveness will alter for diﬀerent peer ﬁrm selection criteria.
In my study, I use two steps to establish the peer group. First, I select a group
of potential peers based on simple OLS regressions. Second, I choose the
peer ﬁrms within this group based on a stepwise regression. As a variation
to the main part of the study, I now modify the selection criteria of the
second step and show the impact on the peer group composition and ﬁltering
eﬀectiveness. To do so, I increase the signiﬁcance level for the selection of
peer ﬁrms to p < .05 (instead of p < .1). The higher hurdle decreases the
number of selected peers, but the average peer ﬁrm is now expected to share
even more common risks with the focal ﬁrm.
[please insert table 6 about here]
Table 6 shows the impact of restricting the signiﬁcance level for the peer
group selection. This change results in an average peer group size of 5.19
ﬁrms instead of 7.47. However, at the same time the smaller peer group
appears to be more stable over time. For example, 34.6% of the initial peers
are still part of the peer group three years later as compared to 16.6% with
the lower selection hurdle of p < .1. Peer ﬁrms with the same industry
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or industry-size characteristics as the focal ﬁrm are again less likely to be
removed from the peer group. This eﬀect is now even stronger than in the
main part of the study.
6.2 Determinants of the peer group composition
I run again the logistic regression from model (49) and now include diﬀerent
control variables to examine whether those variables better explain the prob-
ability of a peer ﬁrm to remain in the peer group or whether the inclusion of
control variables change the main results.
First, I add the size quartile of the focal and the peer ﬁrm. Controlling for
size reﬂects the idea that larger ﬁrms might be more stable in terms of their
exposure to systematic risks. It is more diﬃcult for them to quickly react
to new trends or to reorganize their strategy and/or their products. A large
peer ﬁrm might therefore have a higher probability to remain in the peer
group, especially if the focal ﬁrm is large as well (for this reason I add the
interaction term between those variable). Second, I add the peer group size
as control variable. If a ﬁrm has a large peer group, the probability for a
peer ﬁrm to remain in the group might be higher simply because there are
more free slots to be assigned.
[please insert table 7 about here]
The results shown in table 7 conﬁrm the main ﬁndings in section 5.1.1. The
variables SIC2 and SIC3 are still signiﬁcant at the 1%-level in all three
columns. The exposure risk R is again only signiﬁcant in the column '3
years' and the interaction terms SIC2 × SIZE and SIC3 × SIZE cannot be
distinguished from zero except for one case. The magnitude of the coeﬃcients
is as well very similar to the main results, the R-squared is slightly higher,
mainly due to the inclusion of the variable PEERS .
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One diﬀerent result is that the coeﬃcient SIZE is not signiﬁcant anymore.
In contrast, the interaction term SIZEF × SIZEP is signiﬁcantly positive in
all cases. This result provides some support for the hypothesis that larger
peer ﬁrms are more stable if the focal ﬁrm is large as well. The peer group
size PEERS has a signiﬁcant negative coeﬃcient, which is against the ex-
pectation. However, this does not aﬀect the other estimates and does not
change the overall interpretation from the main results.
6.3 Analysis of the ﬁltering eﬀectiveness
To examine the robustness of the results in section 5.2.1, where the ﬁltering
eﬀectiveness is analyzed, I use regression model (52) and add diﬀerent control
variables. First, I include the size quartile of the focal ﬁrm. The reason for
including this variable is that it might be easier for large ﬁrms to detect other
ﬁrms with some similarities. Small ﬁrms, which often occupy a market niche,
might face more diﬃculties to ﬁnd ﬁrms with a similar risk exposure.
Second, I add the variable R2. It takes the value of the coeﬃcient of deter-
mination obtained from the stepwise regression in (41) during the estimation
period, which I used to identify the initial peer group. In the ex post view,
there is certainly a positive coeﬃcient (since the peer group has explicitly
been chosen in a way to obtain a high R2), but I also expect this positive
relation to hold for the out-of-sample ﬁltering eﬀectiveness.
[please insert table 8 about here]
Overall, the results shown in table 8 are very similar to the main results in
section 5.2.1. The peer group size is positively associated with the ﬁltering
eﬀectiveness in the ex post view and negatively in the out-of-sample view.
The coeﬃcient on the exposure risk R remains signiﬁcant at the 1%-level for
all out-of-sample speciﬁcations.
73
The variable R2 is not only positive and signiﬁcant in the column 'ex post',
but as well in all other columns. A high R-squared in the estimation period is
thus associated with a higher ﬁltering eﬀectiveness in out-of-sample periods.
This observation indicates that the method of choosing peer ﬁrms based
on the approach in this study, i.e. by using the stepwise regression model
(41), has at least some abilities to ﬁlter out systematic risks in later periods.
The second control variable included, SIZEF , has no signiﬁcant eﬀect on the
dependent variable E.
7 Conclusion
This study investigates how the presence of exposure risk, i.e. the time-
variation in the exposure to systematic risks, aﬀects the ﬁltering purpose in
RPE settings. In a ﬁrst step, I estimate the exposure of a ﬁrm's performance
to the performance of potential peer ﬁrms in order to construct a ﬁrm-speciﬁc
peer group. Using a rolling regression approach, I then assess the exposure
risk and examine how the peer group composition evolves over time. Finally,
I compute and investigate the ﬁltering eﬀectiveness, i.e. the relative variance
reduction achieved by using RPE.
The exposure risk aﬀects both the composition and the aggregation of a peer
group. Taking a peer group at a certain point in time, I ﬁnd that only 16.6%
of the peer ﬁrms are left in the group three years later. Peer ﬁrms from the
same industry or same size as the focal ﬁrm are more likely to remain in
the peer group. In contrast, the exposure risk has no clear relation with the
probability to remain in the peer group one or two years later.
The main point of the study is the examination of the ﬁltering eﬀectiveness.
The results provide evidence that the presence of exposure risk aﬀects the
ﬁltering eﬀectiveness in RPE settings. While the self-selected peer group
can explain the largest proportion of the focal ﬁrm's equity return variance
within the sample period, this result does not hold for the out-of-sample pe-
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riods. However, the out-of-sample view is more important, because the peer
group is typically chosen ex ante and the RPE-based performance targets are
agreed upon at the beginning of the period for which the performance should
be evaluated. The observed diﬀerence from the ex post and out-of-sample
ﬁltering results is due to the exposure risk. With constant exposure, there
would be no such diﬀerence.
Interestingly, simple peer indices such as the S&P500 or industry peer groups
show better out-of-sample ﬁltering abilities than the self-selected peer group.
One possible interpretation is that the exposure to such indices is more stable
over time and can thus better ﬁlter out systematic risks in out-of-sample
periods.
I further analyze the ﬁltering eﬀectiveness of the self-selected peer group
and ﬁnd that the peer group size and the exposure risk are signiﬁcantly
associated to the out-of-sample ﬁltering eﬀectiveness. Peer groups with a
high exposure risk show on average a lower ﬁltering eﬀectiveness. This eﬀect
becomes stronger with an increasing time horizon, i.e. a given increase in the
exposure risk is more harmful for the 3-years out-of-sample ﬁltering than for
the 1-year out-of-sample ﬁltering.
The results in this study provide evidence for an additional explanation of the
RPE puzzle. Firms prone to a high exposure risk might prefer standardized
instead of self-constructed peer groups or even refrain from RPE due to its
low ability to remove the exposure of the ﬁrm's performance to common
risk. Future research can investigate how the exposure risk can be taken into
account to further optimize the peer group composition and aggregation.
This could provide insights on the possibility to use RPE eﬀectively, even in
presence of exposure risk.
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Tables and ﬁgures
Table 1: Summary statistics
Panel A: Basic data N Mean sd Min Max
Firm characteristics:
stock return 127'224 .010 .099 -.851 .914
market value ($ millions) 127'224 19'416 39'916 2.5 752'015
Panel B: Benchmark peer groups:
Size:
Industry (SIC3) 53 10.26 6.09 3 23
Industry-size (SIC2 & size) 91 9.40 4.32 3 20
Returns:
Industry (SIC3) 94'183 .010 .071 -.514 .416
Industry-size (SIC2 & size) 107'078 .010 .068 -.416 .442
S&P500 311 .008 .042 -.113 .104
Panel C: Self-selected peer groups:
Peer group characteristics:
Size 6920 7.47 5.76 3 45
Peer ﬁrm characteristics:
total number of peer ﬁrms 51'693
- thereof same SIC3 8'490 1.23 1.80 0 19
- thereof same SIC2 & size 4'022 .58 .94 0 9
The table shows the number of observations (N), the mean value (Mean), the standard deviation
(sd), the minimum value (Min) and the maximum value (Max) for each variable.
The sample period lasts from 1990 to 2015 and contains monthly data. The sample comprises 471
ﬁrms from the S&P500 with overall 127'224 monthly return observations.
Panel A describes the ﬁrm characteristics. The stock returns are computed as ln(
Ri,t
Ri,t−1
), R being
the total return index from Datastream.
Panel B describes the size and the returns of the benchmark peer groups. Both the industry and
the industry-size peer group are computed as equal-weighted index, where the focal ﬁrm itself is
excluded.
Panel C describes the regression based self-selected peer group. The ﬁrst step is to regress the focal
ﬁrm on all sample ﬁrms individually: xi = βi + βi,j · xj + i. I maintain all ﬁrms with a signiﬁcant
coeﬃcient at the 5%-level. Then I run a stepwise regression with the focal ﬁrm as dependent variable
and the ﬁrms maintained from the ﬁrst step as independent variables: xi = βi +
∑n
j=1 βi,j · xj + i.
I provide details to this procedure in section 3.2.1.
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Table 2: Peer group composition over time
t = 1 t = 2 t = 3
avg # of peer ﬁrms 7.47
- thereof maintained after t years 2.22 1.57 1.24
29.7% 21.0% 16.6%
avg # of peer ﬁrms (same SIC3) 1.23
- thereof maintained after t years .59 .48 .44
48.1% 39.4% 36.1%
avg # of peer ﬁrms (same SIC2 & size) .58
- thereof maintained after t years .26 .23 .20
47.5% 39.5% 35.3%
The ﬁrst column shows the average number of ﬁrms per peer group based on the beta-weighted
self-selected peer group. The other columns show the proportion of ﬁrms which are maintained in
the peer group one, two and three years later.
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Table 3: Analysis of the peer group composition
1 year 2 years 3 years
SIC2 .655** .785** .973**
(.056) (.067) (.077)
SIC3 .409** .520** .628**
(.061) (.077) (.088)
SIZE .127** .111** .187**
(.032) (.043) (.051)
SIC2 × SIZE -.116 -.160 -.338*
(.099) (.126) (.148)
SIC3 × SIZE .169 .278 .285
(.113) (.143) (.165)
R -.334 -.431 -2.889**
(.377) (.491) (.609)
Intercept .255* -.130 -.274
(.104) (.135) (.165)
observations 27'364 17'216 12'182
Pseudo R2 4.57% 6.71% 9.37%
Year FE yes yes yes
This table shows the results from regression model (49): Prob(KEEP i,j,t = 1) = Φ(α0+α1 ·SIC2 i,j+
α2 · SIC3 i,j + α3 · SIZE i,j,t + α4 · SIC2 i,j × SIZE i,j,t + α5 · SIC3 i,j × SIZE i,j,t + α6 ·Ri,j + εi,j,t.
The sample contains all ﬁrms which have been chosen as peer ﬁrms in the self-selected peer group.
The dependent variable takes the value one if the peer ﬁrm is still part of the peer group one year
later (respectively two and three years later for the columns '2 years' and '3 years') and zero if the
peer ﬁrm has dropped out from the peer group one year later (respectively two and three years later
for the columns '2 years' and '3 years').
The independent variables are deﬁned as follows: PEERS=number of peer ﬁrms in the peer group.
SIC2 ,SIC3=1 if the peer ﬁrm is in the same industry as the focal ﬁrm, zero otherwise. SIZE==1 if
the peer ﬁrm is in the same size quartile as the focal ﬁrm, zero otherwise. Ri,j =Var(βˆi,j,t), where
βˆi,j,t are the estimates from regression (40) obtained from rolling regressions.
Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. * and ** denote statistical signiﬁcance at the
5% and 1% level, respectively (two-tailed test).
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Table 4: Filtering eﬀectiveness over time
t = 0 t = 1 t = 2 t = 3
Panel A: S&P500
observations 9'361 8'889 8'414 7'945
mean V ar(xi) .00869 .00912 .00863 .00856
mean V ar(zi), t years after estimation .00643 .00703 .00665 .00670
V ar(xi)− V ar(zi) .00225 .00209 .00198 .00187
ﬁltering eﬀectiveness E 25.93% 22.93% 22.97% 21.80%
Panel B: Industry peer group
observations 7'064 6'697 6'630 5'962
mean V ar(xi) .00936 .00926 .00917 .00901
mean V ar(zi), t years after estimation .00613 .00623 .00618 .00606
V ar(xi)− V ar(zi) .00323 .00303 .00299 .00296
ﬁltering eﬀectiveness E 34.52% 32.70% 32.57% 32.80%
Panel C: Industry-size peer group
observations 7'666 7'525 7'112 6'701
mean V ar(xi) .00948 .00925 .00920 .00901
mean V ar(zi), t years after estimation .00642 .00649 .00645 .00636
V ar(xi)− V ar(zi) .00306 .00276 .00276 .00271
ﬁltering eﬀectiveness E 32.24% 29.84% 29.95% 29.91%
Panel D: regression based peer group
(equal-weighted)
observations 6'920 6'499 6'075 5'669
mean V ar(xi) .00866 .00834 .00813 .00803
mean V ar(zi), t years after estimation .00468 .00643 .00646 .00639
V ar(xi)− V ar(zi) .00398 .00191 .00167 .00164
ﬁltering eﬀectiveness E 45.91% 22.89% 20.56% 20.39%
Panel E: regression based peer group
(beta-weighted)
observations 6'920 6'499 6'075 5'669
mean V ar(xi) .00866 .00834 .00813 .00803
mean V ar(zi), t years after estimation .00241 .00761 .00757 .00792
V ar(xi)− V ar(zi) .00625 .00073 .00056 .00011
ﬁltering eﬀectiveness E 72.21% 8.75% 6.90% 1.43%
This table shows the variances and ﬁltering eﬀectiveness for diﬀerent peer groups (Panel A-D) and
ﬁltering periods (t = 0 to t = 3).
Panel A uses the S&P500 as peer group. V ar(xi) is the variance of the monthly stock returns
for a single ﬁrm and a single year. mean V ar(xi) is the average V ar(xi) of all ﬁrms and years.
V ar(zi) is computed as V ar(xi − βˆi,jxindex). The ﬁltering eﬀectiveness is computed as Ei =
V ar(xi)− V ar(zi)
V ar(xi)
.
Panel B uses an equal-weighted return index of all ﬁrms within the same SIC-3 industry as the focal
ﬁrm as peer group.
Panel C uses an equal-weighted return index of all ﬁrms within the same SIC-2 industry and the
same size quartile as the focal ﬁrm as peer group.
Panel D uses the regression based self-selected peer group, giving an equal weight to each peer ﬁrm.
I provide details on the determination of this peer group in section 3.2.1.
Panel E uses the regression based self-selected peer group. I provide details on the determination of
this peer group in section 3.2.1. V ar(zi) is computed as V ar(xi− βˆi,j
∑n
j=1 x
p
i,j), where x
p
i,j are the
ﬁrms of the regression based self-selected peer group and βˆi,j is their weight within the group.
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Table 5: Analysis of the ﬁltering eﬀectiveness
ex post out-of-sample
1 year 2 years 3 years
PEERS .0148** -.1065** -.1264** -.1944**
(.0008) (.0062) (.0081) (.0144)
SIC2 .0064 .0026 .0006 .0734**
(.0036) (.0167) (.0196) (.0283)
SIC3 .0089* .1092** .1232** .1130**
(.0043) (.0189) (.0230) (.0352)
SIZE .0013 -.0059 -.0176 .0608*
(.0022) (.0124) (.0171) (.0273)
SIC2SIZE .0543 -.1315 -.1612 -.6578*
(.0519) (.1867) (.1711) (.3056)
SIC3SIZE .0341 -.0086 -.3982* .0021
(.0569) (.1892) (.1791) (.3153)
R -.7279 -13.6893** -19.9085** -20.5551**
(.4633) (2.0150) (2.7623) (4.1408)
Intercept .3852** .4573** .7485** 1.0469**
(.0186) (.0533) (.0607) (.0936)
observations 6920 6499 6075 5669
R2 29.36% 31.97% 32.45% 26.16%
Year FE yes yes yes yes
This table shows the results from regression model (52): Ei,t = γ0 + γ1 · PEERS i,t + γ2 · Ri +
γ3SIC2 i,t + γ4 · SIC3 i,t + γ5 · SIZE i,t + γ6 · SIC2SIZE i,t + γ7 · SIC2SIZE i,t + εi,t.
The dependent variable Ei,t diﬀers for each column. 'Ex post' uses the ex post ﬁltering eﬀectiveness,
'out-of-sample' uses the ﬁltering eﬀectiveness one, two and three years out-of-sample. The dependent
variable is winsorized at the 1%-level. The independent variables in the columns 'out-of-sample' are
lagged by one, two and three years, respectively.
The independent variables are deﬁned as follows: PEERS=number of peer ﬁrms in the peer group.
SIC2 ,SIC3=(number of peer ﬁrms within the same industry as the focal ﬁrm)/(total number of peer
ﬁrms in the peer group). SIZE=(number of peer ﬁrms within the same size quartile as the focal
ﬁrm)/(total number of peer ﬁrms in the peer group). SIC2SIZE ,SIC3SIZE=(number of peer ﬁrms
within the same industry and the same size quartile as the focal ﬁrm)/(total number of peer ﬁrms
in the peer group). Ri=βˆ
sw
i,j,t· Var(βˆi,j,t), where βˆswi,j,t is the estimate from the stepwise regression
(41) and βˆi,j,t are the estimates from regression (40), both obtained from rolling regressions.
Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. * and ** denote statistical signiﬁcance at the
5% and 1% level, respectively (two-tailed test).
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Table 6: Peer group composition over time
t = 1 t = 2 t = 3
avg # of peer ﬁrms 5.19
- thereof maintained after t years 2.55 2.07 1.80
49.2% 39.8% 34.6%
avg # of peer ﬁrms (same SIC3) 1.29
- thereof maintained after t years .94 .84 .79
72.6% 65.2% 61.4%
avg # of peer ﬁrms (same SIC2 & size) .62
- thereof maintained after t years .39 .34 .32
62.2% 55.4% 51.9%
The ﬁrst column shows the average number of ﬁrms per peer group based on the beta-weighted
self-selected peer group. The other columns show the proportion of ﬁrms which are maintained in
the peer group one, two and three years later.
Diﬀerent from table 2, I set the signiﬁcance level in the stepwise regression at p < .05 instead of
p < .10.
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Table 7: Analysis of the peer group composition
1 year 2 years 3 years
SIC2 .605** .749** .947**
(.053) (.068) (.078)
SIC3 .419** .521** .626**
(.062) (.078) (.089)
SIZE .060 -.024 .130*
(.039) (.051) (.061)
SIC2 × SIZE -.104 -.171 -.344*
(.100) (.126) (.149)
SIC3 × SIZE .147 .220 .307
(.114) (.142) (.166)
R -.098 .003 -2.661**
(.384) (.501) (.610)
SIZEF -.490 -.115* -.144*
(.036) (.047) (.057)
SIZEP -.031 -.075 -.058
(.035) (.046) (.056)
SIZEF × SIZEP .027* .058** .059**
(.013) (.017) (.020)
PEERS -.043** -.031** -.020**
(.002) (.002) (.002)
Intercept .507** .229 -.098
(.143) (.153) (.226)
observations 27'364 17'216 12'182
Pseudo R2 6.52% 7.62% 10.00%
Year FE yes yes yes
This table shows the results from the following regression model: Prob(KEEP i,j,t = 1) = Φ(α0 +
α1 ·SIC2 i,j +α2 ·SIC3 i,j +α3 ·SIZE i,j,t +α4 ·SIC2 i,j ×SIZE i,j,t +α5 ·SIC3 i,j ×SIZE i,j,t +α6 ·
Ri,j + α7 · SIZEF + α8 · SIZEP + α9 · SIZEF × SIZEP + α10 · PEERS + εi,j,t.
The sample contains all ﬁrms which have been chosen as peer ﬁrms in the self-selected peer group.
The dependent variable takes the value of one if the peer ﬁrm is still part of the peer group one year
later, zero otherwise.
The independent variables are deﬁned as follows: PEERS=number of peer ﬁrms in the peer group.
SIC2 ,SIC3=1 if the peer ﬁrm is in the same industry as the focal ﬁrm, zero otherwise. SIZE==1 if
the peer ﬁrm is in the same size quartile as the focal ﬁrm, zero otherwise. Ri,j =Var(βˆi,j,t), where
βˆi,j,t are the estimates from regression (40) obtained from rolling regressions. SIZE
F=size quartile
of the focal ﬁrm. SIZEP=size quartile of the peer ﬁrm. PEERS=number of ﬁrms in the peer group.
Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. * and ** denote statistical signiﬁcance at the
5% and 1% level, respectively (two-tailed test).
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Table 8: Analysis of the ﬁltering eﬀectiveness
ex post out-of-sample
1 year 2 years 3 years
PEERS .0017** -.1308** -.1493** -.2237**
(.0007) (.0064) (.0085) (.0153)
SIC2 .0007 -.0091 -.0123 .0570*
(.0033) (.0162) (.0192) (.0278)
SIC3 .0004 .0942** .1106** .0975**
(.0037) (.0186) (.0226) (.0351)
SIZE -.0024 -.0146 -.0270 .0513
(.0020) (.0119) (.0167) (.0268)
SIC2SIZE .0258 -.1772 .1298 -.6936*
(.0475) (.1820) (.1675) (.3050)
SIC3SIZE .0479 .1634 -.3856* .0237
(.0518) (.1855) (.1767) (.3171)
R -.5513 -13.1129** -19.2282** -19.9713**
(.4156) (1.9927) (2.7610) (4.1752)
SIZEF .0012 .0080 .0136 -.0010
(.0027) (.0094) (.0123) (.0192)
R2 1.0007** 1.899** 1.8171** 2.2380**
(.0279) (.1049) (01339) (.2241)
Intercept -.1630** -.6007** -.2802** -.1673
(.0243) (.0710) (.0821) (.1314)
observations 6920 6499 6075 5669
R2 40.78% 35.49% 34.64% 27.65%
Year FE yes yes yes yes
This table shows the results from regression model (52): Ei,t = γ0 + γ1 · PEERS i,t + γ2 · Ri + γ3 ·
SIC2 i,t+γ4 ·SIC3 i,t+γ5 ·SIZE i,t+γ6 ·SIC2SIZE i,t+γ7 ·SIC2SIZE i,t+γ8 ·SIZEF +γ9 ·R2 +εi,t.
The dependent variable Ei,t diﬀers for each column. 'Ex post' uses the ex post ﬁltering eﬀectiveness,
'out-of-sample' uses the ﬁltering eﬀectiveness one, two and three years out-of-sample. The indepen-
dent variables in the columns 'out-of-sample' are lagged by one, two and three years, respectively.
The independent variables are deﬁned as follows: PEERS=number of peer ﬁrms in the peer group.
SIC2 ,SIC3=(number of peer ﬁrms within the same industry as the focal ﬁrm)/(total number of peer
ﬁrms in the peer group). SIZE=(number of peer ﬁrms within the same size quartile as the focal
ﬁrm)/(total number of peer ﬁrms in the peer group). SIC2SIZE ,SIC3SIZE=(number of peer ﬁrms
within the same industry and the same size quartile as the focal ﬁrm)/(total number of peer ﬁrms in
the peer group). Ri=βˆ
sw
i,j,t· Var(βˆi,j,t), where βˆswi,j,t is the estimate from the stepwise regression (41)
and βˆi,j,t are the estimates from regression (40), both obtained from rolling regressions. SIZE
F=size
quartile of the focal ﬁrm. R2=R-squared value from the stepwise regression (41) during the estima-
tion period.
Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. * and ** denote statistical signiﬁcance at the
5% and 1% level, respectively (two-tailed test).
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Time-variation in the exchange
rate exposure of Swiss ﬁrms
Abstract
This study measures the exchange rate exposure of Swiss ﬁrms for its most
relevant currencies and assesses its time-variation. I ﬁnd that the ﬁrm-level
exposure varies considerably over time. Diﬀerences in operational possibili-
ties to mitigate the exposure cannot explain this variance, while some macroe-
conomic variables are able to capture the time-variation at least partly. I
further show that volatility in exposures reduces the hedging eﬀectiveness
and leads thus to wrong decisions with regard to hedging activities. Try-
ing to hedge an asset exposed to exchange rate movements can increase the
variance of its returns rather than decreasing it.
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1 Introduction
Swiss ﬁrms are strongly aﬀected by exchange rate movements. This conclu-
sion can easily be drawn when reading the business press headlines or oﬃcial
notes from politicians or business representatives. The reasoning behind this
statement is that Switzerland as small, but economically strong country, is
well-known for its export industry. Accordingly, the currency exposure is
expected to be high.
A strong and fast appreciation of the Swiss franc (CHF), namely against
the Euro (EUR) and the US-Dollar (USD) between 2010 and August 2011
(e.g. the CHF/EUR rate was around 1.50 on January 2010 and dropped to a
minimum level of 1.03 in August 2011), has even led the Swiss National Bank
to introduce a minimum exchange rate of 1.20 CHF/EUR on September 6,
2011. The main reason for this exceptional measure was an "acute danger for
the Swiss economy" and a "risk of recession for the Swiss economy" according
to the press release of the Swiss National Bank on September 6, 2011. It was
not before January 15, 2015 that the Swiss National Bank discontinued to
maintain this minimum exchange rate, bringing forward, amongst others,
the argument that the "economy was able to take advantage of this phase to
adjust to the new situation".
The study of Hutson and Stevenson (2010) supports the view of Swiss ﬁrm
having a large exposure. They ﬁnd Switzerland to be the country with the
highest rate of ﬁrms with a positive exchange rate exposure (about 80% of
Swiss ﬁrms are adversely aﬀected by an appreciation of the Swiss Franc).26
However, for a single ﬁrm it is not evident to know about its own exposure.
Some evidence from a survey of Swiss ﬁrms in the 1990s can help to illustrate
this. Loderer and Pichler (2000) have found that over 60% of the ﬁrms are not
able to quantify their exposure27, and over 25% did not even know whether
26A positive exposure means in this case that a ﬁrm beneﬁts (suﬀers) from a depreciating
(appreciating) home currency.
27Firms have been asked to indicate the impact of a ±10% change in various exchange
rates on their operating cash ﬂow.
88
unexpected currency rate changes would have a positive or negative eﬀect on
their cash ﬂow.
The exchange rate exposure is thus a relevant research topic. In this study,
I will investigate the exchange rate exposure of Swiss ﬁrms and especially
focus my research question on how the exposure varies over time. Volatility
in the exposure can be one important reason why ﬁrms have diﬃculties to
estimate this risk. In a ﬁrst step, I will thus estimate the exposure of listed
Swiss ﬁrms and assess its time-variation at the ﬁrm level by means of a rolling
regression methodology.
Second, I will explore whether the variance in the currency exposure can
be explained by underlying ﬁrm-speciﬁc characteristics or macroeconomic
conditions. This is relevant for understanding the volatility in the exposure
and investigating its consequences. If the exposure level of a ﬁrm cannot
be explained by ﬁrm characteristics, such as proportion of exported and
imported goods, or by macroeconomic conditions, such as the gross domestic
product (GDP) growth rate, the exposure itself can be seen as risky. This,
in turn, can e.g. aﬀect the hedging eﬀectiveness of a ﬁrm, which leads to the
third research question of this study.
Lastly, I will assess what the volatility in the exchange rate exposure implies
in terms of hedging. This is an important aspect of why time-variation in the
exposure matters. A manager of a multinational ﬁrm can hedge the exchange
rate exposure of uncertain foreign currency future cash ﬂows if he knows the
(future) exposure. However, if the exposure is volatile, an eﬀective hedging
strategy is not possible anymore, because the estimation of the exposure from
historical data does not exactly predict relevant (future) exposure. In the
worst case, this deviation can even lead to counterproductive hedging, namely
if the manager assumes a positive exposure due to observation of historical
data, but due to its volatility, the actual exposure in the relevant (future)
period turns out to be negative. This constellation, where the exposure has
been positive in some periods and negative in other periods, has actually
been observed in former studies about the time-variability of exchange rate
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exposures (see e.g. Jorion (1990), Brunner et al. (2000)).
The results suggest that exchange rate exposures of Swiss ﬁrms vary con-
siderably over time and that ﬁrm-speciﬁc characteristics cannot explain the
exchange rate exposure, while macroeconomic variables capture the time-
variation at least partly. I show that the time-varying exposure reduces the
hedging eﬀectiveness. In some cases, this can even lead to an increased stock
return variance for hedged positions compared to unhedged ones.
I contribute to the literature by investigating the eﬀect of time-variation
in exchange rate exposures on the hedging eﬀectiveness and show that the
hedging might actually increase the variance of stock returns instead of de-
creasing it. I further contribute to the literature by measuring the exchange
rate exposure more precisely. Namely I measure the exposure against the
most important currencies individually rather than with an exchange rate
index and also consider the proportion of sales and assets in a particular
region instead of just adding up all foreign sales or assets and compute their
ratio to the total sales, resp. assets.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a literature overview
of exchange rate exposure in general and the time-variability of exposures in
particular, section 3 explains the methodology and the econometric approach,
section 4 provides the details about the data used in this study and section
5 presents the main results. Finally, section 6 explores the robustness of the
main results and section 7 concludes.
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2 Terminology and related literature
2.1 Deﬁnition of the exchange rate exposure and the
exposure risk
The exchange rate exposure (or interchangeably the currency exposure) must
ﬁrst be distinguished from the exchange rate risk. The exchange rate risk
simply measures the uncertainty about the future exchange rate, usually in
terms of its standard deviation (or variance). The exchange rate exposure in
contrast explains the sensitivity of a ﬁrm's ﬁnancial position to unexpected
movements in exchange rates, i.e. a large exposure means that a given ex-
change rate movement has a large impact on the ﬁrm's performance (Adler
and Dumas, 1984). A ﬁrst distinction in terms of exchange rate exposure can
be made between the accounting and economic exposure28. The accounting
(or translation) exposure measures how the ﬁrm's ﬁnancial statements are
aﬀected by exchange rate movements, which is reﬂected in the cumulative
translation adjustment (CTA). Only very few studies use the CTA as indi-
cator of exchange rate exposure, one example is Shin and Soenen (1999).
A more common view is that the translation exposure as an accounting mea-
surement does not aﬀect the ﬁrm value, since under the assumptions of an
eﬃcient market, the ﬁrm value is the present value of all future cash ﬂows.
In this setting the economic exposure becomes relevant, which explains the
eﬀect of unexpected changes in the exchange rate on the ﬁrm's future cash
ﬂows and therefore on the ﬁrm value. The economic exposure can be further
divided into the transaction and the operating exposure (Sercu and Uppal,
1995, p. 471). The former arises from contractual claims and obligations that
are denominated in foreign currency and whose value in local currency will
28see (Sercu and Uppal, 1995, p. 471). However, the nomenclature is vague. Some
authors refer to the economic exposure as operating exposure or classify the total exposure
into direct and indirect exposure, such as Hutson and Stevenson (2010), where the direct
(indirect) exposure refers to the transaction (operating) exposure. This article follows the
denomination of Sercu and Uppal (1995).
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depend on future exchange rates. Firms which purchase and sale products
in foreign currencies are subject to this kind of exposure. The latter refers
to the eﬀect of changes in a ﬁrm's competitive position due to movements
in exchange rates, such as changes in prices or costs, or if a ﬁrm's customers
or clients use foreign currencies. An appreciation of local currency can thus
be disadvantageous even for a domestic ﬁrm; frequently cited examples in
Switzerland are the tourism industry (where the tourists from abroad suﬀer
from high prices) or domestic retailers (where clients cross the near boarder
for having shopping tours abroad).
The notion of exposure risk is diﬀerent in a sense that it measures the volatil-
ity of the exchange rate exposure, i.e. how it varies over time. This diﬀeren-
tiation is important for my study. While most research focuses on measuring
the currency exposure, this study investigates the exposure risk. A ﬁrm with
a constant exposure would not be subject to an exposure risk, whereas ﬁrms
with a highly volatile exposure suﬀer from a higher exposure risk. I consider
the exposure risk to emerge from random movements only. This follows the
deﬁnition in Göx (2016), where the exposure risk is deﬁned as part of the
overall ﬁrm risk which is caused by the randomness of the ﬁrm's exposure to
common risk factors, such as currency risks. If the volatility in the currency
exposure can be explained by ﬁrm or industry-speciﬁc characteristics or by
macroeconomic variables, one would thus not speak of exposure risk.
2.2 Literature overview of the exchange rate exposure
There exists a wide range of empirical studies measuring the exchange rate
exposure of ﬁrms or industries. The foundation all of these investigations is
the work of Adler and Dumas (1984). These authors measure the currency
exposure as the regression coeﬃcient from a regression of an asset, such as a
ﬁrm's stock price, on the exchange rate.29
29The model will be described in more detail in section 3.1
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Empirical investigations on the exchange rate exposure have found mixed ev-
idence regarding the statistical signiﬁcance. Even when the sample has been
constructed on the basis of criteria indicating a high exchange rate exposure,
only limited evidence in favor of a signiﬁcant exposure has been found. For
example, Jorion (1990) ﬁnds only a statistically signiﬁcant exposure for 5.2%
of the sample ﬁrms (at a signiﬁcance level of 5%) even though he only con-
siders internationally oriented U.S. companies. Similarly, Choi and Prasard
(1995) select 409 U.S. multinationals with at least 25% foreign sales, net
operating proﬁt and physical assets, and ﬁnd that no more than 61 of those
ﬁrms (i.e. 15%) have a signiﬁcant exchange rate sensitivity at a 10% level.
Research with non-U.S. samples has especially focused on strongly export-
oriented countries, but with the same moderate success in identifying a sig-
niﬁcant exposure. He and Ng (1998) investigated a sample of 171 Japanese
multinational ﬁrms and found 25% (2%) of the ﬁrms to have a signiﬁcant
positive (negative) exposure at a 5% level. Brunner et al. (2000) measures
the USD exposure of German ﬁrms. They ﬁnd 31% of the ﬁrms having a
signiﬁcant exposure coeﬃcient at the 5% level using a model with orthogonal-
ized exchange rate returns. Interestingly, the exposure varies substantially
over the deﬁned subperiods. The proportion of ﬁrms with a positive cur-
rency exposure is e.g. 71% in one subperiod, and in another subperiod this
proportion drops to just 29%.
Bartram and Bodnar (2007) provide a comprehensive survey about empirical
work on the exchange rate exposure. They summarize 31 studies and describe
each with a short overview about the data, results and some methodological
speciﬁcations. These studies diﬀer in many ways. One aspect is the sample
construction, where some studies focus on ﬁnding a sample that has a poten-
tially high exposure, such as export-oriented ﬁrms or industries, while other
studies select single countries or perform a global study. An important diﬀer-
entiation amongst the studies is made in terms of model design, e.g. about
the control variables used or the way exchange rates are measured. Most
models use a market return as control variable to control for macroeconomic
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eﬀects that inﬂuence both stock returns and exchange rates. The choice of
the market return variable can have a substantial eﬀect on the results as
shown by Bodnar and Wong (2003). In their study the authors compare
value-weighted market portfolios with equally-weighted market portfolio as
a control variable. They argue that value-weighted market-portfolio would
put a higher weight on large ﬁrms which are more likely to be multinational
and export-oriented and therefore also more likely to be positively aﬀected
by depreciating home currencies30.
Most studies measure the exchange rate variable in the model using an index
which is composed by a trade-weighted average of diﬀerent currencies (Bar-
tram and Bodnar, 2007). The potential beneﬁt of using a bilateral exchange
rate is generally acknowledged (see e.g. Doidge et al. (2006)), because using
an identical exchange rate index for all companies is not necessarily rep-
resentative for individual ﬁrms and can thus reduce the signiﬁcance of the
exposure estimates. But previous studies, such as Miller and Reuer (1998)
have not found clear empirical evidence that using bilateral exchange rates
improves signiﬁcantly the results in measuring the exchange rate exposure
and therefore, the majority of researchers sticks to the use of an index.
Researchers have as well used diﬀerent methodological approaches. Nonlinear
models, lagged variables or also time-varying exposures have all been exam-
ined. Empirical work on the temporal variation of exchange rate exposures
will be further discussed later in this section.
Despite this diversity of empirical studies, only few among them have found
a statistical signiﬁcant exchange rate exposure for the majority of the ﬁrms.
This has led to the situation known as the "exchange rate exposure puzzle"
for which several possible reasons can be considered (Bartram and Bodnar,
2007). The most evident reason is probably the endogenous nature of the
exchange rate exposure. Managers can hedge against exchange rate move-
30Bodnar and Wong (2003) ﬁnd some empirical evidence to support this view. Other
studies, however, argue diﬀerently by claiming that larger ﬁrms are more diversiﬁed and
have therefore only small exposures, see e.g. Hutson and Stevenson (2010) or Pantzalis
et al. (2001).
94
ments in order to adjust their exposure. I will further discuss this in the next
subsection.
Another possible reason for low signiﬁcance in many studies might be the use
of the market return as control variable. If this control variable is included,
the model does not measure the 'total exchange rate exposure' anymore, but
rather the 'residual exposure', because the incorporation of the market return
in the model also controls for the market portfolio's own exchange rate expo-
sure (Bodnar and Wong, 2003). Depending on how strong the market itself is
correlated with the exchange rate movements, the sign, size and signiﬁcance
of the estimates can be aﬀected considerably. A strong correlation between
those variables could lead to results which are not statistically signiﬁcant,
even for ﬁrms with a large exposure.
2.2.1 Exchange rate exposure and hedging
The degree to which a ﬁrm is exposed to exchange rate movements depends
primarily on the imports and exports, its proportion of foreign to total sales,
the currency denomination of its competitors, and the competitiveness of
input and output markets of the ﬁrm's industry (Bodnar and Wong, 2003) or
also on the openness of a economy in general (see e.g. Hutson and Stevenson
(2010)). However, ﬁrms with a high sensitivity to exchange rate movements
generally take measures to mitigate their exposure (Bartram and Bodnar,
2007).
Those measures can include ﬁnancial as well as operational hedging activ-
ities. Some of the numerous possibilities to engage in operational hedging
are described in this section. A ﬁrst example is the geographical diversiﬁca-
tion, which is achieved if a ﬁrm has operations in more than one region with
diﬀerent currencies and the correlation between the exchange rates in those
regions is less than one. For example, Pantzalis et al. (2001) use the number
of reported segments as proxy for geographical dispersion, Allayannis and
Ihrig (2001) use the number of countries in which a ﬁrm operates or Hutson
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and Laing (2014) classify the ﬁrm as domestic, regional, trans-regional or
global depending on the number of regions in which the ﬁrm has activities.
Firms also diﬀer in the extent they can impose exchange rate movements on
the prices they charge to their customers in foreign markets. This eﬀect of
the exchange rate on the exporter's price in foreign currency is referred to by
the term pass-through (Bodnar et al., 2002). A complete pass-through would
allow a ﬁrm to change their prices in a way that there is no net exchange rate
exposure left. This is of course very unlikely and the extent to which this is
possible depends on several factors. Bodnar et al. (2002) establish a model
in which the pass-through depends on the substitutability of the products
and the market share of a company. In markets, where the products of the
companies can easily be substituted, the pass-through is likely to be low.
On the other hand, the higher the market share of a company is, the higher
is its power in the market and therefore the ability to increase prices in the
foreign market if e.g. the local costs have increased due to an appreciation
of the local currency. Bartram et al. (2010) extend this model and show how
the pass-through can additionally depend on the competition of the input
market31. Allayannis et al. (2001) generally refer to those factors as compet-
itiveness of the input and ﬁnal goods market. They claim that in oligopolistic
market structures, the competition is less intensive and hence the markups
are higher. Therefore ﬁrms can respond to exchange-rate ﬂuctuations by
altering the prices they charge and the exchange rate exposure is smaller
compared to highly competitive market structures.
Another common operational hedging possibility is the adjustment of a ﬁrm's
cost structure with respect to its revenues. If the costs of a ﬁrm incur in the
same currency as the revenues, which can be achieved e.g. by choosing to
purchase input factors in the same currency or by moving, resp. establishing
production sites abroad, this will lead to a lower exchange rate exposure.
31Bodnar et al. (2002) model a market where a ﬁrm produces goods in its home country
and sells them to a foreign export market and a foreign competitor, who produces and
sells in the same market to which the ﬁrst ﬁrm exports its goods. Bartram et al. (2010)
extend this model allowing both ﬁrms to have costs and revenues both home and abroad.
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Bartram et al. (2010) consider this possibility in their model and show that,
ceteris paribus, a higher fraction of marginal costs in foreign currency reduces
the exposure of export-oriented ﬁrms. This measure cannot fully eliminate
the exchange rate exposure, since the proﬁts as diﬀerence between the sales
and the costs will still be measured in the foreign currency.
A ﬁrm can also raise debt in foreign currency, which has similar character-
istics as sourcing abroad, except that in this case the ﬁnancing costs are
aligned to the revenues instead of the raw materials or the property, plants
and equipment32. From an empirical point of view, the diﬃculty lies in the
measurement of the costs, since they are not disclosed by segment. Bartram
et al. (2010) as well as Gao (2000) use the percentage of foreign assets of a
ﬁrm as proxy to measure the costs in foreign currency. For ﬁrms with pro-
duction sites abroad, this proxy can be precise, for ﬁrms that produce locally
but purchase raw materials in foreign currency, this proxy is less precise. De-
pending on the empirical approach, one must take care that the percentage
of foreign assets can be highly correlated with the percentage of foreign sales.
Doidge et al. (2006) ﬁnd that foreign assets are positively related to exchange
rate exposures and conclude that foreign assets might simply be a proxy for
foreign sales. Therefore, regressing the currency exposures on the percentage
of foreign assets might show a positive relation rather than a negative one.
A researcher who ignores the possibilities for hedging, will expect to ﬁnd a
high exchange rate exposure, e.g. for export-oriented ﬁrms. If the estimated
exposure in his analysis is rather low (because the estimation measures the
exposure after having considered all hedging activities), this result might at
a ﬁrst glance be surprising. But estimating a low exposure does in no way
suggest that exchange rate movements are not important to ﬁrms, as already
mentioned by Bartram and Bodnar (2007). Rather one should be aware of
the diﬀerence between the 'gross' exposure (before any hedging activity) and
the 'net' exposure (after having considered the pass-through and all hedging
32This kind of hedging activity is mostly assigned to the category of ﬁnancial hedging
together with the use of currency derivatives. Being just a matter of nomenclature, the
categorization does not aﬀect the size or the measurement of the exchange rate exposure.
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activities).
Some studies further investigate the diﬀerence between the gross and net
exposure, trying to measure the hedging activities of the ﬁrms and their
impact on the exposure. Bartram et al. (2010) ﬁnd that for the average
ﬁrms, pass-through and operational hedging each reduces gross exposure by
10-15% and ﬁnancial hedges (with foreign debt and currency derivatives)
further decreases exposure by about 40%. Altogether, ﬁrms are able to re-
duce their gross exposure by around 70% through pass-through and hedging.
The authors claim that the combination of these factors reduces foreign ex-
change exposures to the observed levels and is the main reason why previous
researchers have struggled to ﬁnd statistically signiﬁcant exposures.
The literature on currency hedging generally assumes that the level of future
foreign cash ﬂows is known and the only risk is the uncertainty about the
future exchange rate, i.e. the valuation of the future cash ﬂow. Chen et al.
(2003) provide an overview of hedging strategies which can be implemented in
such cases. But given the factors described above, exchange rate movements
do not only change the valuation of the future foreign currency cash ﬂows,
but also the amount of those expected cash ﬂows.
A simple and descriptive example of such a situation, where both price and
quantity about future foreign currency cash ﬂows are uncertain, is given
e.g. in Aabo (2015). An analytical analysis of a similar, but more complex
situation, can be found in Kerkvliet and Moﬀett (1991). A perfectly eﬀective
hedge, which removes all risk from the future cash ﬂow, is thus not possible
and, in some cases, the hedging can even become counterproductive, e.g. by
leading to worse lower-tail outcomes (Aabo, 2015). A relevant question is
therefore, how these dynamics in exchange rate exposure aﬀect the hedging
eﬀectiveness. This question will be addressed in section 3.4 in more detail.
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2.3 The time-variation of the exchange rate exposure
There are several studies examining the time-variation of the exchange rate
exposure. Already Adler and Dumas (1984) have mentioned that the ex-
posure might vary over time and also the ﬁrst empirical studies, e.g. Jorion
(1990) have investigated this aspect. Mostly the time-varying exposure is not
the main focus of the studies, but rather an addition to the main analysis.
Since the volatility of the exposure can be highly relevant, this study will
focus on the time-variation of the currency exposure.
One of the most common methods is to simply split the available time series
data into diﬀerent subperiods, as in Jorion (1990), Brunner et al. (2000),
Williamson (2001), Bodnar and Wong (2003) or Parsley and Popper (2006).
Within these intervals the exposure is then assumed to be constant and the
exposure can therefore vary from one subperiod to another, but remains
stable within each of the subperiods. This simple method can be adequate
to gain some ﬁrst insights about whether the exposure actually varies over
time or not, but it remains diﬃcult to amplify the analysis of the temporal
aspect, since only few observations of exposures are obtained. Nevertheless
those studies ﬁnd considerable time-varying exposures.
Jorion (1990) as well as Brunner et al. (2000) even ﬁnd evidence that the
sign of the exposure varies between the subperiods. Jorion (1990) analyzes
three subperiods (1971-71; 1976-80 and 1981-87) and ﬁnds that only 109
out of the entire sample of 287 ﬁrms exhibit the same sign for the exchange
rate exposure in all subperiods. However, the standard errors are large and
despite these ﬁndings the tests of stability cannot reject the hypothesis of
constant exposures.
Brunner et al. (2000) create four subperiods and the length of the inter-
vals depend on whether the USD has appreciated or depreciated against the
German Mark (DM). Using both the standard model and a model with or-
thogonalized exchange rate returns, they ﬁnd variation in the exposures over
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time. In subperiods of depreciation of the USD against the DM the exposure
generally tends to be positive (meaning that the depreciation of the DM was
interpreted favorably by investors and vice versa) and in the subperiod with
a strong appreciation the measured exposures were mostly negative.
Parsley and Popper (2006) study the exchange rate exposure of Asian-Paciﬁc
ﬁrms and split their full sample into four equally long periods. In order to
assess the time-variability, the authors include time dummies in the regres-
sion.33 The results are then presented as percentages of ﬁrms within the
sample which have a statistically signiﬁcant exchange rate exposure at the
5% level. This method does not allow identifying how the sign of the ex-
posure changes over time, but the percentage of signiﬁcant exposure coeﬃ-
cients varies substantially. As an example, only 8% of Korean ﬁrms have a
signiﬁcant exposure in the period 1993-1995, compared to 70% in the period
1995-1997.
Another widespread approach to investigate the temporal aspect of exchange
rate exposures is the use of a rolling regression in order to generate a higher
number of exposure estimates. Brunner et al. (2000) for example regress
daily stock returns over 250 days on exchange rate returns to estimate the
exchange rate sensitivity and afterwards shift the interval by 30 days. Even
though the periods are strongly overlapping, the results show a high variation
over time in the exchange rate exposure. Similarly, Bodnar and Wong (2003)
estimate the exposure with monthly data over a time horizon of ﬁve years
and then shift the interval by one year. To further investigate the reasons
why the exposure might vary, most studies use a two-step regression, where
the estimated exposures of the ﬁrst step are regressed on the determinants,
which are expected to explain the exchange rate exposure.
For example, many studies use the ratio of foreign to total sales as deter-
minant of the exchange rate exposure (see Bodnar and Wong (2003) for an
overview). Other possible determinants are proxy variables for the hedging
33For each subperiod a time dummy is included interacting with the exchange rate
return, thereby allowing a diﬀerent regression slope per subperiod.
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activities, such as the percentage of foreign to total assets, gross margin or
the number of region in which the ﬁrm operates.
Other approaches explain the time-variability with macroeconomic factors
rather than with ﬁrm- or industry-speciﬁc characteristics. They do so by us-
ing interaction of those macroeconomic variables with the currency exposure.
Priestley and Odegaard (2007) model the exchange rate exposure as func-
tion of the exchange rate movements itself. Another example is Chaieb and
Mazzotta (2013), who use a random coeﬃcient model, where they interact
the exchange rate movements with ﬁnancial business-cycle indicators.
3 Methodology and empirical approach
3.1 Standard Model
In the ﬁnance literature one can already see on the basis of simple cash-ﬂow
oriented ﬁrm valuation models that movements in exchange rates will aﬀect
the cash ﬂows and therefore alter the ﬁrm value. Based on this, the academic
literature mostly deﬁnes the exchange rate exposure as the elasticity between
changes in ﬁrm value and exchange rate measures.34 Empirically, this expo-
sure is obtained from an OLS regression of stock returns on exchange rate
movements, as introduced by Adler and Dumas (1984):
Rj = αj +
n∑
i=1
γi,jXi + εj (54)
Rj is the stock return of the ﬁrm j, Xi represents the return on the ex-
34Only unexpected exchange rate movements are considered, since all expected changes
are assumed to already be reﬂected in the asset's price. In accordance with previous
literature, as e.g. Allayannis et al. (2001), I assume the exchange rate movements to
follow a random walk process, therefore all changes in exchange rates are unexpected.
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change rate of the Swiss franc against the currency i35 and the regression
coeﬃcient γi,j measures the (economic) exchange rate exposure. I use log-
arithmic returns for both the dependent and independent variable. In this
case, γi,j measures the percentage change of the stock return if the exchange
rate moves by one percent.
In an eﬃcient market setting, the ﬁrm value is an appropriate measurement
for the exposure, since it reﬂects per deﬁnition the present value of all future
cash ﬂows. Movements in exchange rates aﬀect these cash ﬂows and have
accordingly a direct impact on the ﬁrm value. However, when considering
such a valuation method, one has to think about the impact of exchange
rate movements on the discount rate. Bartram and Bodnar (2012) discuss
how the currency exposure could already be priced in the asset by a risk
premium. They ﬁnd that the relation between the currency exposure and
the ﬁrms' stock returns is more consistence with a cash ﬂow eﬀect rather
than a discount rate eﬀect and thus the impact of the currency movements
on the discount rate is negligible.
Regression model (54) can serve as a benchmark and give a ﬁrst idea about
the exposure, but the model is not suﬃciently speciﬁed, since a multitude
of other factors aﬀect stock returns and are also correlated with exchange
rate movements, especially macroeconomic factors such as interest rates or
inﬂation. Since Jorion (1990), almost all studies about exchange rate expo-
sure add a market return variable RM to the regression model to control for
macroeconomic and general market factors. Thus, the model (54) can be
extended to:
Rj = αj +
n∑
i=1
γi,jXi + βjR
M + εj (55)
One has to be careful that the interpretation of the coeﬃcient γi,j has changed
now. If the market return itself is also correlated with the exchange rate
35The exchange rates are computed as the home currency price of foreign currency, i.e.
CHF/EUR, CHF/USD, etc. I explain the exact deﬁnition of all variables used in this
study in appendix A.
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movements, the exchange rate exposure γi,j will be lower compared to model
(54), since the incorporation of the market return in the model also controls
for the market's own exchange rate exposure. Bodnar and Wong (2003) refer
to the exposure in model (54) as the 'total exposure' and in model (55) as the
'residual exposure'. A residual exposure of γi,j = 0 does not mean that the
ﬁrm j is not exposed to the exchange rate i, but rather that its exposure is
the same as the market's currency exposure. The incorporation of the market
return can be problematic if the market has a high correlation with exchange
rate movements, because it would lead to a situation of multicollinearity. The
consequences would be increased standard errors of the regression coeﬃcients
and estimates that are very sensitive to changes in the model.
There is also another potential problem of multicollinearity in the measure-
ment of exchange rates. Most studies use an exchange rate index in their
regression model rather than separating each currency as in (55). This index
is usually trade-weighted, i.e. it is built on the basis of trade statistics of
the respective country, giving more weight to currencies from countries with
higher trading volume (see Bartram and Bodnar (2007) for an overview).
The downside of this approach is that the same index is used for all ﬁrms,
which does not reﬂect the economic reality. Firms operate in diﬀerent regions
to a greater or lesser extent and accordingly react diﬀerently to exchange rate
movements in those regions. Many Swiss ﬁrms are strongly involved in the
eurozone and thus I expect a high dependence on the EUR. Some ﬁrms are
however more exposed to other currencies. For example, a ﬁrm like Swatch
is more dependent on the exports to Asia than to Europe.
This study therefore uses the single currencies as regressors instead of a com-
mon index to all ﬁrms. Other studies like Makar and Huﬀman (2013), Parsley
and Popper (2006) or Priestley and Odegaard (2007) have already used this
approach. Parsley and Popper (2006) discuss the possible multicollinearity
between the exchange rates, but come to the conclusion that it is not a se-
rious issue in their study. I will as well discuss the correlations between the
diﬀerent currencies used in this study.
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Additionally and thanks to the detailed information collected for this study,
I was are able to create an individual exchange rate index for each ﬁrm, an
approach which has rarely been used so far (see Makar and Huﬀman (2013)).
This way I can combine the advantage of using individual currencies with-
out facing the problem of multicollinearity. The most important currencies
for Swiss ﬁrms with respect to foreign trade are the Euro (EUR) and the
US-Dollar (USD). Asian currencies like the Hongkong-Dollar (HKD) have
become increasingly important and will also be considered in the analysis36.
More precisely, I deﬁne a ﬁrm-speciﬁc exchange rate index by weighting the
currency returns in the index on the basis of the net sales in the corresponding
region. For example, if a company generates more sales in the US, the USD
receives a higher weight in the index. The index considers the EUR, USD
and HKD and is deﬁned as follows:
X indexi =
∑
j=EUR,USD,HKD
Net salesi,j
Net salesi
∗XCHF/j (56)
3.2 Time-variation of the exchange rate exposure
The models, which have been described so far, assume a constant exposure
over the whole sample period. In this section I will introduce the time-
variation of the exchange rate exposure. To do so, I divide the sample period
T in several subperiods t and conduct for each subperiod separately the
following regression:
Rj,t = αj,t +
n∑
i=1
γi,j,tXi,t + βj,tR
M
t + εj,t (57)
Within the subperiods I assume the exposure to be constant. This is a
36During the year 2014, 45.8% of the Swiss exports went to the eurozone, 17.1% to Asia
(resp. 3.3% to Hongkong and 3.0% to Japan) and 12.4% to the USA according to the
statistical bulletin of the Swiss National Bank in June 2015.
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key assumption for the use of this approach. As long as the exchange rate
exposure is fairly stable during the subperiod, the simple OLS regression
should produce unbiased estimates. The advantage of this non-parametric
approach is that no assumptions about the functional form of the exposure
or its determinants are required (Lewellen and Nagel, 2006).
The stability within a subperiod might appear to contradict the subject of
the study at the ﬁrst glance, but there are some good reasons why exposure
can be seen as constant over a short time period. While the transaction
exposure is rather a short term issue, the operating exposure is subject to
slower and long-term changes (Hutson and Laing, 2014). The former can
be hedged with ﬁnancial instruments and there would accordingly be no or
only a small inﬂuence on the stock price if exchange rates move. Changes
in operational hedging activities, such as amending the cost structure, take
more time, and the exchange rate exposure will adapt over time.
Imagine as an example a company which produces locally, i.e. in Switzerland,
and sells primarily to the eurozone. A shock in the exchange rate CHF/EUR
aﬀects the company negatively and they experience negative stock returns
in connection with this shock. As a consequence, the company decides to
outsource some production activities to the eurozone as an operational hedg-
ing activity to align the costs with the revenues. The next time, when a
similar shock in the exchange rate CHF/EUR occurs, this would not aﬀect
the company anymore, or at least to a lower extent.
I estimate regression model (57) by a rolling regression approach on a ﬁrm-
level basis. The time series of estimated exposures generated by this proce-
dure is then tested to evaluate whether the exposures remain constant over
time. This will be done by running the following AR(1) regression model:
γ̂i,j,t = δi,j γ̂i,j,t−1 + εi,j,t (58)
For constant exposures I expect the regression coeﬃcient to be equal to one.
Rejecting the hypothesis δi,j = 1 would provide evidence for the presence
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of exposure risk. Another, more narrow approach would be to test whether
δi,j = 0 and conclude for all ﬁrms with a signiﬁcant positive regression coef-
ﬁcient, that there is at least some stability over time. Either way, it will not
be surprising to ﬁnd a substantial time-variation in the exposure for some
or even the majority of ﬁrms. The interesting questions arise subsequently
to this analysis. First, I discuss whether the volatility can be explained by
some observable variables or not. Second, I investigate whether the esti-
mated, time-varying exposure is still useful for hedging purposes.
3.3 Determinants of the exchange rate exposure
In addition to the time-varying exposure, I assess if the volatility can be
explained by ﬁrm-speciﬁc determinants or by business cycle indicators. One
could directly test the determinants by interacting those variables with the
exchange rate movements, which would be similar to e.g. Williamson (2001),
Gao (2000) or Chaieb and Mazzotta (2013). An attempt to explain exchange
rate volatility by business cycle indicators will be provided later in this sec-
tion. Unfortunately, for ﬁrm-speciﬁc variables, the data is only available at a
yearly basis, which makes this approach unsuitable, since it would limit the
number of observations per ﬁrm to 16 for this study. With such a low number
of observations, a possible time-variation in the exposure cannot be tested
reliably. Thus, I will follow previous literature and implement a two-stage
regression, where the estimated exposures of the ﬁrst step are regressed on
the ﬁrm-level variables in a second step.
3.3.1 Firm-speciﬁc determinants
As ﬁrm-speciﬁc determinants I will use the ratio of foreign sales to total
sales FS i,j and possible hedging activities, such as in e.g. Gao (2000), Al-
layannis et al. (2001) or Hutson and Laing (2014). More precisely, I measure
hedging activities with four diﬀerent proxies. First, the geographical diver-
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siﬁcation DIV j is measured by the number of regions that the ﬁrm operates
in, counting all regions where at least 10% of the company sales are gener-
ated37. Second, I proxy the competitiveness of the ﬁrm by measuring the
variable MARGIN j as EBIT divided by net sales. Third, the foreign pro-
duction FAi,j is proxied by the ratio of foreign to total assets. And lastly,
the ﬁnancial hedging activities FXD i,j are measured by the contract value
of outstanding currency derivatives as percentage of total assets. Taken to-
gether this leads to the following regression model, the subscript t is left out
for simplicity:
γ̂i,j = αi,j + δ0,i,jFS i,j + δ1,i,jDIV j + δ2,i,jEBIT j
+δ3,i,jFAi,j + δ4,i,jFXD j + εi,j (59)
The results can give some indication whether the variance of the exposure is
driven by the determinants as measured above. Especially, a high R2 would
indicate that the volatility in the exchange rate exposure is not random, but
largely determined by ﬁrm-speciﬁc variables. With respect to the expected
signs one has to distinguish between net-exporters, which are expected to
have an overall positive exposure, and net-importers, where the exposure is
expected to be negative. For positive exposures I expect the coeﬃcients of
the determinants to appear as follows:
The sign for δ0 is expected to be positive, meaning that ﬁrms with a high
proportion of foreign sales should have higher exchange rate exposures. All
other coeﬃcients are expected to be negative, since a larger geographical di-
versiﬁcation, more foreign assets, a higher EBIT margin or a higher contract
volume of currency derivatives should, ceteris paribus, lead to a decrease
in the exchange rate sensitivity.38 For negative exposures, the situation is
less evident, since most theoretical models and empirical studies focus on
net-exporters. I expect the proportion of foreign sales to be positive and
37Four regions are distinguished: Switzerland, Europe/Middle East/Africa, Americas
and Asia/Paciﬁc.
38see section 2.2.1 for further details on the reasoning behind the expectation.
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the proportion of foreign assets to be negative. Furthermore, I expect the
geographic diversiﬁcation and the use of ﬁnancial derivatives to be positive.39
One should note that the foreign sales and assets are measured separately
for each currency, as indicated by the subscript i, whereas the geographical
diversiﬁcation, the EBIT margin and the contract value of outstanding cur-
rency derivatives are obtained at the ﬁrm-level. Some ﬁrms disclose their
EBIT for each segment or provide information about the currencies hedged
by their ﬁnancial derivatives. But this is only the case for few ﬁrms and
in most cases not for the entire sample period. Hence, I cannot use this
information for my study.
3.3.2 Macroeconomic variables
Chaieb and Mazzotta (2013) show that the time-variation of foreign cur-
rency exposure is driven by business cycle indicators and macroeconomic
variables40. Following their study, I will examine the relationship between
the foreign exchange rate exposure of Swiss ﬁrms to those factors by using
the following random coeﬃcient panel model:
Rj,t = αj,t + γ0R
M
t + γ
EUR
0 XEUR,t + γ
USD
0 XUSD ,t +
K∑
k=1
(γEURk + υ
EUR
k,j )IV k,t−1XEUR,t +
K∑
k=1
(γUSDk + υ
USD
k,j )IV k,t−1XUSD ,t +
K∑
k=1
(βk + υ
M
k,j)IV k,t−1R
M
t + εj,t (60)
39A geographical diversiﬁcation will lead to an exposure closer to zero from any given
exposure on. A change in the exposure from a strongly negative to a less negative one
is a change with a positive sign and thus the regression coeﬃcient for DIV j should be
positive. Analogous a ﬁrm with high negative exposure will use more ﬁnancial derivatives
to bring the exposure closer to zero.
40Chaieb and Mazzotta (2013) use default and term premium as business cycle indica-
tors.
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IVk,t−1 represent the lagged macroeconomic variables, namely the gross do-
mestic product (GDP) growth of Switzerland and the term spread (TS ),
which at several occasions has shown to perform well in predicting future
macroeconomic conditions (Chaieb and Mazzotta, 2013). The term spread
is deﬁned as the diﬀerence between Swiss confederation bonds with 10-year
maturities and the 3-month LIBOR for Swiss franc investments. A negative
term premium indicates a downturn of the economy. γEURk , γ
USD
k and βk are
the average exposure coeﬃcients, where statistical signiﬁcance provides evi-
dence that the variation in currency exposure is driven by the correspondent
macroeconomic variables. υEURk,j , υ
USD
k,j and υ
M
k,j are ﬁrm-speciﬁc deviations
from those coeﬃcients. The model is estimated by the maximum likelihood
method as in Chaieb and Mazzotta (2013).
3.4 Hedging returns using the estimated exposure
There are several theoretical approaches to evaluate optimal exchange rate
hedge ratios and also various ways of estimating them. One of the most
widely used hedging strategy is based on the minimization of the variance of
the hedged returns, where the so-called minimum variance (MV) hedge ratio
is employed, see e.g. Chen et al. (2003). The return on a hedged asset is in
this case given by:
Rh = Ru − h ∗ X (61)
where h is the hedge ratio and Ru the return of the unhedged asset. In
a static setting without any volatility in the exchange rate exposure, the
optimal hedge ratio h∗ is given by
h∗ =
Cov(Ru,X )
V ar(X )
(62)
which is the same as the estimated exchange rate exposure γˆ obtained in an
OLS regression using model (54). In this case, the entire exposure can be
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removed and the variance of the hedged return is:
Var(Rh) = Var(Ru − γˆX )
= V ar(ε) (63)
In a dynamic setting with time-varying exposure, one way to adapt the hedge
ratio is to recalculate h based on the current information of the covariance
matrix. The optimal MV hedge ratio at time t is then the regression coeﬃ-
cient γˆt given the information I at time t− 1 (Chen et al., 2003):
h∗t = γˆt =
Cov(Ru,X )|It−1
V ar(X )|It−1 (64)
However, since the exposure based on conditional information, γˆt, is an im-
perfect forecast for the realization of the exposure, γt, the variance of the
hedged return is thus ex post not minimized.41 Using γˆt as the hedge ratio
leads thus to the return:
Rht = αt + t + (γt − γˆt) ∗ Xt (65)
The exposure is now only completely removed if γt = γˆt. Otherwise the vari-
ance of the hedged returns now also depends on the variance of the currency
movements and the exposure itself. Following Göx (2016), γˆt is assumed to
be a random variable with N ∼ (γt, σ2t ) and Cov(γˆt,X ) = 0, the variance of
the hedged return can be shown to equal
Var(Rh) = V ar(ε) + V ar(γˆ) ∗ (V ar(X ) + E(X )2) (66)
which is higher than the variance in (63) as long as V ar(γˆ) or V ar(X ) is
not zero. The expected exchange rate movement is zero, as explained in
the previous section. The eﬀectiveness of the hedging thus depends on the
41I refer to the realization of the exposure as the regression coeﬃcient which would be
obtained if all information of the relevant period could be used, e.g. if all data from 2014
is used to estimate the currency exposure of the year 2014.
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variances of the exposure and the exchange rate. The higher they are, the
higher will be Var(Rh) and the lower will be the hedge eﬀectiveness.
I construct a simple and descriptive example of an investor, who would like to
hedge the exchange rate exposure of his investment, to illustrate the eﬀect of
a time-varying exposure on hedge eﬀectiveness. Taking the actual data from
the ﬁrm 'Jungfraubahn Holding AG', I ﬁnd a signiﬁcant exposure of 1.04
against the Euro for the years 2008-2009, a signiﬁcant negative exposure of
-1.03 for the years 1999-2000 and an exposure close to zero for the years
2012-2013. These estimates will serve as the realized exposures γt.
I use the company 'Jungfraubahn Holding AG' for this example, because
I can ﬁnd both, signiﬁcant positive and negative exposures for this com-
pany during the sample period, which suggests some time-variation in the
exposure. Additionally, this company has only very limited possibilities to
operationally hedge its exposure, since as an operator of excursion railways
and provider of winter sports facilities, its assets are geographically tied to
Switzerland and there are no possibilities to export these goods. Nevertheless
one can expect a signiﬁcant exposure to foreign currencies, since the majority
of its customers are tourists from abroad.
For the three exposures estimated at the diﬀerent points in time described
above, I compute the weekly, hedged returns as shown in (61) over a time
horizon of two years, e.g.
Rh2008−2009 = R
u
2008−2009 − h ∗ X2008−2009 (67)
This leads to 104 observations, for which the variance, resp. the standard
deviations are computed and shown in the table below. I arbitrarily use
the hedge ratios {−1, 0, 1} and compare the standard deviations of Rh. One
can see that the lowest standard deviation always occurs when the 'correct'
hedge ratio has been used, i.e. the same as the realized exposure. In the
other cases, using a wrong hedge ratio even increases the variance compared
to the unhedged return. For example, in the years 2008 and 2009, when the
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unconditional estimation has shown a realized exposure of 1.04, an unhedged
position would have led to a standard deviation of 0.03673. Wrongly applying
a hedge ratio of -1 would have led to a higher standard deviation of 0.04035.
[please insert table 9 about here]
Volatility in the exposure, which causes diﬀerences in the applied hedge ratios
and the realized exposures, thus aﬀects the eﬀectiveness of the hedging and
a high volatility can even be counterproductive, meaning that the variance
of the hedged return turns out to be higher than it would have been without
any hedging, i.e. Var(Rh) > Var(Ru).
A possible measure for the eﬀectiveness of the hedging is to compute how
much variance has been removed by the hedge procedure. I thus deﬁne the
hedge eﬀectiveness as follows:
Hedge eﬀectiveness =
V ar(Ru)− V ar(Rh)
V ar(Ru)
(68)
A positive number means that the hedge successfully reduced the variance
of the returns compared to the unhedged ones. In the extreme case, a hedge
eﬀectiveness of 100% indicates that all variance has been removed and the
hedged returns are constant. 0% indicates a completely useless hedge and a
hedge eﬀectiveness below 0% reveals a counterproductive hedging.
I used the example of an investor, who would like to protect his investment
from currency movements, because it is comprehensible and this empirical
study is based on stock returns. The basic principle is a situation of future
foreign cash ﬂows, where there is not only uncertainty about the exchange
rate, but also about the amount of cash ﬂows. The exposure risk arises from
this twofold uncertainty and prevents perfect hedging.
The same concept can easily be transferred to other settings. One can imag-
ine for example a manager of a multinational company who would like to
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hedge dividend payments of the ﬁrm's European subsidiaries to its head-
quarter in Switzerland against exchange rate movements. Instead of just
naively hedging the amount of expected dividends (h = 1), the manager can
estimate the more sophisticated hedge ratio γˆt based historical data. How-
ever, as described above, the eﬀectiveness of this hedge will depend on the
volatility of the exchange rates and the exposure γˆt.
4 Data
The basic population for this study contains all ﬁrms listed in the Swiss Per-
formance Index (SPI) as per end of 201442. I exclude diﬀerent categories of
ﬁrms. First, banks and other ﬁnancial institutions are not considered, mainly
because the exchange rate exposure is part of their daily business and it is
expected that they manage those risks in a diﬀerent way than non-ﬁnancial
ﬁrms. This restriction is consistent with most other previous studies on the
exchange rate exposure. Second, ﬁrms with headquarters outside of Switzer-
land are excluded as well as ﬁrms which report their ﬁnancial statements in
a foreign currency. A necessary condition for a Swiss company to be allowed
to choose a functional currency other than the Swiss franc, is that sales and
costs must mainly be generated in that other currency. Third, ﬁrms with less
than ﬁve years of consecutive data of stock returns are excluded and lastly
some very illiquid ﬁrms are removed (as e.g. in Brunner et al. (2000))43. In
cases where the same company has two diﬀerent types of shares listed in the
stock exchange (e.g. Swatch transferable and personal share), only one type
of share is kept in the sample. Out of the 209 listed companies in the Swiss
Performance index as per December 2014, the sample used for this study
42The SPI R© contains over 200 stocks, which is the vast majority of all listed companies
at the SIX stock exchange in Switzerland and is considered to be Switzerland's overall
stock market index.
43More precisely, I exclude a ﬁrm if the average annual trading volume over the sample
period is less than 5% of the outstanding stocks.
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contains exactly 100 companies after all exclusions.44
I extract the market and ﬁrm-level data from Datastream. The market data
I use are the diﬀerent exchange rates and returns of the SPI. The ﬁrm-level
data I use are the stock returns (measured as total shareholder returns),
accounting measurements (net sales, EBIT, total assets), geographical in-
formation on sales and assets and the contract value of foreign exchange
derivatives. The geographical information allows to allocate the sales and
non-current assets of a whole ﬁrm to the regions in which the ﬁrm is active.
However, there are some measurement problems related to this information.
Before 2009, IAS 14 was the relevant accounting standard on segment re-
porting. It required ﬁrms to report details on business and geographical
segments. Sales and non-current assets had to be reported for both kind of
segments, but more detailed information, such as the operating result, had to
be disclosed only for the primary segment, but not for the secondary segment.
The operating result per region would have been an interesting information
source for this study but since only few ﬁrms use geographical segments as
primary segment, there is little data available on segment results.
The introduction of IFRS 8 for annual reporting periods beginning in 2009,
has led to some diﬀerences in the segment reporting. Since 2009, only one
reportable segment was required to be disclosed. If geography is not the
reportable segment, some geographical information has to be disclosed as
entity-wide information. In this case, ﬁrms need to disclose sales and non-
current assets of single countries, but not for a whole region. This can lead
to situations, where e.g. a ﬁrm ﬁrst included the sales in Switzerland in the
segment 'Europe', but since 2009 disclosed those sales separately.
Furthermore, the segments can change over time. For example, a ﬁrm might
have summarized the region Asia in the segment 'Rest of the world' for some
periods. But due to the strong growth in this region, the ﬁrm needed to cre-
44The large reduction of the sample size is mainly due to the numerous ﬁnancial insti-
tutions which have been excluded.
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ate a separate segment for this region later on. Lastly, ﬁrms applying Swiss
GAAP FER have less extensive disclosure requirements, e.g. they are not
required to report segment assets.45 Because of the variety of possible disclo-
sure on geographical information, the available date from Datastream had to
be manually assigned to the respective regions and in many cases has been
cross-validated with the annual reports to remove existing inconsistencies
and ensure the accuracy of the data.46
The sample period contains data from January 1999 until December 2014.
A longer period would lead to some conceptual problems, since the Euro was
introduced in 1999 and by using data before 1999 I would need to consider a
variety of diﬀerent European currencies. The exchange rate and stock returns
are measured as weekly, logarithmic returns. The interval of one week is a
compromise between the advantages of a longer period, which are less prone
to the daily, random ﬂuctuations in stock prices and the advantages of a
shorter interval, which provides more data. Previous literature has often
used monthly return data, see e.g. Allayannis et al. (2001) or the discussion
in Lewellen and Nagel (2006), but weekly data is as well a common interval,
e.g. as in Bartram and Karolyi (2006) or Dominguez and Tesar (2006).47
4.1 Sample description
Table 10 shows the descriptive statistics of the variables used for regression
models (1)-(3) and also for the determinants of the exchange rate exposure
used in (5) and (6). For the exchange rate returns, the stock and market
returns, 834 observations are available, which corresponds to weekly data
over 16 years. With respect to the EUR, one has to be aware that the
45FER 30.42 requires the disclosure of net sales per geographical market. FER 31.8
requires the reporting of sales and earnings per operating or geographical segment.
46For example, some ﬁrms report their segment revenues based on production site and
customer location separately. In this case, I ensured that always the sales based on cus-
tomer location was assigned to my data set.
47In section 6 it is shown that the choice of the interval does not change the results of
the study.
115
Swiss National Bank had introduced a minimum level of 1.20 CHF/EUR on
September 6, 2011 and has maintained that level until January 15, 2015.
The interval from September 2011 until December 2014 has therefore only
small ﬂuctuations and the observed exchange rate is not the one which would
have been observed in a free market without the intervention of the National
Bank. This has no negative impact on my investigation, however, one can
only state that during this period the stock return movements cannot have
been caused by exchange rate ﬂuctuations and due to the small variation
in exchange rates, one can hardly measure any correlation between those
variables.
[please insert table 10 about here]
The variable FSSwitzerland is the ratio of the sales in Switzerland to the total
sales of the ﬁrm in a year. The average company generates 25.5% of their
revenues in the domestic market, 43.1% in Europe, 15.6% in Northern Amer-
ica48 and 11.0% in Asia. The minimum level is zero for all currencies and
the maximum level ranges from 0.71 to 1.00, showing the large dispersion
of sales and that using the same currency index for all ﬁrms would not be
appropriate to measure the exchange rate exposure of Swiss ﬁrms.
The variable FXD shows the percentage of the contract value of outstanding
currency derivatives in terms of total assets. This proxy for ﬁnancial hedging
has been used amongst others by Allayannis et al. (2001). More than 25%
of the ﬁrms explicitly mention that they have no open currency derivatives
in the year of measurement. In terms of diversiﬁcation, the average ﬁrm has
signiﬁcant sales in more than 2 regions, mostly Switzerland, Europe and/or
the Americas. All variables, except of the raw exchange rates, are winsorized
at the one percent level to mitigate the eﬀect of outliers.49
48some ﬁrms report both Northern and Southern America in one segment. In that case
no separation was possible and the whole segment sales have been attributed to Northern
America, assuming that a large majority of the sales would have occurred in the USA.
49All regressions and analysis are also conducted with the original data. The results are
virtually the same. However, the R-squared are usually slightly higher with the winsorized
variables.
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The EBIT margin is additionally limited to zero to preclude some obvious
errors in the data.50 The logarithmic GDP growth rate is available on a
quarterly basis and the information is obtained from SECO (State secretariat
for economic aﬀairs). To align the data frequency, I measure the term spread
as well at a quarterly frequency, the source of this information is the SNB.
There are two observations with negative term spreads, which are supposed
to indicate a downturn in the economy, the ﬁrst one occurred in the second
quarter of 2001, and the second one in the fourth quarter of 2008.
A possible multicollinearity of the exchange rate returns could be a prob-
lem for the regression approach used in this study. In table 11 I thus show
the correlation coeﬃcients between the currencies used and also between the
market return for the weekly returns over the entire sample period. One
can see that there is a certain correlation between the returns of the EUR
and USD, resp. the HKD, but this will most likely not be an issue of multi-
collinearity in the study. However, the correlation coeﬃcient of 0.91 between
the USD and HKD is in my view considered as an issue and I therefore skip
the HKD when estimating the exchange rate exposure.51
[please insert table 11 about here]
I also investigate the correlation coeﬃcients between the variables for the
foreign sales and asset percentages, because one might expect that e.g. the
percentage of sales to the US is highly correlated with the assets of that
company in the US. But the coeﬃcients range from 0.47 (Asian sales and
assets) to 0.65 (Swiss sales and assets), the details are provided in appendix
B. Thus, I will include both variables, FS (foreign sales) and FA (foreign
assets), as regressors in the same regression. In the cases where I use the ﬁrm
50Not restricting the EBIT margin would lead to some important outliers (even after
winsorizing at the 1% percentile), since often the newly listed companies with few sales
still experience losses. All negative values are thus replaced by zero.
51Using HKD instead of USD leads to very similar results for the regression, which is
not surprising regarding the high correlation between those two currencies.
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speciﬁc index, I will again include the HKD, since multicollinearity would not
be a problem in that case.
4.2 Descriptive statistics on the estimated exposures
I brieﬂy present the summary statistics of the estimated exposures. Table 12
shows the average regression coeﬃcient per industry and per currency from
regression model 57, i.e. from the rolling regression approach.
[please insert table 12 about here]
Overall, there are no particular diﬀerences between the industries. Only
the telecommunication sector shows a more pronounced deviation from the
mean, since it is the only sector with a negative exposure to the EUR and
a positive one against the USD (together with the technology sector). But
this industry just contains one single ﬁrm in my sample and might thereby
not be representative for the whole sector, even if the very low exposures are
not surprising regarding that the telecommunication industry is a very local
business with few international activities. Other industries, which seem to
have low currency exposure, are e.g. the consumer goods and the utilities
sector, while technology or industrials ﬁrms have on average higher exposures.
5 Results
5.1 Results of the standard model
On the basis of models (54) and (55), I ﬁrst estimate the exchange rate
exposure with a pooled OLS regression over the entire sample period. The
results are reported in table 13. They show a signiﬁcant regression coeﬃcient
for the exchange rate movements of the EUR and USD, both in model (54)
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and in model (55), when taking into account the market return. For example,
a one percent increase in the exchange rate CHF/EUR is associated with an
.92% increase in the stock return when using model (54). When controlling
for the market, this coeﬃcient drops to .27%.
Interestingly, there is a negative regression coeﬃcient for the USD, meaning
that the average Swiss ﬁrm experiences positive stock returns when the CHF
appreciates against the USD, even when controlling for the market return.
However, in third column I regress the stock returns on XCHF/USD only
and one can see that the exposure is positive in this case. Otherwise the
coeﬃcients remain stable. For example, the estimate for the market return
is always between .69 and .73 and signiﬁcant at the 1%-level.
[please insert table 13 about here]
A glance at the coeﬃcient of determination shows that the exchange rate re-
turns can hardly explain the stock price movements of the companies. Adding
the market return to the regression improves the coeﬃcient of determination,
but the R2 remains at a low level of around 10%.
The fourth and eighth column uses the ﬁrm-speciﬁc exchange rate index
X index as independent variable. I ﬁnd a positive signiﬁcant exposure when
using model (1), but no signiﬁcant positive coeﬃcient when controlling for
the market return. This result suggests that a foreign exchange index might
not be able to identify signiﬁcant currency exposures in contrast to the single
currencies.
In a next step the regression models (54) and (55) will be conducted for
each ﬁrm separately. This ﬁrm-by-ﬁrm regression approach allows to get an
impression of how relevant the exchange rates are to the single companies and
for how many ﬁrms the stock returns are positively and negatively related to
e.g. an appreciating Swiss franc. I present the results in table 14.
One can see that the Euro plays an important role for Swiss ﬁrms. Around
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86% of the ﬁrms have a signiﬁcant exchange rate exposure to the Euro. When
controlling for the market return, this level shrinks to 24%. Most ﬁrms have
a positive exchange rate exposure to the Euro, i.e. a higher exchange rate
CHF/EUR is associated with positive stock returns. Yet, whereas in model
(54) almost all ﬁrms had a positive regression coeﬃcient for the EUR, in
model (55) just 82.0% of the coeﬃcients were positive. With the diﬀerent
interpretation of the coeﬃcients for model (54) and ((55) in mind, the expla-
nation for that diﬀerence is evident.
In model (55), γi,j measures only the residual exposure. Thus, ﬁrms who had
a low, but positive exposure in model (54) will exhibit a negative exposure
in model (55), because the market return itself is positively related to the
exchange rate returns. The exposure against the USD is again negative,
which conﬁrms the results of the pooled OLS regression. 66.0% of the ﬁrms
have a negative coeﬃcient, resp. even 80.0% when controlling for the market
return. In the case where the ﬁrm-individual exchange rate index is used
as independent variable, 57.0% of the ﬁrms show a signiﬁcant exposure in
model (54) and only 7.0% in model (55).
[please insert table 14 about here]
These results are similar to many other studies on the exchange rate exposure,
especially when the sample consists of ﬁrms in export-oriented countries like
Switzerland. Dominguez and Tesar (2006) as an example ﬁnd signiﬁcant
exchange rate exposure at a 5% level for up to 21.5% of the ﬁrms in export-
oriented countries like Netherlands or Japan using a trade-weighted index.
Similarly, Hutson and Stevenson (2010) ﬁnd signiﬁcant exposures for 7.8%
of Swiss ﬁrms.
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5.2 Results on the determinants and the time-variation
of the exchange rate exposure
In this section, I will use regression model (57) to estimate the currency
exposures by a rolling regression approach, where ﬁrm-by-ﬁrm regressions
are run over a time horizon of two years. The ﬁrst regression covers the
period 1999 to 2000 and contains 104 weekly observations. Then the interval
is shifted forward by one year after each regression, until the last interval,
where the sample period is 2013 to 2014. Thereby I obtain 15 diﬀerent
exchange rate exposure estimates γi for each ﬁrm j.
52 Table 15 shows the
results of these regressions to check the consistency of the outcome with the
results in the previous subsection.
[please insert table 15 about here]
As the previous results suggested, also on a ﬁrm-level basis the Euro plays an
important role for most companies. 39.7%, resp. 10.3% of the companies have
a signiﬁcant exposure against the EUR, the vast majority of coeﬃcients are
positive. Regarding the exposure towards the USD, again more companies
have a negative exposure. The overall mean of the exchange rate exposures
are found to be .3703 for the EUR (with a standard deviation of 1.0599),
resp. -.0904 (.4535) for the USD as one can see in table 12.
In order to get a better picture of the volatility of the exposure, I will analyze
the obtained exposure estimates on a ﬁrm-level basis. A ﬁrst impression on
the stability of the exposures against the EUR is given in ﬁgure 1, which
shows the development of the currency exposures over time per industry.53
One can see that for all industries the exposure has changed at least once
from positive to negative or vice versa during the sample period.
52For some ﬁrms, data is not available for the entire sample period from 1999 to 2014
and accordingly there will be less than 15 exchange rate exposures for some ﬁrms.
53Plotting the same graph using the exposures against the USD leads to similar patterns
with more industries having negative coeﬃcients.
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[please insert ﬁgure 1 about here]
For hedging purposes, it is especially harmful, if one assumes or estimates
a positive (negative) exchange rate exposure based on historical data, but
it turns out that the actual exposure for the relevant period is negative
(positive). In this case the hedging activities would be counterproductive,
as discussed in section 3.4. The constellation of changing signs appears in
my sample more frequently than expected. Using the estimated ﬁrm-level
exposures as shown in table 15 (model (55)), I obtain 376 changes in signs
for the exchange rate exposure against the EUR and 393 for the USD.54
For comparison, I also computed the number if sign changes for the regres-
sion coeﬃcient of the market return βj. This coeﬃcient is much more stable,
with only 66 changes in signs. On average a company experienced thus more
than three changes in signs of the exchange rate exposure both against the
EUR and the USD during the period from 2000 to 2014. These numbers
refer to all estimated coeﬃcients, not only the signiﬁcant ones. Accordingly,
some changes in signs might just occur because the exposure moves around
zero without any statistical signiﬁcance and one has to be careful when in-
terpreting these results.
If one only considers the signiﬁcant exposures, the number of changes in signs
is small. This is due to the low number of signiﬁcant exposures. For example,
I estimated 142 (146) signiﬁcant exposures against the EUR (USD). Among
these estimates, there have only been 12 (13) changes in sign. For a single
ﬁrm, it happens thus rarely that the exposure is both signiﬁcantly negative
and positive during the sample period. More often the coeﬃcient moves from
a signiﬁcant to a non-signiﬁcant exposure.
54For the EUR, out of the 336 sign changes 200 went from positive to negative and
176 from negative to positive. For the USD, out of the 393 sign changes, 199 went from
positive to negative and 197 from negative to positive.
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5.2.1 The time-variation of the exchange rate exposure
section 3.2 describes one way to more formally assess the volatility of the
estimated currency exposures. I will now estimate regression model (58) on
a ﬁrm-level basis and use a Wald test to determine whether the regression
coeﬃcient δi,j is signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from one. Rejecting the hypothesis
δi,j = 1 would suggest a considerable time-variation, i.e. that the exposure at
time t is signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from the one at time t− 1. As an alternative,
I test δi,j = 0 as well. Not rejecting δi,j = 0 would be even a stronger
evidence for time-varying exposure, though it is more diﬃcult to interpret,
since it is not a necessary condition for time-variation. Firms with low, but
statistically signiﬁcant regression coeﬃcient δˆi,j can still be prone to a time-
varying exposure.
I now use regression model (58), where I regress the exposure at time t on
the one at time t − 1. The results shown in table 16 indicate that there is
a signiﬁcant volatility in the exchange rate exposure for many ﬁrms. The
average regression coeﬃcient is .5048 for the EUR and .4676 for the USD,
which might suggests that the exposures at time t can at least partially be
explained by its estimate at t−1. Looking at the ﬁrm-level results and testing
for δi,j = 0, one can identify that in many cases the regression coeﬃcient δi,j
cannot be distinguished from zero. For the exposure against the EUR, 41
(59) out of the 100 ﬁrms show a p-value higher (lower) than .05. For those 41
ﬁrms, the exposure against the EUR (USD) at t− 1 provides no information
on the exposure at time t.
[please insert table 16 about here]
Testing whether δi,j = 1, the hypothesis is rejected for 67 (67) out of the
100 ﬁrms at a p-value of .1 when looking at the exposure against the EUR
(USD). Requiring a p-value below p = 0.01 makes it more diﬃcult to reject
the hypothesis δi,j = 1 and leads to a rejection of only 27, resp. 26 ﬁrms,
for which the exchange rate exposure in time t is signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from
123
the one at t− 1.55 The average R2 is .32 for the EUR and .29 for the USD,
but the coeﬃcients of determination are highly dispersed across ﬁrms with
values ranging from .00 up to .94.
Depending on the time horizon and especially on the regression interval that
have been employed when estimating the exposures, the results of regression
(58) will be diﬀerent. For highly overlapping estimation windows, the expo-
sures will not vary much from one period to another. Hence, in those cases
the autocorrelation is higher than it would be with non-overlapping intervals
and it becomes more diﬃcult to reject δi,j = 1. Section 6 will address this
sensitivity in more detail.
5.2.2 Firm-speciﬁc determinants of the exchange rate exposure
This section aims to explain whether the volatility in the exposure can be
explained by ﬁrm-level characteristics. For this purpose, I run regression
model (59) separately for both currencies and also for positive and negative
exposures.56 Regression (59) takes the estimated exposures from the pre-
vious step as dependent variable and ﬁrm-speciﬁc variables as independent
variables. A ﬁrm-level analysis is not appropriate anymore, since the deter-
minants can only be measured on a yearly basis, which gives not more than
15 observations per ﬁrm. Additionally, there is some missing information
due to diﬀerent disclosure requirements with respect to time or the applied
accounting standards. Hence, a pooled regression will be run for analyzing
the determinants.
The results in table 17 can give an insight how ﬁrms might manage their
exposure and which hedging activities are used by ﬁrms with high, resp.
low exchange rate exposure. While this second step regression analysis is
55There are no ﬁrms with an estimated regression coeﬃcient bigger than one for which
δi,j = 1 is rejected, meaning that all those 27, resp. 26 ﬁrms have a δi,j signiﬁcantly lower
than one.
56The reasoning behind that is the diﬀerent expectations for the signs of the coeﬃcients
as discussed in section 3.3.1
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common in many studies about the exchange rate exposure (Bartram and
Bodnar, 2007), one has to be careful with its interpretation. Since the esti-
mated coeﬃcient γˆi,j reﬂects only the post-hedging exposure, a low currency
exposure can result from both, a low operational exposure or a higher one,
which has been signiﬁcantly reduced by hedging activities (Bartram and Bod-
nar, 2007). Furthermore, due to the endogenous nature of the ﬁrm-speciﬁc
variables, the regression coeﬃcients show associations of those variables with
the exposure, but no causal claims can be made on how the ﬁrms react to
changes in their exposure.
[please insert table 17 about here]
Overall, there seems to be little evidence that hedging activities signiﬁcantly
reduce the exchange rate exposure. The only signiﬁcant coeﬃcient for the
positive exposures is the EBIT margin, indicating that ﬁrms with a high
positive currency exposure have on average a lower EBIT margin. The for-
eign sales show a positive coeﬃcient and the foreign assets show a negative
one, but the coeﬃcients are not statistically signiﬁcant. Similarly, the coef-
ﬁcients for the diversiﬁcation variable and the ﬁnancial hedging cannot be
distinguished from zero.
Regarding the negative exposures, the diversiﬁcation seems to provide some
protection from the exposure, i.e. a higher diversiﬁcation is associated with
an exposure closer to zero. The coeﬃcient of .1075 is signiﬁcant at the 5%-
level. The ratio of foreign sales shows a negative coeﬃcient. This is against
the prediction, since at any level of exposure, I expect that an increase in
foreign sales would be associated with an increase in the exposure.
The coeﬃcient for the currency derivatives is mostly negative, but never sig-
niﬁcant at a 5%-level. While the expectation is to have a negative coeﬃcient,
and some studies (e.g. Allayannis et al. (2001)) indeed ﬁnd evidence that ex-
change rate exposure decreases with the use of ﬁnancial derivatives, other
studies actually ﬁnd positive coeﬃcients (e.g. Pantzalis et al. (2001), and
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the authors' interpretation of this ﬁnding is that highly exposed ﬁrms might
choose to use more currency derivatives to mitigate their risk.).
An interesting ﬁnding is that the proportion of variance that can be explained
by the hedging activities is very low, the R2 being only between .026 and
.070. This means that a substantial part of the variance in the exchange rate
exposure cannot be explained by the model. Similarly, previous studies have
found a low explanatory power when investigating the determinants of the
exposures, mostly below 15% (see e.g. Doidge et al. (2006), Gao (2000) or
Hutson and Laing (2014)). This supports the view that the exchange rate
exposure moves randomly, because there are movements over time, but those
movements cannot be explained by changes in hedging activities.
5.2.3 Macroeconomic determinants of the exchange rate exposure
The next step will provide results on whether the volatility of the currency
exposures can be better explained by macro variables rather than ﬁrm char-
acteristics. The quarterly available data now allows to directly estimate this
relationship by using the mixed-eﬀects linear regression model (60). Firstly,
and closely related to Chaieb and Mazzotta (2013), I conﬁrm that the cur-
rency exposure is still signiﬁcant and time-varying despite of using another
model.
[please insert table 18 about here]
There is again a signiﬁcant positive exposure of the average ﬁrm against
the EUR and a signiﬁcant negative exposure against the USD. The signiﬁ-
cance of the interaction terms conﬁrms the time-variation of the exposure.
A constant exposure might lead to a signiﬁcant coeﬃcient γˆ0, but would not
show signiﬁcant interaction terms γˆ1 or γˆ2. Furthermore, the results not only
conﬁrm the volatility, but also suggest that the time-variation is driven by
macroeconomic variables. Against the EUR, both the GDP and TS have a
126
negative coeﬃcient. This implies that the ﬁrms are less sensitive to exchange
rate movement in times of economic prosperity, respectively a negative shock
in the time spread or GDP growth is associated with higher exposures in the
following quarter.
Taking the EUR and the term spread as an example, the economic interpre-
tation of the coeﬃcients is as follows: The unconditional exposure is 1.89 and
thus, a decrease of one standard deviation in the term spread is (using the
coeﬃcient γˆ1 of -1.05 and the standard deviation of the term spread (.7036))
associated with an increase in the exchange rate exposure from 1.89 to 2.63.
The results do not change signiﬁcantly if both currencies are used in the same
regression or if the exposures is estimated separately for each currency. The
ﬁndings are consistent with the general conclusion in Chaieb and Mazzotta
(2013), where the currency exposure tends to be higher during economic
contractions.
5.3 Hedging returns using the estimated exchange rate
exposure
The results so far suggest at least some volatility of the exposures. I will now
investigate the possible consequences of the time-variation in exchange rate
exposure. To do so, I estimate the yearly variances of the raw stock returns
for each ﬁrm and compare them to the variances one would get by hedging
the stock returns as suggested in (61).
Table 19 shows the results of this comparison. Each of the four large columns
contains the average variance of the unhedged positions Ru and the hedged
positions Rh. It as well presents the percentage of the variance, which has
been ﬁltered out by the hedging, i.e. a positive number indicates that the
hedging was able to reduce the variance of the returns compared to the
unhedged stock returns.
127
Ru is simply calculated as the yearly variance per ﬁrm of the weekly stock
returns. The table then shows the aggregated average variance. For example,
.00188 is the average variance of all years and all ﬁrms in the basic material
industry.57
[please insert table 19 about here]
The column Rh computes the variances of the hedged returns. More precisely,
I estimate the exposure over a certain time horizon, e.g. using the data from
1999 to 2000, and then use the estimated exposure γˆ2000 as hedge ratio for
computing the variances of hedged returns as in equation (61). For the ex
post hedging, the returns of the year 2000 are hedged by using γˆ2000. This
approach is equivalent to an in-sample-prediction, since I use all information
in a particular year to hedge the exposure in the same year. This is, of course,
not possible in the real world, but it can be seen as a benchmark solution.
Realistically one can only use the estimated exposure to hedge against future
exchange rate movements, which is simulated in the other large columns. In
these cases, the approach corresponds to an out-of-sample prediction. For
the same estimated exposure as before, i.e. γˆ2000, I now compute the hedged
variances of the stock returns in the year 2001 (one-year-ahead), 2002 (2-
years-ahead) and 2003 (three-years-ahead), respectively. A time horizon of
one year is realistic and commonly used in the literature and in practice. The
three year time horizon might seem too long, but it can help to understand
the consequences of trying to hedge time-varying exposures. Again, the vari-
ance is estimated per year and for each ﬁrm separately and the numbers in
table 11 show the average of all those variances.
Compared to the unhedged returns, the ex post hedging is able to reduce
the average yearly variance of the stock returns by 3.63%. This is logical,
57The reason why Ru is not identical in all four large columns is that the number of
years used to calculate Ru is not the same in each large column. For example, the ex post
hedging computes variances for the years 2000 to 2014, but for the 3-year-ahead hedging,
the data of Rh is only available from 2003-2014, and hence, I use this period to compute
Ru as well.
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since the in-sample-prediction produces the best results by construction. The
industry, where ex post least of the variance has been ﬁltered out, is the
consumer goods industry with a variance reduction of 2.41%, but the results
are similar across industries.
If there is no exposure risk at all, then the hedging would be equally suc-
cessful, no matter what time horizon is used. Regarding the results about
exposure volatility in the previous subsection, it is not surprising to see that
the hedging becomes less eﬀective the longer the forecasting horizon is. Even
when using the estimated exposures to hedge the stock returns just one year
ahead, the variance of these stock returns is higher by .30% compared to the
unhedged position, meaning that not hedging the stock returns would have
led to a smaller variance. An interval of three years shows an increase in
variance for all industries except utilities and technology.
The results suggest that there is a serious exposure risk which can lead to
wrong decision-making. Due to the time-varying nature of the currency ex-
posure, the estimates generated from past information should not carelessly
be used for hedging the exchange rate exposure. The longer the forecasting
horizon is, the greater is the risk of counterproductive hedging.
6 Robustness checks
In this section, the robustness of the empirical results will be addressed.
Overall the results do not alter substantively and are thus robust to diﬀerent
speciﬁcations.
6.1 Time horizon and intervals
For all analyses so far, the exchange rate exposures have been estimated over
a time horizon of two years with weekly data. The weekly data has been a
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compromise between the advantages of a longer period, which are less prone
to short term random ﬂuctuations in stock prices and the advantages of a
shorter interval, which provides more data. The time horizon of two years has
been chosen in order to obtain enough data without using too old data, which
might be irrelevant for estimating current exposure. I will now recompute
the results with diﬀerent time horizons, namely one, two and three years of
data for the weekly returns and three, four and ﬁve years for the monthly
data. Another choice in the empirical approach consists of the interval used
for the rolling regression. Throughout the paper, an interval of 12 months
has been used between two regressions. In this section I will also present the
results for an interval of 6 months.
The proportion of ﬁrms with signiﬁcant exposures against the EUR and the
USD at the 5%-signiﬁcance level has been 10.3%, resp. 10.6%. For all kind
of diﬀerent speciﬁcations with respect to time horizon, data frequency and
regression interval, this proportion remains between 9.2-10.9% for the EUR
and 9.9-11.2% for the USD. These narrow intervals show that the overall pro-
portion of ﬁrms with signiﬁcant currency exposures is robust to the diﬀerent
model speciﬁcations.
The volatility of the exposures does not signiﬁcantly depend on the time
horizon or the data frequency used, but it is comprehensible that the regres-
sion interval has some eﬀect on the results of the volatility as shown in the
table 20. A shorter intervals means a higher overlapping, especially when
longer time horizons are used. Hence, δEURi = 1 can be rejected only for 26
out of 100 ﬁrms when using a time horizon of three years and an interval of
six months, but for 88% of the ﬁrms when the time horizon and the regres-
sion interval is one year (in which case there is no overlap in the estimation
window).
[please insert table 20 about here]
Eventually, I assess whether the results on the hedging eﬀectiveness are ro-
bust to the modiﬁcations of time horizon, data frequency or regression inter-
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val. As table 21 shows, this can be generally conﬁrmed. Since the results do
not vary much for diﬀerent time horizons, only the results of the two year
time horizon (for weekly returns) and the four year time horizon (for monthly
returns) will be shown. The ex post ﬁltering reduces the variance at least by
3.18% and at most by 5.83%. No matter if the forecasting period is one, two
or three years, the variance of the hedged returns remains on average always
higher compared to the unhedged returns.
[please insert table 21 about here]
6.2 Control variables and lagged exposure
The market return is widely used as control variable when estimating ex-
change rate exposures and allows to control for diﬀerent kind of macroeco-
nomic or other market wide shocks. Some other studies instead, or addition-
ally, include factors of the Fama French asset pricing model, such as Makar
and Huﬀman (2013), where they incorporate the factors for the value (HML)
and size (SMB) premium in their model.
I run regression model (55) including the HML and SMB factors.58 The
coeﬃcients are close to zero for both factors (the size premium SMB being
signiﬁcant at 5% level though) and hardly contribute to the coeﬃcient of
determination in this case. The fact, that these results are virtually the same
as in the basic setting, indicate that the volatility of the exposure would not
be aﬀected by the incorporation of the Fama French factors neither.
I also include size as additional control variable in regression model (55),
as e.g. suggested in (Bodnar and Wong, 2003). The variable is created by
categorizing the total assets on the basis of deciles into a scale from 1 (small
58The data for value and size premiums have been downloaded from the homepage of
K. French (http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/). Since those data
are only available at a monthly frequency, the exchange rate exposure is estimated with
monthly returns in this case.
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companies) to 10 (large companies). The size coeﬃcient is signiﬁcant at the
one percent level, but the magnitude and signiﬁcance of the exposures against
the EUR and USD are not aﬀected.
Size might also be a relevant determinant of the exchange rate exposure,
since larger companies have generally more possibilities to operationally and
ﬁnancially hedge their exposure (see e.g. Bodnar and Wong (2003) or Hutson
and Stevenson (2010)). I thus include the size variable in regression (59), but
the results do not show any signiﬁcant diﬀerence between small and large
ﬁrms regarding their exposure. Again, the volatility of the exposure is not
aﬀected, because their estimation is based on ﬁrm-by-ﬁrm regressions and
including size as control variable in this case does not change the results,
since there is very low variation of size categories within ﬁrms.
It is possible that market ineﬃciency leads to a lagged eﬀect of exposure into
stock prices, see e.g. Doidge et al. (2006). I therefore examine regression
model (55) with the one week lagged exchange rate and market returns as
independent variables. The coeﬃcients for the exposure against the EUR,
USD and also the market returns are generally still signiﬁcant, but much
lower (just 6.5% signiﬁcant exposures against the EUR and 4.5% against
the USD compared to 10.3%, resp. 10.6% without the lagged variables). I
thus ﬁnd no evidence that lagged independent variables would be better in
explaining exchange rate exposures and its time-variation.
7 Conclusion
This study examines the time-variation of exchange rate exposures of Swiss
ﬁrms and how this volatility aﬀects hedge eﬀectiveness. While there exist a
wide range of studies about the currency exposure, few of them focus on the
time-variation of the exposure. This study explores this aspect and goes one
step further by investigating the consequences of a volatile exposure on the
hedge eﬀectiveness.
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First, I ﬁnd that Swiss ﬁrms are signiﬁcantly exposed to exchange rate move-
ments, especially to the Euro. 24% of the sample ﬁrms show a statistically
signiﬁcant sensitivity towards currency movements of the Euro and 26%
against the USD.
Second, I provide evidence that the exchange rate exposure is not constant
over time for most ﬁrms. For the majority of observations, the exchange rate
exposure at a point in time t is signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from the one at t− 1.
This is a ﬁrst key result, since most previous studies about the currency
exposure do not assess its volatility. One consequence of a time-varying
exposure is that it leads to diﬃculties when trying to hedge the exposure
based on the observation of historical data.
Third, I explore the hedging aspect in detail. I show that the hedge eﬀective-
ness is reduced due to the time-varying exposure. This can in some cases even
lead to an increased stock return variance for hedged positions compared to
unhedged ones. For example, estimating the currency exposure based on the
data of the two past years and using the regression coeﬃcient as hedge ratio
for the stock returns in the next 12 months, leads to a variance which is on
average 0.30% higher compared to the unhedged returns. An even longer
forecasting horizon than 12 months increases the risk of counterproductive
hedging.
I also have brieﬂy investigated whether the volatility of the currency expo-
sures can be explained by ﬁrm-speciﬁc determinants or by macroeconomic
variables. The former do only explain a small portion of the variance in
the exposures, while the latter seem to signiﬁcantly drive them. Further
analyzing how this patterns could be used to improve hedge eﬀectiveness
lies beyond the scope of this study, but would be a possible path for future
research. Beside of the hedging, a time-varying exchange rate exposure can
also be relevant in the contracting theory, which might be another interesting
aspect for further research.
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Appendix A: Deﬁnitions of the variables
Variable name: Abbr.: Deﬁnition:
FX return XCHF/EUR X
CHF/EUR
t = ln(
(CHF/EUR)t
(CHF/EUR)t−1)
)
FX return XCHF/USD equivalent to XCHF/EUR
FX return XCHF/HKD equivalent to XCHF/EUR
FX-index return Xindex Xindexi =
∑
j=EUR,USD,HKD
Net salesi,j
Net salesi
∗XCHF/j
Stock return Ri Ri,t = ln(
TRIi,t
TRIi,t−1
), where TRIi,t is the ﬁrm's
total return index obtained from Datastream
Market return RM RMt = ln(
SPIi,t
SPIi,t−1
)
Foreign sales FS FSj =
Net sales in region j
Total net sales
Foreign assets FA FAj =
Assets in region j
Total assets
FX derivatives DIV
contract value of outst. FX derivatives
Total assets
EBIT margin EBIT
EBIT
Total net sales
Diversiﬁcation DIV number of reported geographical segments
with at least 10% of net sales
GDP growth GDP ln(
GDPt
GDPt−1
)
Term spread TS Yield on 10yr Swiss confederation bond −
3 month LIBOR CHF
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Tables and ﬁgures
Table 9: Standard deviations of hedged returns
Hedge ratio
realized exposure γt h = 0 h = 1 h = −1
γ2012−2013 = −0.02 .01817 .01864 .01890
γ2008−2009 = +1.04 .03673 .03504 .04035
γ1999−2000 = −1.03 .02425 .02574 .02378
This table shows the standard errors of unhedged (h = 0) and hedged returns (h = 1
and h = −1) for the stock returns of the ﬁrm 'Jungfraubahn Holding AG'. The
returns are computed as Rht = R
u
t − h ∗XEURt .
The realized exposures γt are the estimates from the regression 57: Rj,t = αj,t +
n∑
i=1
γi,j,tXi,t + βj,tR
M
t + εj,t
Table 10: Descriptive statistics
N Mean Std dev. Min Max
XCHF/EUR 834 -.00036 .0069 -.026 .026
XCHF/USD 834 -.00041 .0139 -.035 .032
XCHF/HKD 834 -.00039 .0137 -.034 .033
stock return Ri 74763 .00069 .0475 -.391 .371
market return RM 834 .00052 .0217 -.067 .059
FSSwitzerland 1471 .2554 .3424 0 1.00
FSEurope 1471 .4319 .2401 0 .87
FSAmericas 1471 .1555 .1496 0 .71
FSAsia 1471 .1100 .1395 0 .74
FASwitzerland 1127 .2554 .3424 0 1.00
FAEurope 1127 .4359 .2401 0 1.00
FAAmericas 1127 .1201 .1374 0 .61
FAAsia 1127 .0596 .0839 0 .40
FXD 1021 .0563 .1017 0 .54
DIV 1474 2.4299 .8723 1.00 4.00
EBIT 1485 .0898 .0776 0 .34
GDP 63 .0050 .0061 -.0196 .02
TS 64 1.2160 .7036 -.3895 2.52
The table shows the number of observations (N), the mean value (Mean), the standard deviation (Std
dev.), the minimum value (Min) and the maximum value (Max) for each variable. The deﬁnition
of the variables is provided in appendix A. The sample period lasts from 1999 to 2014 and contains
weekly data for the return variables, yearly data for the ﬁrm-speciﬁc variables and quarterly data
for the macroeconomic variables. The sample comprises 100 ﬁrms from the SPI with overall 74'763
weekly return observations.
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Table 11: Correlation matrix
1. 2. 3. 4.
1. XCHF/EUR 1.0000
2. XCHF/USD .3434 1.0000
3. XCHF/HKD .3078 .9102 1.0000
4. RM .3216 .1855 .2014 1.0000
The table shows the correlation coeﬃcients among the exchange rate and the market return vari-
ables. The data is measured at a weekly frequency. Appendix 7 additionally shows the correlation
coeﬃcients for the ﬁrm-speciﬁc and macroeconomic variables.
Table 12: Descriptive statistics on the estimated exposures
N mean sd min max
γ̂EUR All industries 1376 .3703 1.0598 -7.89 6.83
Basic Materials 104 .4425 1.0062 -2.50 4.31
Industrials 644 .4032 1.0545 -3.96 6.83
Consumer Goods 183 .1561 .8909 -2.64 4.91
Health Care 191 .3575 1.2654 -7.89 4.40
Consumer Services 129 .3608 .8967 -2.86 3.33
Telecommunications 15 -.0441 .3428 -.47 .64
Utilities 34 .1947 .7816 -1.51 1.95
Technology 76 .7173 1.3137 -2.32 4.42
γ̂USD All industries 1376 -.0904 .4535 -3.87 4.51
Basic Materials 104 -.1869 .3530 -1.01 .76
Industrials 644 -.1421 .4456 -3.87 1.58
Consumer Goods 183 -.0054 .3940 -1.10 2.69
Health Care 191 -.0910 .6037 -2.59 4.51
Consumer Services 129 -.0907 .3910 -1.41 .94
Telecommunications 15 .1221 .2570 -.38 .69
Utilities 34 -.0361 .3532 -1.00 .78
Technology 76 .0359 .4208 -1.00 .93
The table shows the number of estimates (N), the mean (mean) and the standard deviation (sd) of
the estimates, as well as the minimum value (min) and the maximum value (max).
The regression model used to generate these estimates is model (55):
Rj,t = αj,t +
∑
i=EUR,USD
γi,j,tX
CHF/i + βj,tR
M + εj,t
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Table 14: Exposures resulting from ﬁrm-by-ﬁrm regressions
model (1) model (2)
γi,j > 0 γi,j < 0 % γi,j > 0 γi,j < 0 %
Panel A:
XCHF/EUR 99 1 82 18
thereof sign. at 5% 86 0 86.0% 22 2 24.0%
thereof sign. at 1% 68 0 68.0% 6 1 7.0%
XCHF/USD 34 66 20 80
thereof sign. at 5% 4 11 15.0% 2 24 26.0%
thereof sign. at 1% 2 4 6.0% 1 11 12.0%
RM 99 1
thereof sign. at 5% 97 0 97.0%
thereof sign. at 1% 93 0 93.0%
Panel B:
Xindex 90 5 50 45
thereof sign. at 5% 57 0 57.0% 3 4 7.0%
thereof sign. at 1% 43 0 43.0% 1 1 2.0%
RM 100 0
thereof sign. at 5% 97 0 97.0%
thereof sign. at 1% 94 0 94.0%
The column 'model (1)' estimates model 54: Rj = αj +
∑
i=EUR,USD
γi,jX
CHF/i + εj
The column 'model (2)' estimates model (55): Rj = αj +
∑
i=EUR,USD
γi,jX
CHF/i + βjR
M + εj
The regressions are run for each ﬁrm separately. Standard errors are corrected for heteroskedastic-
ity. The table shows the number of positive and negative regression coeﬃcients resulting from this
procedure. The third column shows the percentage of signiﬁcant regression coeﬃcients.
Panel A shows the results for the independent variables XCHF/EUR and XCHF/USD. Panel B
shows the results for the independent variable Xindex.
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Table 15: Exposures resulting from ﬁrm-by-ﬁrm rolling regressions
Model (1) Model (2)
γj > 0 γj < 0 % γj > 0 γj < 0 %
XCHF/EUR 1190 185 868 506
thereof sign. at 5% 540 6 39.7% 111 31 10.3%
thereof sign. at 1% 309 0 22.5% 42 7 3.6%
XCHF/USD 601 775 562 814
thereof sign. at 5% 95 151 17.9% 40 106 10.6%
thereof sign. at 1% 39 68 7.8% 15 43 4.2%
RM 1317 58
thereof sign. at 5% 943 2 68.7%
thereof sign. at 1% 808 0 58.7%
The column 'model (1)' estimates model 54: Rj,t = αj,t +
∑
i=EUR,USD
γi,j,tX
CHF/i + εj,t
The column 'model (2)' estimates model (55): Rj,t = αj,t+
∑
i=EUR,USD
γi,j,tX
CHF/i+βj,tR
M+εj,t
The regressions are run for each ﬁrm separately over a period of two years by a rolling regression
approach. The interval between the regressions is one year. Standard errors are corrected for het-
eroskedasticity.
The table shows the number of positive and negative regression coeﬃcients resulting from this pro-
cedure. The third column shows the percentage of signiﬁcant regression coeﬃcients.
Table 16: Results on the stability of the exposures
Firms with a p-value of lower than
δi,j = 1 δi,j = 0
Mean δi Mean R
2 .1 .05 .01 .1 .05 .01
γ̂EUR,t−1 .5048 .3167 67% 47% 27% 69% 59% 38%
γ̂USD,t−1 .4676 .2909 67% 51% 26% 62% 57% 32%
The regression model used is 58: γ̂i,j,t = δi,j γ̂i,j,t−1 + εi,j,t
The regressions are run for each ﬁrm separately. The dependent variable is the estimated exchange
rate exposure γi,j obtained from regression model 57, the independent variables is the dependent
variable lagged by one year. The sample contains 100 ﬁrms.
'Mean δi,j ' shows the average regression coeﬃcient over the entire sample, 'Mean R
2' the average
R-squared value, the rejection rates show the percentage of ﬁrms for which the hypothesis δi,j = 1,
resp. δi,j = 0 has been rejected using a Wald test.
Standard errors are corrected for heteroskedasticity.
140
Table 17: Determinants of the exchange rate exposure
CHF/EUR CHF/USD
Coeﬀ. sd t-stats Coeﬀ. sd t-stats
γˆi,j > 0:
FS .5029 .3012 (1.67) .2566 .2176 (1.18)
FA -.4108 .2420 (-1.70) -.2199 .1953 (-1.13)
DIV .0003 .0602 (.01) -.0122 .0245 (-.50)
EBIT -2.8702** .7754 (-3.70) -.9564** .3207 (-2.98)
FXD .5879 .5583 (1.05) -.0658 .1358 (-.48)
Intercept 1.0626** .1729 (6.14) .3899** .0894 (4.36)
N 449 270
R2 .0704 .0612
γˆi,j < 0:
FS -.5642* .2393 (-2.36) -.0531 .1444 (-.37)
FA .3990 .2081 (1.92) .2650 .1839 (1.44)
DIV .1075* .0506 (2.12) -.0260 .0244 (-1.06)
EBIT 1.3396 .8181 (1.64) .3804 .2312 (1.65)
FXD -.0382 .4716 (-.08) -.3321 .2175 (-1.53)
Intercept -.8568** .1989 (-4.31) -.3239** .0789 (-4.11)
N 275 454
R2 .0480 .0259
The regression model used is (59): γ̂i,j = αi,j+δ0,i,jFS i,j+δ1,i,jDIV j+δ2,i,jEBIT j+δ3,i,jFAi,j+
δ4,i,jFXDj + εi,j
The dependent variable is the estimated exchange rate exposure γˆi,j obtained from regression model
(57), the independent variables are described in appendix A.
The table shows the estimated regression coeﬃcient (Coeﬀ.), the standard deviation (sd) and the
t-values (t-stats).
Standard errors are clustered by ﬁrm to control for heteroskedasticity and to allow for serial corre-
lation within a ﬁrm's observations.
* and ** denote statistical signiﬁcance at the 5% and 1% level, respectively (two-tailed test).
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Table 18: Macroeconomic determinants of exchange rate exposure
γ0 γGDP∗XR γTS∗XR
γˆ0 t-stats γˆ1 t-stats γˆ2 t-stats
XEUR 1.89** 6.05 -81.78** -3.84 -1.05** -5.76
XCHF/USD -.51** -4.50 39.21** 4.55 .10 1.52
RM 1.06** 13.59 3.15 .64 .15** 3.18
XCHF/EUR 1.20** 4.35 -17.51 -.90 -.86** -5.23
RM 1.07** 13.39 -6.96 -1.37 .18** 3.86
XCHF/USD -.18* -1.81 16.93* 2.21 -.02 -.40
RM 1.30** 16.55 -16.64** -4.13 .02 .44
The regression model used is (6): Rj,t = αj,t + γ0R
M
t + γ
EUR
0 XEUR,t + γ
USD
0 XUSD,t +
K∑
k=1
(γEURk +
γEURk,j )IV k,t−1XEUR,t +
K∑
k=1
(γUSDk + γ
USD
k,j )IV k,t−1XUSD,t +
K∑
k=1
(βk + βk,j)IV k,t−1RMt + εj,t
The dependent variable is the estimated exchange rate exposure γˆi,j obtained from regression model
(57). The independent instrument variables (IV) are GDP and TS as described in appendix A.
The table shows the estimated regression coeﬃcient (γ), the t-values (t-stats).
Standard errors are clustered by ﬁrm to control for heteroskedasticity and to allow for serial corre-
lation within a ﬁrm's observations.
* and ** denote statistical signiﬁcance at the 5% and 1% level, respectively (two-tailed test).
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Table 19: Comparison of unhedged and hedged stock return variances
ex post 1-year-ahead
N Ru Rh % Ru Rh %
all industries 100 .00231 .00222 3.63% .00227 .00227 -.30%
Basic Materials 7 .00188 .00179 5.16% .00196 .00195 .56%
Industrials 46 .00221 .00213 3.96% .00218 .00215 1.01%
Cons. Goods 13 .00187 .00183 2.41% .00181 .00183 -1.09%
Health Care 15 .00306 .00297 2.94% .00308 .00318 -3.20%
Cons. Services 9 .00186 .00179 3.69% .00184 .00187 -1.54%
Telecomm. 1 .00055 .00053 3.42% .00046 .00048 -4.64%
Utilities 3 .00196 .00188 4.08% .00171 .00167 2.34%
Technology 6 .00372 .00353 5.06% .00348 .00346 .55%
2-year-ahead 3-year-ahead
all industries 100 .00217 .00223 -2.57% .00204 .00209 -2.37%
Basic Materials 7 .00196 .00200 -1.84% .00192 .00198 -3.20%
Industrials 46 .00203 .00206 -1.40% .00189 .00193 -2.24%
Cons. Goods 13 .00177 .00180 -1.44% .00169 .00174 -3.50%
Health Care 15 .00316 .00345 -9.03% .00303 .00315 -3.80%
Cons. Services 9 .00172 .00171 .30% .00161 .00170 -5.65%
Telecommun. 1 .00041 .00041 -1.85% .00039 .00041 -4.17%
Utilities 3 .00177 .00184 -3.84% .00192 .00172 10.13%
Technology 6 .00307 .00295 4.07% .00266 .00261 1.80%
This table compares the variances of the undhedged returns (Ru) and the hedged returns (Rh).
The column (%) shows the hedge eﬀectiveness (
V ar(Ru)− V ar(Rh)
V ar(Ru)
). The column (N) shows the
number of ﬁrms per industry.
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Table 20: Exposure volatility for diﬀerent time horizons and intervals
δi,j = 1 δi,j = 0
DF TH RI γEUR γUSD γEUR γUSD
W 1 yr 6m 80 83 63 65
W 2 yrs 6m 33 37 97 93
W 3 yrs 6m 26 22 94 96
W 1 yr 12m 88 90 10 12
W 2 yrs 12m 47 44 55 52
W 3 yrs 12m 34 22 77 73
M 3 yrs 6m 44 23 90 90
M 4 yrs 6m 30 18 91 96
M 5 yrs 6m 22 15 91 96
M 3 yrs 12m 33 23 58 70
M 4 yrs 12m 35 23 69 77
M 5 yrs 12m 27 19 72 78
DF = data frequency, W = weekly, M = monthly, TH = time horizon, RI = Regression interval,
6m = 6 months, 12m = 12 months.
The regression model used is 58: γ̂i,j,t = δi,j γ̂i,j,t−1 + εi,j,t
The regressions are run for each ﬁrm separately. The dependent variable is the estimated exchange
rate exposure γi,j obtained from regression model 57, the independent variables is the dependent
variable lagged by one year. The sample contains 100 ﬁrms.
The numbers in the table show the percentage of ﬁrms for which the hypothesis δi,j = 1, resp.
δi,j = 0 has been rejected using a Wald test with a signiﬁcance level of 5%.
Table 21: Stock return variances for diﬀerent regression intervals
ex post 1-year-ahead
Ru Rh % Ru Rh %
weekly returns:
6 month .00214 .00208 3.18% .00203 .00204 -.20%
12 months .00231 .00222 3.63% .00227 .00227 -.30%
monthly returns:
6 month .01029 .00971 5.63% .00973 .00988 -1.53%
12 months .01030 .00970 5.83% .00973 .00976 -.36%
2-year-ahead 3-year-ahead
weekly returns:
6 month .00196 .00204 -4.20% .00201 .00204 -1.10%
12 months .00217 .00223 -2.57% .00204 .00209 -2.37%
monthly returns:
6 month .00977 .01020 -4.42% .00961 .01000 -4.05%
12 months .00977 .01015 -3.89% .00961 .00100 -3.99%
The time horizon used is two years for the weekly data and four years for the monthly data. All
variances are computed as in table 19.
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Figure 1: Average exposures against the EUR per industry
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